104 10169 10139

14-00000 104-10169-10139 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

: ΒΕΡΑΛΑΤΕ COVER ATTACT TO 200-1400431 Jamary 1968 C DENTITY & La Mr. Jease Brem, & security officer Free Headquarters. INDAL

14-00000 : CONF ANTIAL ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET UNCLASSIFID NAL ONLY SULECT:

WOM ; 10 1. 1. 9. 10. SE/DCOP Burop "43세의 ACSREI/P DE/SR 11. CSR/CI 12. 13. 14. BAN FORWARDED EGOT-14004 31 Jau 62 OMCER'S COMMENTS com. INSTIALS 3ニュ - 1/10 Flessenile load 2/65/15803 Vist 2 Pedro BENTHAM The statem about Berlin true? و 5-6: stre mot, and 2 Lave so informed Q. sad: Infeest right appreciate a wond possibly to the effent that we RYBAT: you, স dong a good jot but an even m ingprased by the Letoile. 15. PORM 019" UNCLASSIFIED В. А ФОТЕХЛЫENT PROITING OFFICE 1900-1 BORTIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY i

14-00000 CONF ANTIAL XSECRET UNCLASSIFIED RNAL ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBIECT:samut FROIL 10 DATE EGOT-1400K 3. Jau 62 1, 8. 7. 10. 40182 SR/reop 이즈미의 ACSRET/P DESR ۱۱. eselez 12. 13. 14. COMMENTS Merchant to show how whow Drowe tee DATE OFFICER'S INITIALS SEEMED FORWARDED 3ニュッ 14 20 lease note lost 2/65/15 15 mand Prom the statement about Berliin true? 5-6: stis mit, and d Lave so informed Q, sad: I suggest cos might ajgiraciste a word foran you, possibly to the effect that we won dong a good job bat ne vi ingprassed Sly the detaine. RETURN TO CI Background Use Do Not Reprod 15. FORM 610 UMHOUS FDITIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED V. A, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987

14-00000 A EGOT-1400م HEADGAJANTERS FILE NO DISPATCH RYBAT SECRET TO Chief, E (ATIN: Matthew L. CARSON) Chief, SH (ATTN: Therman O. CUSICK) Chief, E (ATTN: Leopard P. SACKET) FROM CATE Chief of Station, Germany SULECT ADMINISTRATIVE Handling of a Soviet Defector ACTION REQUIRED See below. REFERENCERS 31 Jamary 1962 RE 43-3 CHECKY ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEUNG REQUIRED INDEUNG CAN BE JUDGED BY QUAIRED HO. DESK ONLY 1. I suggest that the story of ABLADLE, from the moment he walked into the home of Martin A. HOODINE until he was safely under alihaka custody in the United States, deserves compiling, analysis, and publication in the form of an Opera- tional Aid. It richly illustrates the many problems nich must and can be sur- mounted, and could be highly instructive to Chiefs of Station in all countries where the next Soviet defcator aight appear. 2. Here is the Frankfurt contribution (written at my request) to such a compilation: a eliffhanger from start to finien, but also acumentary on the many types of problems which can arise, and the foot tint it takes hard work and skillful improvisation to solve them. it was a cliffhanger both before and after the Frankfurt chapter (1 nominate HOUDING for a modal for his part) and ought to nake excellent reading. 02 3. The handling of defectors obviously is not a new responsibility to the German Station. The (ChicZONE facility which existe primarily for the receipt, establishcent of bona fides, debriefing, and resettlesont of defectors bas existed here for the last decade. Hor in the movement by black evacuation-of-operational personnel a unique task for us to perform. We have acumplished this many times by use of our o integrated DUNIT facility and also by the furnioning of alias documentation to the person of interest and accomplishing the transport via scheduled NATS flights. The significant points which made the ARLADLE case unique may never again in their entirety be duplicated but in part they amy well be, and therefore should be enumerated: a. A Soviet diplomat, and noæber of the HIS, stationed in a non- Satellite but politically sensitive country, which at the time of AELADIE' dofection was under considerable Soviet pressure. b. The fact that the actual crownteres concerning his ant of defection were such that an immediate decision by then on the scene had to be made to take advantage of the opportunity. c. The fact that little alternative could be given, under the facts as described in (a) above, except to believe the defector's statements and coquiesce in his demands, i.e., he possessed information of a significant and perishable nature and would disclose it completely only upon arrival in the United States. d. The fact that once the commitments in (c) above were made every reasonable effort had to be made to accommodate the defector's demand. ٠ In order to accomplish all this an untried method of evacuation, 1.e., black ovaouation via commercial aircraft had to be accomplished in order to successfully proceed with the undertaking. 4. A retrospective analysis as to how this case commenced, and the unique factors connected with it as enumeratai above, lead me to suggest for Headquarters study what I refer to as "findings" and "areas of study," that I have labeled as "rindings in effect represent facts which, if not present, quite probably would have deprived us in Germany of participating successfully in the movement of the ARIADIS family. The "areas of study," on the other hand, represent either answer- able questions or matters in areas wheroin operational discussions may well take place to noo if some type of school-book solution can be devised. 5. I will elaborate bolow, where appropriate, on some of these "findings" but will first record thems COPY ROUTING n 12 autr Anly. 19

