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104-10192-10110 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FBI 29 Dec.67 Miami Re: MOC Confidentine

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Chief, WH Division. INFO. fre SUBJECT Chief of Station, JUWAVE AKULE/MHSPARN AMMOP C Plans for ODCA Mid-April Congress ACTION REQUIRED-REFERENCES REF: JMWAVE 0180 X PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDI KING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM 15

  1. The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments of AMMOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). Congress. AMMOP-1 said that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though it is still scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will While have a copy of the formal agenda by the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. AMMOP-1 is not a member of the committee preparing the agenda, he said that he is being kept generally informed of developments and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence felt. AMMOP-1- also said that he has been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.

  2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end.

Distribution: 23 WH/COG

Rodi Micha Roger E. MARCHBANE

14-306-10 CA COPY DEC: CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER DATE 3- 201-767219 UFGA-29068 CLASSIFICATION SECRET 1957 Enter 1.December 1967 HOS FILE NUMBER 19-300-10

20 Que. 67 Mini Re: noc Confidentine

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: FBI: 30 Aug. 67 Meani Re: тос no class.

5 Jure ? Meani Re moe Confidextere

14-00000 CLON/COG PROCESSING ACTION 10 AFO. FROM DISPATCH CLASSIFICATION SECRET Chiefs, All Mi Stations and Bases

Chief, Wil Division SUBJECT Christian Democracy in Latin America ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI. X QUIRED ONLY QULIFE DESA CAN AIDGE INTE MICROFILM

The following analysis has been prepared in Wil Division and is transmitted to all Mi Division Stations and Bases as a review of the current status of Christian Democracy in Latin America and an updating of Headquarters' view on the movement. We believe the subject matter merits close and careful study by all Station operations and reports officers whose comments are solicited. FYI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published in the 3 March issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and will thus be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. However, the WOGEAR study could not includo much of the "Conclusions" section since it was interpretative and had operational overtones. Thus we've decided to send the full text herein in book dispatch form.

  1. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress. Christian Democracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus frequent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these concepts had an emotional appeal. This political charisma, coupled with a commitment to, basic social reform and opposition to Communism, and presented within an ideological framework stressing the dignity of the human person, comprised a package of considerable attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and middle class clements. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups -- which CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL: AND NUMBER DATE BOOK DISPATCH 5951 OFFICE CLASSIFICATION SECRET a (2) MOS FILE NUMBER Eactuced trea 21: CORGINATING EXT. WH/CA/ Joseph Di Stefano gb (8) March 1967) 5006 OFFICE SYMBOL- WH/1 WH/2 WH/3. WH/4 WH/5 /6 WH/7 OFFICE SYMBOL C/WHD DATE 1401 CATE COORDINATING OFFICER'S NAME (in draft) in draft (in draft) (in draft (in draft) (in draft) (In draft) RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE William V. Brocc TDISPATCH

14-00000 CC...TUATION OF DISPATCH SECRET SIMOOL AND NUDLA DOOR DISPAТСИ 5961 represent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.

I- CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

  1. Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.

a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the respon- sibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC. :

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the clectorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.

c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Actica (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in compe- tition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru. FORM 364 53 a USE PREVIOUS EDITION ! CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO SECRET XCONTINUE 2

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH CLASS FICATION SECRET BOCK DISPATCH 5961 3. Parties of Moderate Potential. Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgement of potential, there are not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil and Guatemala -- that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

s. The Dominican PRSC stands as a prime example of CD irresponsibility from the time Caonabo Javier took over Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of Marxist-lining parties, and moderation of its extreme cilitancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has developed a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily from the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest CLASC affiliate (CASC) in the Hemisphere.

b. The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a miniscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. If the Panama CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and attracts militants from the predominantly negro and mestizo population, it could become a force of some importance.

c. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three ey states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 1966. Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after the seating of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political parties will be limited. It appears likely that the PDC will have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the legislative life of the country. If the. PDC joins with a party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PDC message and mystique sets the tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

d. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This nascent group has good strength in the youth and student movement and growth potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de Leon appears honest and intelligent but he has little organ- izational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left. With more vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly.

  1. Parties of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentins (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sualdo) and Bolivia FORM 80.4 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION, CLASSIFICATION SECRET 女 PAGE NO د

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH CLASSIFICATION SECRET VUGIL AND N BOOK DISPATCH 5961 (Reme 1 Katale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bridesmaids to the handful of parties that really count.

II -PARTY YOUTH WINGS

  1. CD Strength in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants are drawn from the ranks of student appendages active in the local universitics. In most countries of the hemi- sphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much more significant thần the political strength of the parent party. A few examples. illustrate this point: In Panama, the Party polled 3.1 percent of the vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 election. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1953; its student wing on the campus of the Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966. These comparitive figures suggest some conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below.

