104 10179 10025

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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992imb

Fill capy AM Rung

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only • Do Not Reproduce

SECRET 8 Soventer 1960- Ray

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SURFECT: Contact Feport on Meeting with AMRURO-1201-290613

  1. On 5 November at 1130 hours, AMRUNG-1 and DECKER were met at the shiston Airport by undersigned. They were then taken by taxi to the Mayflower Fotel, where a room had been reserved for their uso. After having lunch at the hotel, the party adjourned to the room, where ANG-l was given a short briefing en Francisco 03 Castell, the /T operator who was scheduled to meet G-1 at 1400 hours.

  2. At 100 hours, the undersigned Went to the loty of the hotel where Francisco was waiting with Ray Carcia, his escort officer. Garcia was instructed to bring Francisco u to the room. It was agreed in advance of this that all principals would with draw. from the room to give ARUNC-1 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone. Fowever, it was suggested that Garcia Return a half hour before the interview was terminated to clear us any points as to the nature of Francisco's training, or any aspects that AMPUHO-1 ht wish to clarify. The interview with Francisco was terminated atout 1510 hours, as AMENG-l statod he would be pleased to have Francisco assigned to him. All indications were that a happy rapport was esta- blished between the principals and a completo understanding was reached as to the future role of Francisco as the "/T operator for the AMYUM group in Cuba.

  3. At approximately 1535 hours. Andy Rogers put in his appearance at the mom and was introduced to AMEUNG-l as Pr. Fodrick. Prior to this meeting, RUNG-1 was told that Mr. Rodrick was the coordinator for operations and would like to discuss some of the more specific aspects with him, prior to his return to Cuba. Cecil Cartwright, who as had escorted AMSUNG-l to Washington, asked to sit in on this meeting along with Peters and Rogerappas he felt that MASH should be fully informed on whatever operational matters were discussed with AMRUNG-1 for more effective future coordination between Headquarters and MASH. Rogers indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have him sit in at this meeting.

  4. In substance, Sopers covered most of the highlights dealing with previous attempts to supply the ANTUM group with aras and ammo, and air-maritine operations currently being planned. In this connection, was highly pleased to learn that a 4,000 pound SECRET

: 91BK

14-00000 SECRET -2- shiprent had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence and again urged that more such sicrents should bo stepped us in the future. Rogers then briefly discussed the SINNE operation and asked ANHUNG-1 if he didn't think this area for the De wa.. already "tlown" due to the number of people who already knew of his operation. (This includes S other people besides M-1 and A SUNG-1.) AMRUNG-1 stated he was not sure, Iut would investigate this upon his return. However, he felt that this was an excel- lent DZ site and should be utilized for any subsequent airdrop scheduled in the Pinar del Rio province Rogers informed ARUNG-1 that his overlays on various LZ's and 22's had been received and were being reviewed by the opera- tions peo, lc. He complirented AAUNG-1 on the excellent work of his carto grapher and expressed the view that these CZ areas would be put to good use. Finally, he assured ANANG-l that no stone is being left unturned to provide his grou with the necessary rateriel support which is critically needed and that this suport will be step ed up as our infiltration capabilities are in- creased both by air and sea. In parting, he cautioned ANG-l not to take any unnecessary chances when he resumed operational activities in Cuba, since his leadership in the AYUN group was vital to our overall interests. The reeting was terminated about 1720 hours as Rogers and Peters took their de parture.

  1. Spire of the more significant hishlights of the conversations which took place between AVSUNG-1 and the undersined prior to his meetings with the W/T operator (Francisco) and Regers are noted herewith: a. Security: Castro has taken stringent acti n in tightening up his internal security a, ainst counter-revolutionary forces inside Cuba. The raiitia are being used to search houses for concealed Leapons (usually by a block system), and anyone failing to produce proper identification is removed for questioning by the DIER. Hence, ANSUNC-1 ani his organization are largely confining their activities to the daylight hours from 0700 to 2000 hours. Re considers night operations - particularly on the stiects of Havona as highly dangerous inasmuch as the Diell (security oryans) are constantly on the alert to stop individuals on the street to check their identification documents.

b. Documentation of A, ents in Cuba: AMACIG-1 surgested using an identirication card issued by the Havana University for their students. He had a sample copy in his ossession, which he clairs was readily accepted by Castro security forces as being valii. Similarly, a driver's license properly authenicated along with a health certificate were considored to be ford "cover" docurents for acents operating in the Havana area. A supply of blank identi fication caris will be turned over to the Station by ASUNG-1 for transmittal to headquarters for any suta quent documentation of SECRET чіве