14-00000 CASCA CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH 38 ChBT SYBAT Бл-10, Al January 192 8. Tra isdom fintaining in the European area at least one field installation having assigned to it personnel representing the sany competencies necessary in the intelligence was taking as been recufirmed. २. The «iscon of ottaining appropriate security clearances, and having Stations brief and wase sitting of at least an Ais contact, the resident senior United States citizen porspanel of United States flag air carriers operating itain any Station's area. c. The fallacy of depending on marginal or obsolescent equipment to accomplish sensitive tasks of nign priority. we here refer to 17-year C-24 17 craft, d. A realization that a ratio exists between the number of people unde avere of a given undertaking in rolation to the obstacles encountered in success- fully accomp.laning tat undertaking. 6. A few words of elaboration are in order on the four prancasing points. Because the initial endeavor at clack evacuation by Klinik aircraft aborted, wo vere given an opportunity to see with great clarity the application of these points. If the attempt to evacuate by Al-assigned aircraft had been successful, then knowledge of the defection could nave been held to approximately als staff and assigned military personnel. Because that endeavor was unsuccessful, at least nine additimal staff and a:litary personnel.. bocamo-generally or specifically aware of the atter, plus the Consul General and one of his senior officers. Additionally one private United States citizen, the senior Pan American official in Frankfurt, became very much. asare of this sensitive case. This increase in the number of individuale came about because of an immediate noed late in the evening of Saturday, 16 December, to vee two to scatters to assist in the safenousing function, a total of six NATOPAZ staffers (documentation, graphics, photographie) to prepare and issue frawulent and alles passpurts, and an assigned enlisted man to act as a safehouse guard. The Consulate Jeneral and to affix visas to the fraudulent passports. The most erucial individual involved, however, was the Pan American official wro to a certain degree put his position in Jeopardy by being as cooperative on the actter na. he was without previously having clearod and briefed this official, (His counter- part in Tha is also so cleared and briefed) the sole undertaking would have been precluded. It would have been impossible to accomplish departure without documenta- tion on a commercial aircraft without the connivance of the commercial airline involved. Indeed with auan cunnivance it was difficult and risky onough. Finally, the point canoerning cbsolescent equipment speaks for itself. licadquarters is fully aware of the feelings of this Station concerning the inadequacy for our purposes of assigned aircraft. Suffice it to say that when defectors apparently of signifi- cant value refuse te ride such aircraft atter merita thorough ום 7. The atter of "areas of stwiy" appears to us to encompass at least the fellering a. Average time differences in transmitting high precedence electrical gommieations betreen and and representative groupies of station. The German Station is extremely fortunate in naving Kw-20 circuite with 100 quarters. It affords us a facility for instantaneous commealcation. se oan make certain rough estimates as to how long it might take appropriate Head- quarters officiala to answer our queries and we can then approxlants the arrival time of answers to high precedence traffic. Other Statiune, however, do not have KW-26 equipment, all do not have the same type of cryptological equipment, and there is a different pattern as to the type of circuitry, 1.0.. direat leased lines, tux, straight somercial servics, etc. Va believe there le merit in the appropriate Headquarters unit chloavoring to group geograph- Joally Statione and then based on the type of cxminluations and cryptologioni equipment and the channel of transmission to come up with predictions auto the average length of time the transmission of a priority or operational lamediato cable would take between and among the various representative groupings. In the case under study, watch represented a rather fast-breaking eltuation, it was not possible for is to calimate the fencin of time it took to transmit an operatiual inmediate cable hetesen Stodanora and Frankfurt. Σε πολλά λανe been of value to ve to have had come as this siter. b. Coordination between 0.8. Air Attauhon and Cus. he believe it would be worthwhile to request each Chief of Station in a location whore the Air FORM USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS SECRET PAGE NO.

