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INCLUSIVE DATES: AUG. 62- DEC. 63

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14-00000 UNCLASSIFIED. INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL SECRET USE ONLY ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DC/03/JPriebe

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED FORWARDED 1. DO/SR 30/7 2. DO/SAT 3. SR/CI/BBright AUG1 2- This information was sent to Staff recently and has probably been forwarded to you for reply. Though you might 4. Joon be able to use this extra copy. 5. 6. CSR/CI/K ENLARGED FROM RID/FI 7. Dolores OR 8. EE/G/CE-Wagen 19/8 I sonate in memo... Schroeden apparent BIND approach a subsequent 9. SR/CI/K Sou, ausach.Cous

10. Felife bower Spotid o

  1. SR/CI/A IGB?

  2. Joon 8 to 9: Looks like RIS was on him first, but they have sent Felt (KJA 19 (or another) at him for they for Secrintment attit elipt. 4 13. RIDIAN -RI/MIS RID/files

14.

610 AISE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL UNCLASSIFIED USE ONLY. 100-5-1 14-00000 CLOFET SENSITIVE

5 July 1963 Chief, CI Staff/L 2 C 48 Про

Chief, Contact Division, CO

Attempted RIS Penetration of Bell Telephone Laboratories - BI-10612

  1. Attached are two memorunda, dated 21 June 1963, from car New York Field Office concerning apparent Ria interest in Manfred R. Schroeder and Donald E. Thomas, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. We believe this informa tion should be passed to the FBI immediately. We would ap preciate being advised the date this information is forwarded to the Bureau.

  2. For your information, permission to brief Dr. Schroeder prior to his trip to the USSR was requested by our New York Office but refused by FI Staff. In view of his employment, how- ever, and previous CD/00 contacts with him, FI recommended he be provided with a strong defensive and realities briefing.

  3. Further inquiry may be directed to Mrs. Shirley Stetson, cn/08, Depart Branch, Room 413, 1717 8 Street, H. W., extension 2268. Canos. 7701 1816-3

Reales: As stated above K. M. AIRCRAFT SBStetson/m 80 100 100-5-1 Για

30 JULY 63 CS COPY 100-5-1

SECRET SENSITIVE - info 14-00000 SECRET UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum

TO Chief, Contact Division DATE: 1 July 1963 Attn Mc Connell/Czajkowski/Lincoln Staff FROM Chief, New York Office SUBJECT: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

Ref: II Reports 2988-3 and 2989-3

  1. We thought the attached reports would be of interest to Lincoln Staff from a Soviet realities standpoint. We also felt that they should be brought to the attention of Division management because the M.O. out- lined therein is becoming a major factor in dealing with sources who have contact with Sovbloc nationals. It has been our experience that the type of activity outlined has been on a marked increase, particularly since the establishment of the KGB 10th Directorate. Although such activity by Sov legals is taking place throughout the continental U.S., undoubtedly its greatest impact is being felt in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas because of the large Soviet Government establishments in both of these cities. For this reason it would seem imperative that both WAFO and NYFO be extremely vigilant for such activity in companies and insti- tutions with which they are dealing in order that it may be recognized in its earliest stages and appropriate CI/CE countermeasures instituted. In order to assist other offices in this respect, we plan to write in the near future an article for the Division Newsletter, outlining some of our experiences along these lines.

  2. We were somewhat disappointed in CI Staff's reaction to our recent request for assistance in defensive briefing of the subject of one of the attached reports. It seems to be quite clear now that our original assumption concerning his being R.I.S. targeted was quite correct and that there is a strong likelihood that his current trip behind the Curtain vill be utilized by the opposition for provocation and/or an actual recruitment attempt. We wonder in future cases of this nature exactly what support we may expect from Angleton's shop. Although we feel that we have a fair capability for handling such matters here in New York, we do admit that, at least on this one, we would have felt slightly more comfortable had a CI specialist been along, if for no other reason than to preclude any possible Monday morning quarterbacking by the "old pros."

SECRET 10612

14-00000 SECRET -2- Subject: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

  1. Judging by the attached material, it would appear that, despite established Bell policy (see our 16 May memorandum re Case 39,790), the opposition has seen fit to deflower at least two of Bell's scientific virgins. We serjously wonder at this point just how many other Bell people might be in the same boat. Perhaps, as a result of all this, some representation by Bell management to the KGB will be forthcoming, spelling out to that organization, as was spelled out to our own, estab- lished company policy pertaining to such matters. In any event, it would appear that at least one or two Bell scientists, and there are probably more, have been giving the R.I.S. more cooperation and reporting than the Agency. Let's hope that in the near future Bell management takes some effective steps to rectify this rather ludicrous, and patently dangerous, situation.

Attachments: I Reports 2988-3 and 2989-3 JAY B. L. REEVES

Chagle/ng

10612 SECRET

14-00000

Memorandum SEROBICE TO Attn : Chier, Contact Division. : Support (Chirley Stetson) DATE. 26 June FROM Chief, New fork Office Apparent KIS Interest in Manfred Pr stapper: Bell Telephone La> 201-734194 (201-734194)

1: 11 0930-1230 hours 14 June, Manfred A. Schroeder of Bell Labs received a strong defensive briefing in correction with his June - July trip to the USSK and sulguria (see our 7ay Coordination Out- line for subject). During Schroeder's briefing, Nagle elicited from him that prior to a trip to the USSR in 1959 he had been con- tacted by an individual who represented himsel se a West Germaτι Intelligence Officer. More important, we also learned that, ut about the same time, RIS cultivation of Schroeder apparently began.

  1. Concerning the West German approach, Schroeder indicated that his mother, who resides in Hamburg, wa, telephoned in 1959 by an individual who claimed to be an old acqur.intance of her son's and who was interested in contacting hin concerning employment in the US. The caller left a phone number and said that he would ap- preciate il if Schroeder could call him neze time he was in Haaturg. Schroeder's mother relayed the message to her con, and, as requested, he telephoned the caller just prior to his ン USSR junket. The individual he called identified himself as a West German intelligence Officer and said that he would like to oder as coon as possible. Schroeder agreed. When they met, the individual in question (Schroeder does not recali his name) presented suitable credentiale and expressed interest in Senroeder's trip to the USSR. According to Schroeder's account, the West German Intelligence Officer gave him the old "keep your eyes and ears open" pitch, and old him that he would contact him in the first West German city in which he touched down after his USSR trip. Schroeder was conducted in Stuttgart promptly after returning to Germany from the US on his way back to the US. Because of his US employment and the fact that Bell paid for his trip, Schroeder became very apprehensive about any further contact with the West German service and at the time of the call indicated that he had nothing to say and wanted no further contact. Other than the cursory examination of credentials (us reported above), Schroeder made no attempt to establish the bona fides of the German who made the approach. We pointed out to Schroeder the unlikely possibility that the approach might not have been Lone fide and might, in fact, have been a provo- cation.
  2. Cogheytached.

SECRET 10612 SENSITIVE

14-00000 SENSITIVE

A interest.

  1. Apparently R.I.S. ultivation .

prior the above incident. According to him

received what appeared to be a routine invitation vis

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