14-00000 4. SECRET : agents who can be passed off as students at the Havana University. (He suggested preparin: cae for his h/t operator (Francisco).

c. Operational Expenditures: Queried on this aspect, VNG-1 stated his organizati nowould need a vinimum of 50 to 60,000 pesos a month to cover their overall operational expenses. These funds are being used for safehouse maintenance, travel expenses, purchase of vehicles and gascline, ailocation of funds to varicus sub- divisions of the AMIT organisation located in various provinces of Cuba, and purchase of food and support of various arents whose families may be in dire need of food and medical supplies.

d. W/T oerators: To date, both PANIC-14 and ANGLEX-1 have not met the requirements for effective communication with us on ANTUM operations. However, ANG-1 feels that APAC-l has not been compromised or turned by the DICK and once he rets over his nervous state, it is possible he can still be used. Similarly, although A: GLEN-1 is considered to be a god w/T operator, LatYG-1 feels his usefulness to him has been considerably negated by the nature of his assignment at the Naval base and his recent restrictions to this base by orders of the Castro recire. In short, AvKUNG-1 feels communication is the weakest link in his current operations and that direct comunications with the Embassy is growing in creasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy personnel are under close surveillance by the Castro cecurity forces. For this reason he feels that Francisco will fill a serious wid in this respect, once he is infiltrated into the ANYIK organisation in Cuba. In e. Support for other anti-Castro props in Cubat at stated that all materiel support should bo funneled directly to his organiza- tien for distribution to other anti-Castro grops in Cuba. his view this would serve as a control factor in unifying the over- all effort of the varicus splinter groups seeking svet support in Cuba and ould also enhance the prestige of the MRR as the spear head for the FRENTE. He then went on to add that he was fully aware of our efforts to support other groups in Cuba, which he assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis. (i.e., he sited Nino Dias in Oriente). AMUNG-1 felt this was a serious mistake, as this unilateral support would affect the leadership and direction new being provided by the MRR throughout Cure. The undersigr.ed told AMAUNG-1 that he agreed on the desirability of a coordinate d effort on the part of all counter-revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rally- ing center. However, the question of support being etve ted through one channel namely: his organization in Cube, was neither feasible nor practical. The fact that Castro had tightened up security throughout the various provinces of Cuba, weld make it difficult or impossible for the AYLH group to ship arms and other equiprent from Havana to the eastern rost provinces (te.. Las SECRET :

14-00000 SECRET Villas, Caraguay or Oriente) without jeopardizing both shiprents and person el. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our part to supply these fighting groups in these provinces. This explanation appeared to satisfy ANEUNO-1, however he still insisted that his organizati n should at least be appraised of any rateriel support provided other Ecroups in Cuba. He was assured that we would take his request under consideration.

f. ANDIDOY-1: AMRUNO-l feels that ne useful purpose would be served in sending his associate to join forces with him in Havana. He feels that AFBIDDY-1 should continue to represent the AYUM faction in the Fid and when the counter-revolutionary forces aro fully prepared to overthrow the Castro regire, AFRIDCY-1 will be brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the forces in this province.

g. Nanolo Ray: AMAUNG-l considers RAY as a highly dangerous individual because of his great ambition to play a prominent role in any subsequent Cuban government following the overthrow of the Castro regime. In his opinion, RAY poses a serious threat to VARONA'S leadership and the FRD inside Cuba. He is attempting to draw various dissident groups to his banners and appears to have support from the riddle class represented by business interests, politicians, and the professional class. Should BAY be persuaded to join forces with the FRD, AMDUNG-l thinks he wi:l continue to operate on a unilaterai basis while seeking to supercede the FRD with his own cryanization in Cuba.

h. Tony Varona and the FRD: Although ANKUNG-1 recognizes the need to support the FRD as a political front for rallying counter- revolutionary groups against the Castro regime, he nonetheless feels that the FIENTE and Tony VEROVA have lost considerable face in Cuba by inaction and political maneuvering. He further pointed out that he is aware that thousands of dollars had been poured into the FRETE, but dissident groups in Cuba have seen no evidence of any of this money to sup ort their efforts to cverthrow Castro. Hence, confidence in the FID is at a rolatively low ebb among the people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of materiel and financial support is needed to restore this confidence. Ac- cording to PRUNG-1 this cup, ort must be forthcoming soon because such peole as Manolo RAY are taking the initiative and will soon control the entire counter-revolut onary movement in Cuba. SECRE John D. Peters