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH CLASSIFICATION SECRET MYBAT MAICHS-B100 BOOT-14004, 31 January 1962 Force or liavy has an assigned attache plans to establish procedures whereby the Air or Naval Attache will advise COS of any absence of the attache plane, the point of designation of the aircraft, and the duration of the absence. There have been previous defections where attache planes were used the initial vehicle of black evacuation. In the evacuation plan of Stockholm for ABLADLE they informed us by cable that they proposed to won the attache plane. We ar of the opinion that when the statement was ande Stockhorn made the assumption the plane was immediately available. As was later discovered by us the particular plane in question was at biesbaden and not stimola. This, however, was some six hours after Steinstated its intent to use that aircraft. hile in this particular case matters eventually worked out successfully the story might be otherwise in a different set of facts. e. Priority furishing of traces. When a Station is alerted to a request to render operational support to the novecent of a defector and simultaneously answers a request in the negative if it can furnish traces, the following procedure is worthy of study. If Headquarters pussesses, and time permits, we believe it worthwhile to forward an immediate sumary to the Station rendering support if the background of the devoter is such that it would be a matter of local interest. This would have been the case in ARLADLE. As suboequent head- quarters dobriefing developed (and we assumed it would have sen disclosed in Headquarters traces) ABIADLE had previously boen stationed in Berlin. Had such facts been known here, and nad time allowed, certain debriefing on the Berlin period designed to elicit any matter of inmediate concern could have been under- taken. 103 JOEL D. BENTHAN Attachment Ramo dated 18 Dec 1961 Identities uno/top Distribution 2-B v/atta A-SR w/atts 1-ME w/asto FORM USE PREVIOUS EDITION. BEPLACES FORMS PAUE 1940 530 ECRET 4/60 51-20, 21-28A AND $1.29 CONTINUED

14-00000 2 1 TO EGOT-14004, 31 Jan 1962

18 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Handling at German Station 16 and 17 December of Soviet Defector from Russian Embassy at Helsinki

  1. This memorandum is designed to record, soon after the event, all facts pertaining to the handling within the German Station of the evacuation of a Soviet Vice Counsel (and member of the RIS) from the Russian Embassy at Helsinki. At the time of this writing there is still lacking certain information to complete the entire story. How-.... ever, it is felt worthwhile to record all events while the memory in still fresh. In the following paragraphs the defector is referred to as "subject" and pseudonyms and identities are used in all other cases.

  2. At approximately 0730 hours Saturday, 16 December, Arnold J. LYACK (Chief, CABEZONE) contacted me at my home and asked me to proceed immediately to the residence of Joel D. RENTHAM (Chief of Station). Upon arrival at BENTHAN's residence, BENTHAM and LYACK briefed me on 143 the Stockholm cable which announced Stockhe's intent to endeavor to fly subject and family "black" from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard the Air Attache aircraft. Cable also requested Frankfurt to have an air- craft available to receive immediately subject and family and take off forthwith to the United States. LYACK also mentioned an IN cable from DIR which requested Stockholm to move family soonest to CABEZONE in Frankfurt for establishment of bona fides. 02

