104 10088 10070

104-10088-10070 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PEBORAT

SECRET ( REPRODUCTION CLANDESTINE SE INSTRUCTION NO. 10.5 CSI NO. 10-5 SECURITY Revised 17 July 1958

COVERT APPROVALS AND RELATED MATTERS : Reference: CSI-F No. 10-5, 17 July 1958

Rescission: CSI No. 10-5, 31 January 1955

CONTENTS

ة الدانة PURPOSE GENERAL. INVESTIGATIONS. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY Page 1 1 2 2

APPROVALS.3 COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED- STATES OFFICIALS SERVANTS OF AGENCO EMPLOYEES... 1. PURPOSE Page EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES..... 5 NOTIFICATION OF TERMINA- TION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY AP- PROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS.... SPECIAL SERVICES DOUBLE AGENTS. DEFECTION AND RECRUIT- REPROD MENT IN PLACE.. نستان سال زرد

This instruction describes the functions of headquarters components with regard to covert approvals and related matters which are the subject of CSI-F No. 10-5, 2. GENERAL

5 6 6 6 a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is delegated authority to act for the Deputy Director (Plans) in the exercise of all functions which are the lat- ter's responsibility with regard to the granting of Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

b. The Director of Security has designated the Deputy Director for Investiga- tions and Operational Support, Office of Security, to represent him in dis- charging the functions which are reserved to him with regard to the granting of Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Proprietary Approvais.

c. it is the basic intent of both components that sensitive operational data shall remain within the custody and knowledge of the Clandestine Services, and that sensitive security investigative data shall remain in the custody. and knowledge of the Office of Security. It is recognized, however, that such data may be necessary for proper performance by either component and, consequently, where necessary, it shall be made available or shall be discussed to the extent necessary. REPRODUCTION PRURIENTED 0004134

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5 SECRET CSI NO. 10-5 SECURITY ✓ Revised 17 July 1958

1. INVESTIGATIONS

The function of performing all investigations in the United States in connec- tion with approval matters, except for the check of certain Agency records, is reserved to the Office of Security 4. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS

a. The assembly and analysis of all file material (including the files of the Records Integration Division) in the Clandestine Services will be accom- plished by professional personnel of the interested operating divisions under the technical supervision of the Counter Intelligence Staff and sub- ject to spot check by the Counter Intelligence Staff. Certification will be made in each case by a responsible official of the requesting division that the material furnished is complete and accurate.

b. The requesting division will assemble any biographical data; information of investigative or security significance (such as additional names the subject may have used); information relating to character, reputation,... politics, or other activities, favorable and unfavorable information or comments; background Information: PRQ Parps equivalent (in du- plicate); and freld traces. Any informaton previously furnished by the subject concerning himself (suchas personalhistory statement, records of activities or employments, ments, memberships in organizations, etc.) will be furnished verbation perfinent Information thus produced--includ- ing that resulting from technical interrogations, personal observation, field investigations, etc.--will be furnished to the Counter Intelligence Staff for necessary transmission to the Office of Security. It is also nec- essary to forward PRQ Part to the Counter Intelligence Staff before an Operational Approval will be issued. The Counter Intelligence Staif will not forward PRQ Part II to the Office of Security. In rare, compli- cated, or sensitive cases the Office of Security, in coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff, may wish actually to review the material of the Records Integration Division. A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of the proposed usage of the subject will be furnished to the Office of Security along with the other data.

c. The requester should also furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff for transmission to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the in- vestigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

d. Following appropriate investigation and analysis of a case, the Office of Security will forward its recommendation to the Counter Intelligence Staff, with the investigative data enclosed. Upon receipt of this material 2 SECRET REPROTHOM PROHIBITED : 0004135 D D F

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5 SECRET REPDADITION CSI NO. 10-5 SECURITY Revised 17 July 1958 .: the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Of- fice of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Secu- rity recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff with motify the Office of Security whenever it has: (1) Granted an Operation : REP AST or a Provisional Operational Approval. (2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.

e. In Operational Approval case the Office of Security will forward investi- gative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Secu- rity will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.

f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circum- stances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Pro- visional Operational Approval.

g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Oper- ational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security. 5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

a. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or secu- rity significance; information-relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavor- able information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security la its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Late- gration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also REPRODUCTION 1 0004136

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5 SECRET REPDADITION PROPILULD CSI NO. 10-5 SECURITY Revised 17 July 1958

be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The re- quester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (1. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the Investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, not, why this is not feasible.

b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the ✓ Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those in- stances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will re- view that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the repre- sentatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals. "c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative flew in Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will: Approyancases, D Covert Security (1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant infor- mation in cases where provals are granted. In ert Security Approvals of Proprietary Ap- (2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.

d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the re- quester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Se- curity Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Of- fice of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position..

e.. A. Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval. 4 SECRET REPRODICTION PROHIBITED i : 0004137

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5 SECRET REPRODUCTION ED : CSÍ NO. 10-5 SECURITY 09 September 1963

f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or dis- closed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior ap- proval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States cit- izens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dis- patch or cable involved.

1. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

Requests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with S officials, wheth- er such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a re- quest for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison, The request shall be accom- panied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum bio- graphic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.

1. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES 11 Requests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel em- ployed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations. .8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Proper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous em- ployees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termi- nation of use, CI/ Lialson will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.

1. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES

Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees REPRODUCTION MET PROHIBITED icials of foreign 0004138

14-00000 : SECRET *: CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5 REFT CSI NO. 10-5 SECURITY 19 September 1963

intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a state - ment as to the service which the subject represents.

1. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

The Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the dis- continuance of interest in or termination of employmentor use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval Approval has been re- quested or granted. 11. SPECIAL SERVICES

DDDD coprietary a. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff, Each re- quest shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact ac- tion required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.

b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or com- mercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.

1. DOUBLE AGENTS

The operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.

1. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE

No attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate. D D D Di Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plas FROMIBUTED 5 SEC.CET 0001130

14-00000 DDO INSTRUCTION NO. 50-10 SECRET REPRODUCTION C PROIN YED DOI 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 4 September 1973 RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970 1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In gen- eral, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following: (1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of in- dividuals.

ecia (2) The Agency has entered into a restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals do (3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation. 2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently per- tain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where ap- propriate, reference has been made to another publication, which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5. SECRET PANIED E-2 IMPDET 0004140

14-00000 D SECRET REPPOTION DDO INSTRUCTION NO. 50-10 3. DEFINITIONS C DOI 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 4 September 1973

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operationał use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances. which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a deter- mination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable as- surance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. Operational Use Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or train- ing of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Direc- torate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that in- dividual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs serviees, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an ele- ment of the Operations Directorate.

b. DDO Element Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mech- anisms.

c. Operational Contact Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

1. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction: (1) Operational Use is Prohibited (see paragraph 5): (a) Members and trainees of ACTION; 99 (b) Fulbright grantees; 99 2 SECRET REPRODUCTION D 0004141

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C DDO INSTRUCTION NO. 50-10 SECRET REPROPNICTION DOI 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 4 September 1973 (c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom; 22 (d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and 99 Carnegie Foundations; (e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies. 399 (2) Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO, (a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies; (b) DDO agents or assets in the United States; (c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies; (d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, 99 the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand; (e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands; (f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries. (3) Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO (see para- graph 7(اجو (a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public infor- mation media, (b) CARE employees; (c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities; (d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States; .: (e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned; (f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies; (g) Officials of the Vatican State; (h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees; (i). Members of educational or private voluntary organizations; (j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute; (k) Volunteers to America. J (4) Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division (see paragraph 8): (a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas; (b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations or- ganizations not assigned in the U.S.; (c) Members of the academic community. b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case. PEPECRET PLANNED 99 0004142 Rs

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DDO INSTRUCTION ΝΟ. 50-10 SECRET REPRODUCTION Ple 5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED HIBITED a. Members and Trainees of ACTION C DOI 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 4 September 1973 99 (1) It is Agency policy that members and/trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of AC-99 TION will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)99 99 (2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be em- ployed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following: 99 (a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION. 99 (b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of 99 ACTION but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION 99 ११ (c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. (3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty for training over- seas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former 99 members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION 25 service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior ap- proval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained. The Deputy Director 99 (4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use : is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION ACTION بوع (5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former SACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct brief- ing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of 99 ACTION is subject to the following: (a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained. 4 SECRET " 0004143 (23/RS

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SECRET REPRODUCTION DOI 50-10 DDO INSTRUCTION NO. 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 99 4 September 1973 (b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION or a former ৭৭ trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training over- seas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from SACTION 99 Σε If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose 99 ACTION service included duty for training overseas should be un- avoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoid- able contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division. 99 b. Fulbright Grantees 99 DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving 99 U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and. Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, 9 commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibi- tion are areſteachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including stu-99 dent artists and student musicians who have been selected to receive 99 scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the 99 Seducational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other, categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, 99 specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholar- 99 ships (see 7.j., below). 99 c. Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover ca- pacities must be limited to their cover assignments. d. Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundatiors ११ DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Founda 29 tion, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation for of other persons actively participating in programs, which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organiza tions. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational con tacts or consultations with such individuals. REP 5 SECRET PROCED 0004144 ३५ eps

14-00000 SECRET 1: REPRODUCTION DDO INSTRUCTION NO. 50-10 DOI 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 99 4 September 1973 e. Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or controlled private 99 detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial Tor credit investigations. 99 399 6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED a. Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies encies will will be granted only in cases where the the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5. : 99 b. DDO Agents or Assets in the United States 99 In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to [the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the 99 United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff. (1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United 99 States require the prior concurrence of the FBI In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or pro-99 cedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the ac- ceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions. (2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruit- 29 ment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI. (3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior noti- fication be provided to the FBI 29 (4) Whenever domestic DDO Coperations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be C SECRET TON PROLO 0004145 16 R

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DDO INSTRUCTION NO. 50-10 SECRET : REPRODUTION 99 انان DOI 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 4 September 1973 provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO per- ε sonnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes. c. Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other 9 U.S. Agencies 99 The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at head- quarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies Ca centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence] A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional, duplicate operational use of such agents and_human sources It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational pur- poses by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the Lagency having primacy of interest! If a DDO element desires to arrange the 99 Etransfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will con- tact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter. d. Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the 99 United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand 95 99 (1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (includ- ing the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such ११ countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division 99 (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens (2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above. named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above. 29 (3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by CRET SECRET the Director. 0004146 Mes

14-00000 DDO INSTRUCTIONATIO ΝΟ. 50-10 SECRET PROMOTION 99 DOI 50-10: OPERATIONS-GENERAL 4 September 1973 e. Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The 99 Maximax Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval only, siamen of the national intelligence service concerned These countries are par- ticularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens 29 who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their inyolving the proposed operational use of a citizen Jof one of these countries will will be reviewed by the Chief of the the European 93 only flags Each case Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service, concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European] Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When