  2. Radicalization of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most notably Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups of every political stripe assume positions to the left of their parties is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assumed by Marxist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out" it has carned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University is allied with the Communist students. :

  3. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Some observers believe that the CD youth problem has been exaggerated and that the "hot heads" will mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is partially true, we would take issue with this relaxed view. The raw material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed -- ard among the youth the cry has assumed din proportions. The natural mellowing process will no longer produce the same magic.

S. Need for Training. Some believe that the only way of arresting the CD youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lies in massive and intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national political training institutes, ORMEU and various student training FORM 530 ust reeviouS CONTION; CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGE NO 4

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH CLASSINATION SECRET BOOK DISPATCH 5961 courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers share identical biases with the students with the result that misconceptions are reinforced and no new horizons are opened up. Frei and Caldera have asked the German Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field, but the Germans, while recognizing the serious need, have thus far declined to increase their commitment. To accomplish anything significant, the Germans believe a massive program wast be launched (which would tax their current resources), and they wonder whether tho CD youth situation has been permitted to drift too long to salvage. :

III - THE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DE:OCRATIC MOVEMENT

  1. CLASC Poses Sericus Danger for CD Movement. A KUMONK study points out that "Organized labor could contribute substantially to the development of well-organized CD political parties in the. hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for CD extremists to cause harm to the movement." Few would argue that how the CD movement fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant measure on the posture assumed and progress achieved by CLASC. More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it -- and in this regard CLASC is challenged only by the party youth and student wings. As an organized labor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesino arm); its only impact and sole raison d'etre up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they achieve the responsibility of government.

  2. CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite its "Christian" label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any member party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the CD parties, it invariably comits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting an example that is cmulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does not discourage the belief that it is the chosen labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although this label has never been formally bestowed. :

  3. Closer Ties Between CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely. It appears likely that a more organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing. A Seminar was held in Montevideo from 11-23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratic Formation Institute -- IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties. The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political movement and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal representation of ODCA in both the Christian labor organization and CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coordinating Comittee was formed -- the Comite Relacionador Y Coordinador De Organizaciones Laborales y Funcionales De Los Partidos Democrata Cristianos. The Act appeals to the CD parties : FONM 53 a USEMEVIOUS EDITION, CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO SECRET x 3

14-00000 FORM 8-C4 1401 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH SECRET BOOK DISPATCH 5961 to request ODCA approval of the creation of this Coordinating Committee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen haaispheric labor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership appears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would have emerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the OFCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.

  1. Negative CLASC Influence on Perty Youth Wings. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement will likely rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with the revolutionary image and mystique CLASC has som and propagated. It is perhaps significant that CLASC has intensified its efforts since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor movement. This initiativa appears to have made greatest-progress in Central America.

IV- THE ROLE OF ODCA

  1. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin American CD partics formed their regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 -- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:

President Vice President Vice President : Rafael Caldera, Venezuela : Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru : Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala Secretary General: Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic) out on balance has been less strident in its criticism than several of its member parties (notably the Chilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of Caldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit much closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply sanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to little more than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogencity and the cement of their union appears to be based more on revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful to qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) and m negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and the oligarchies), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agree- ment on just what they want.

  1. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support from the Latin American parties and organizations against these criteria. DYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans CLASSIFICATION X 53 a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECR PAGE NO 6

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH, SECRET يال BOOK STSPATCH 5961 continue to tolerate and thus abet the irresponsibility of the Latin CO parties because there are no standards at ail. ODCA leader Caldera appears to recognize the need för sleast some basic ideological common ground among ODCA-member parties. But no signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are not at all sanguine that even modest progress will be made in this regard in the foreseeable future. Reporting on the Congress of the World Christian Democratic Union (CDU) held in Lima in April 1966 indicates clearly that the Latin American parties will not submit without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the European financial backers of the CD movement or by ODCA) that aims at imposing standards and controls that will impinge on their complete freedom of action.

  1. Formation of Central American Regional Grouping. The Central American CD parties act in El Salvador in July 1966 to establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Democrata Cristiana de Centroamerica (UDCCA). This action does not appear to reflect any element of pique with ODCA (the relations of COPEI and Rafael Caldera with the Central American parties appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to establish a smaller and more cohesive unit that can better address itself to the problems common to the area and, to a lesser extent, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is comprised of five parties (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras.

V EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

  1. The European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). The European CD parties were first to establish a regional organization, the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (EI) in 1947. The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin American parties maintained their closest ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in Europe, particu- larly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin America. The NEI became progressively less significant and in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization was revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its newly elected President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECDU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature.