  3. We then adjourned to the office and awaited more word from either Stockholm, which would advise on the arrival time of the family at Frankfurt, or from Headquarters concurring in Stockhdim's request for immediate departure of ine family for the United States upon arrival at Frankfurt. EAOB was immediately alerted and they made errangesients to have a C-54 with augmented crew prepared to depart for the United States by 1200 hours. A compartment for the subject's family was put in the C-54 and the regularly assigned tail number was removed and a false number put on the aircraft. Conrad V. LAPOLLA (Acting Chief: COS/KUSODA) was contacted and asked to come to the office Immediately. Discussions were then held with LYACK and Carl T.. UPDILL as to the availability of a KUDOVE case officer with Hussian language capability to act as escort.

RYBAT SECRET

14-00000 SAT 2 14-3 4. Having heard nothing from either Stockholm or Headquarters by 0945 hours OPIM traffic was sent, in both directions telling them Gersary was prepared to receive and effect immediate black evacuation of the family to the United States. In the meantime, it had been determined that IDENTITY A would be used as the security escort and Russel K. MUCHANK (AD/PI Staff) would be on standby to serve as a KUDOVE escort. This was a contingency arrangement because we lacked knowledge whether or not a KUDOVE officer from either Helsinki or 143 Stockhole was prepared to travel with subject all the ways to washing- ton.

  1. Around 1100 hours I asked Edward. P. TOCHENSKY (Chief; RAOB) to establish contact with the Wiesbaden Air Engeztower and lay on arrangements to monitor the flight of the Stockholm Air Attache plane. This was done because we have had previous instances of "black" arrivals at Wiesbaden where the aircraft actually arrived before the ETA cable from the Station dispatching the body At about 1115 hours TOCHENSKY informed me by telephone that the Stockholm Air Attache aircraft, a C-45, was and had been at the Wiesbaden Air Base since. 12 December. At about 1130 we cabled this information to Stockholm 14-3 and DIR and also offered to dispatch an aircraft to Copenhagen to make the pickup if Stockholm could move the body there. Because of technical difficulties involving air clearances and lengths of runways, we could not imsemately get into any field north of Copenhagen. 14-3

  2. At approximately 1145 hours a cable was received from Head- cuarters concurring in the immediate evacuation from Wiesbaden by EAOB aircraft of subject's family upon arrival. If such could not be arranged we were then requested to hold subject and family at (CABEZONE.

  3. Having heard nothing from Stockholm by approximately 1600 02 hours: we again sent them OPIM traffic asking that they inform us inmediately of their intentions. I had previously left the office about 1430 hours in order to get some lumen and take one of one or tae parsonal items. I had called Nelson R. POLIAKOFF (Deputy for Administration Staff) in to cover for me and had briefed him on the then current situation. When I returned at 1600 hours MUCHANE had cons into the office prepared for the trip. We then sent the above- mentioned cable and suggested that MUCHANK return to his quarters and await further developments. I phoned TOCHINSKY and suggested that he and his communicator return to their quarters. LAPOLLA, in the mean- time, had gone to Rhein/Main Airport to meet an incoming staffer carry- ing classified material and get him through Customs. lie then returned to his home. I left word with the Signal Center Watch Officer that any incoming traffic on subject's trip should be telephoned tamediately to LAPOLJA who would come in, review the traffic and contact me. The

SEGRET

14-00000 3 Watch Officer was also asked to immediately phon: the Wiesbaden Com- municator who in turn would contact TOCHENSKY and both of them would go to their office. :

  1. At approximately 1900 hours LAFOLLA contacted me at home from the Signal Center and informed me that an ETA and other information was in from Stockholm I told him to stand by and I would immediately come in. Based on Stockholm's cabled statement that Martin K. ROODINE (Chief 27, 14-1 of Station, Helsinki) was escorting subject to the United States, T told LAPOLLA not to alert MUCHANE. I arrived at the office at 1930 hours and inmediately dispatched the Guard Sergeant to buy certain types of foods and magazines that Stockholm asked to be put aboard the United States-bound aircraft. We contacted TOCHENSKY and ascertained that EAOB was in a state of immediate readiness. David R. MULFALL (COS/KUSODA office) then arrived with IDENTITY A. IDENTITY A was given & general briefing on the mission and his responsibility following which he and LAPOLLA took off immediately for Wiesbaden. They took with them the purchases of the Guard Sergeant.

  2. I then proceeded to the home of Ronald M. CORBANE (COS Lawyer) where we were guests for dinner. At approximately 2200 hours I received a call from LAPOLLA that subject and family had arrived, the turnover was made, and that the EAOB aircraft was airborne at approximately 2150 hours. I telephoned this information to HENTHAN.

  3. At approximately 2245 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer who relayed to me the following message from the Wiesbaden Communicator. That message stated the EAOB aircraft was immediately returning to wiesbaden because of a sick passenger. Immedi- ately thereafter I received a call from LAPOLLA who was at the quarters of Arthur G. DREIBERIS (EAOB) in wiesbaden. LOFOLIA stated that he had gotten hold of the Air Base Flight Surgeon and was proceeding to the Air Base. He how at that time ac other details. I told him Chester E. FAGERLUND (Cos Musical Officer) and myself would leave immediately for Wiesbaden Air Base.

  4. PAGERLUND was in attendance at the same dinner party and we departed immediately for the Air Base. Upon arrival at approximately 2300 hours the EAOB aircraft had already landed and maximum scourity provisions were observed in the area. Air Police had the "Hargar 34 Area" blocked off two blocks in either direction.

  5. TOCHENSKY met me outside the building and informed me that immediately after take-off subject's six-year-old daughter lind become extremely airsick and suffered respiratory difficulties, she was administered oxygen. The mother became hysterical and the father demanded that the aircraft immediately be returned to its point of

14-00000 :: 4 departure. He further stated he would not agree to further travel to the United Statesixcept by commercial jet. We then entered the Operations Office of the 7405th Flight Squadron where I was introduced to ROODINE, who recited basically the same story as told by TOCHENSKY. We also ascertained that the Flight Surgeon had looked at the daughter and had found nothing organically wrong. We then asked ROODINE to. bring FAGERLUND into the room where subject's family was staying and introduce him as an "Azerican Intelligence Service Medical Officer" and have FAGERLUND examine the child. FAGERLUND's results were the same as the Plight Surgeon and no medication was given the child. A discussion of some fifteen minutes then took place as to how best to proceed with onward transportation arrangements. HOODINE took me aside and strenuously impressed me with the fact that subject was of the opinion that certain of his information on the matter of Soviet/Finnish relations was of great perishability and that subject deeply felt his necessity to arrive in Washington and state this information within the next 48 hours. ROODINE also stated he concurred in subleot's feel- ings. All KUBARK representatives then on the scene again got together and the undersigned made the decision to abort the mission, arrange immediate safe-housing overnight for subject and his family, and attempt comercial transportation on Sunday.

  1. Earlier in the day LYACK informed me that he had cleared out their Eschborn safe-house in case we should need it. I immediately tried to contact LYACK by phone but there was no answer. Henry R. GANLINGAY (Deputy for Administration Staff) and asked him to I then phoned do for me the following thingst

a. Contest Stephen R. LACKLEN (CABEZONE) and tell him we had an ismediato need to house a family of three, plus two KUBARK officers at Eschborn. To further tell LACKLEN to be standing by at Opel Circle opposite the Minneapolis Honeywell Building at 0100 hours end be prepared to escort another vehicle to Eschborn.

b. Phone ESATHAN and toil him we would drop by his house later that evening to brief him on any developments. .. Phone YACK and tell him we were using Eschborn.