  2. European Financial Support to the CD Parties. The two CD organizations which have contributed most heavily to the support of the Latin American CD parties and related organizations are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to $1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $450,000 for the 1968 election from FIS at the rate of $160,000 per year commencing in 1966. 3. The IIS. The Institute for International Solidarity, headed until recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the new Director is Adolf Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Like its 530 USE PALVIOUS FOITION, CLASSIFICATION SECRET Xcontaneo PAGE NO 7

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH CLASSICATION SECRET DOCK361 Social Fouadracie counterpart (che Friedrich Ebert Foundation), the bulk of IS's operating budget comes from the German Government. IIS maintains several permane.it representatives in Latin America aid supports several CD activities directly. But it also contributes more than fifty percent of the FIS budget.

home International Solidarity Fund was formally created on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of Financial support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CD-oriented groups in Latin America. The name was later changed to the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as an arm of the ECDU, with headquarters in Rome. Its most important leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS, a German national and close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer), Mariano Rumor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendael (Sceretary General of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions -- CISC).

  1. Difference in Function of IIS and FIS. From the start of its activities, the Germans and Italions have contributed almost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for example, Vanistendael contributed only $15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS appears to be the exclusive European CD channel for örganizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tandem and could easily fund the Latin American parties directly, the FIS channel is preferred by the Germans and has two major advantages: First, since FIS is a regional solidarity instrument with representation (but not contributions) from all the European parties, the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CD's cannot easily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the German government. Second, it is easier to obfuscate the magnitude of European organizational support to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America if it is channeled through a multi-party organization. The Germans have limited IIS funding to less controversial areas support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training institutes. (See Attachment A for a detailed flow chart.)

CONCLUSIONS

  1. CD's Challenge Communist Domination of the University. It was noted in Para. Sabove that almost without exception CD strength in the university greatly exceeds the voting strength of the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it is a fact that Communist/Christian Democratic strength on the campus is overwhelmingly dominant throughout the hemisphere. Few would take issue with the conclusion that the vast majority of university youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational message (the word "inspirational" more accurately characterizes the CD movement than does "ideological") or an aura of revolutionary mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats the vote has shifted from one movement with a message to another. It would appear that the Christian Democrats are the only political group capable of challenging the Communists' hemisphoric domination of the campus. -- FORM 6-04 530 USE PREVIOUS EDITION CLASSIFICATION SECRET X CONTINUCO PAGE NO 8

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH SECRET. BOOK DISPATCH 5961 20. CO Strength in University to Indicator of Co Party Strength of Potential, Fras the foregoing, however, it does not follow that the growth of Co strength in the university presages a corresponding increase in CD party strength. While voting patterns in the university provide valuable fasights on population (particularly youth) attitudeo and aspirations, these patterns are not a reliable barometer of either organized party strength or future potential. in no country of Latin America is the voting strength of the 's or the Communists nearly as strong cong the population at large as it is on the campus. Ona reason is that the university population of Latin America is less than 2 percent of the total population. The CD campus leader almost invariably graduates from student politics to more direct party involvement when he leaves the university -- even if the party has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the non-university youth (lecking the pseudo-intellectual pre- tensions and the self-bestowed elite label of the university- trained) are much less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because it has emotional or inspirational appeal.

  1. CD Failure to Transform Affinity of Lower Classes Into Votes. The inadequately educated and the lower social classes in Latin America are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury ho believes ha cannot afford. Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class mover With fow exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino appeal. By and large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

  2. Individual Party Fortumes Appear Unaffected by CD Progress Elsewhere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movement throughout the hemisphere. This has not happened. There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted or hindered in their development by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Chilean victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEI leader Rafuel Caldera has broadcast a variation on this theme that several European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI must emerge victorious in the 1953 election if the CD movement is to maintain its momentum, for sa ideologically based movement cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would reject the view -- based on election results in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. What appears to emerge from these elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of micile echelon cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the "socially disinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and considerations. International events (with rare exception) count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties even less. FORM 864 530 USC PALVIOUS EDITION, CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO SECRET Xrisim 9

14-00000 CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH CATION BOOK DISPATCH 5961 SECRET 23. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anti- cipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, 1s CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contri- buting positively to correct this failure appear remote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commonnground, despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical root's would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (c.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact, remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties. :

  1. Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great enthusiasm two years ago including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "visceral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challege of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-by- country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question is: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.

RUTHERFORD J. LYNER CLASSIFICATION MGENO 533 USE PREVIOUS (DITION. SECRET LXJCONTINUED 10

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