  1. All concerned departed Wiesbaden Air Base at approximately 0020 hours on 17 December and arrived at the meeting point at Opel Circle at exactly 100 hours. Subfoot's family plus MULFALL, who had also gone immediately to Wiesbaden, followed LACKLEN's car to Bechborn. PAOKRLAND, LAPOLLA, ROOD INs, and myself went immediately to BENTHAN' house. 190

14-00000 12 5 15. BENTHAM was then fully briefed on developments and ROODINE gave certain operational information of a sensitive nature from subject το ΒΕΝΤΙΑΝ. After necessary analysis and discussion the following decisions were reached:

a. We would endeavor to remove the family out of Frankfurt by commercial aircraft that day, 1.6., Sunday, 17 December.

b. In the absence of the ability to accomplish this, we would endeavor to remove them on an Air Force Hodical Evacuation Flight on Monday, 18 December.

c. Seeph Q. KLDMACK (Chief, COS/KURIOT) was contacted by phone from HENTHAN's residence and said he believed that his people could affix in the subject's passports a Pederal Republic entry stamp. This was considered neces- sary in order to prevent embarrassing questions by German Immigration Authorities on Sunday when the family would depart by commercial air. The family had entered the Federal Republic "black" and accordingly there was no entry permit in their Soviet Diplomatic passports.

d. We would return LAPOLJA and HOODING to the safe-house and I would also send out one enlisted guard with sidearm.

  1. A cable to Headquarters was drafted on the basis of all this information and everyone departed the HENTHAM residence for their respective missions. I proseeded to the Signal Conter and released the drafted cable.

  2. I arrived back at my quarters about 0330 hours. At about 0410 hours I received a call from KLEMACK, wanting to get in touch with LAPOLLA on matters pertaining to the documentation work he was tryin,, to accomplish. I gave him the telephone number of the Eschborn safe- house. It turned out that the cold weather had affected telephone coa mnications to Rechborn and the phone was dead. KIHACK ülen went to Kechborn and discussed his problem wit LAPULLA and KOODINE. I am informed, but as yet do not know the technical reason why, that KURIOT Guld not put in the subject's passport the required German entry stamp. It was decided at the meeting at the Ksohborn safe-house that KURIOT would try to make and have ready by the next morning Austrian passports for subject and his family. 11

  3. At about 0600 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer informing me that Headquarters "approved your plan." I ármediately tried to contact the Eschborn safe-house by phone but to no avail. Around 0630 I acntactol hinn at the kimior installation and was then informed by him of his earlier visit to Eschborn around 0400. He told me during his phone conversation that LAPOLLA was going to get up about 0700 hours. I surmised that LAPOLLA would proceed immediately to the office and then did so myself.

14-00000 6 19. LAPOLIA arrived at the office sometime shortly after 3800. e then discussed what our possibilities were, based on the situation as we then saw it. We had no guarantee that the Austrian passports would be finished by AURIST in time to be used by an early afternoon United. States flag commercial jet. ke discussed again, as we had the previous evening, contacting Mr. William Naylor, the Pan American Senior Officer in Germany and a cleared and witting contact, as to whether or not he could arrange to board passengers without going through German Imigra- tion, 1.0., Passport Control. The question of the availability of seats was also involved. LAPOLLA suggested that we phone Naylor in his residence in Bed Homburg and explain to him we had a matter of serious urgency and ask him to come immediately to the I.0. Farben Building and discuss the matter with us. The phone call was made and Naylor agreed to do this. LAPOLLA then contacted the MATS Office at Whein/Main to ascertain if MATS had any commercial jets chartered for departure that day. Ho discovered that they had no commercial jet chartered flights that day but at midnight on Sunday they were dispatching a C-135 con- figured to carry 66 passengers. He was further informed that 36 of these seats had been given to the Air Force and 3) to the Army to be used only by single military personnel departing to the States on Christmas leave. No families could be sent on the flight. Inasmuch as a C-135 is the military cargo version of a Boeing 707, LAPOLLA and myself discwsed seriously the advisability of endeavoring to get military authority to fly this family out. We decided against such course of cotion for several reasons. We anticipated that there would be too much conversation among the single military personnel aboard the flight when they observed five civilians, three of whom were obviously & family, flying on the same plane. The fact that the six-year-old daughter spoke no English also contributed to the adverse situation we anticipated. Secondly, subject and family had already been aboard one cargo type aircraft and were reported tj ROODINE to have made a series of uncomplimentary remarks of the type transportation that they were being afforded.

  1. Naylor arrived at the office at about 1000 hours and was made generally aware of our problem. He was informed that the principal traveler involved was a defecting Russian diplomat, plus wife and child, and that we were under obligation to expeditiously and securely return them to the United States by Jet aircraft. He was further informed that we lacked the proper doowaentation to board them on the commercial airoraft through normal clearance procedures and we had no guarantee that we would have the documentation by flight departure time of PAA No. 75 at 1315 hours. We then asked him what he considered to be the possibilities of working out a procedure to board the party "black" and to prevent any divulgence of their existence to the German Immigra- tion Authorities. After considerable discussion it appeared that there RYBAT

14-00000 7 existed a very good possibility to get the passengers aboard the air craft and successfully circumvent German passport controls. Naylor contasted his own assistant and the PAA Operations Officer assigned to Rhein/Main, both of whom are United States citizens, and asked that they proceed to the airport and stand by to assist him in the handling of some very important personages who were departing on PAA No. 73. He then ascertained that only three first class seats were available on this flight. He told his assistant to seat two passengers in the aircraft lounge and he would accept full responsibility for it. This is somewhat touchy in the airlines business as lounge seats have no safety belte. He also know additional first class seats were available out of London.

  1. In the meantime, KLEMACK and one of his men working on the documentation had returned to Eschborn to take pictures of subject and his family that would be necessary for the Austrian passports. The best reading we could get from the KURIOT people working on the doou-. ments was that they would not be ready on time. Inasmuch as decisions had been made, we decided to set the wheels in motica and started the family to the airport. LAPOLLA accordingly took off for Eschborn and a plan was agreed upon where he would arrive with the family in front of the Rhein/Main Departure building at 1230 hours. Naylor would be standing by the entrance and take the family via a circuitous airport building route to the PAA Operations Office which is located on the second floor of the building beyond Passport Control. Naylor departed at about the same time as LAPOLLA and went directly to the airport.

  2. Earlier in the morning I had asked BOTHAN if he could effect arrangements at the Consulate to have a Visa Officer standing by to put United States visitors' visas for subject's family in the Austrian pass- ports. BHAM accomplished this and, at Naylor's suggestion, we asked if the Consulate Officer could go to the PAA Operations Office at Rhein/ Mair, and end by there to accomplish his visa work. By 60 Going we could save approximately 30 minutes time. I contacted Mr. Rollie White of the Consulate office and he agreed to meet us at the airport at 1245 hours. :

  3. I next phoned BENTHAM and made him aware of our situation. It did not look as if we would have any meble documentation to pass the family and would have to take tize chance of wirewrventing the Passport Control. Our principal concern was that a German Immigration Officer would be standing by the aircraft doparture area and would ask to see subject's passport. We could not get subject's family aboard the regular bus that goes from the departure building to the aircraft because there was no way we would get them to the bus loading area without going through Passport Control, THAM asked how we evaluated an ability to withdraw gracefully at plane side if challenged by Cerman PYBAT

14-00000 8 authorities. I told him the chances were better than even and that we would appeal to the fact that this was a VIP party being handled out of the regular airport procedures and that the passports had been left in the PAA office. he would then put the party back in the vehicle "that" took them out and just keep going. BENTHAM authorised us to proceed with the "black" evacuation.

  1. I then made one last call to KURIOT and told them if they could not complete their work and get the passports to the airport by 1315 hours to forget it. With that MULFALL and myself left for thein/Main.

  2. We arrived at Rhein/Main exactly at 1230 hours as subject's party was drawing up. The group was then taken by a circuitous route to the PAA Operations office. It was cscertained that PAA No. 73 would arrive at 1245 hours, approximately thirty minutes late.

  3. During our wait at the PAA Operations Office, ROODINE got me aside three or four times and kept me continuously aware of subject's