104 10308 10062

DISPATCH

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO. FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMLEO Unsuccessful Exfiltration Attempt by M/V ADA, 9-12 May 1964 ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES Action Required: None, FYI

References: A. BARR-1606, dated 13 May 1964 B. BARR-1607, dated 13 May 1964 C. WAVE-6458, dated 13 May 1964 D. WAVE-6433, dated 13 May 1964 E. WAVE-6463, dated 13 May 1964 F. BARR-1612, dated 14 May 1964 G. BARR-1614, dated 14 May 1964 H. BARR-1619, dated 15 May 1964 I. UFGA-15986, dated 20 May 1964 J. WAVE-6844, dated 21 May 1964 K. UFKA- 130, dated 14 May 1964

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1. During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated, and kept under control, by the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist him in obtaining asylum for his wife and family in a third country diplomatic installation in Cuba. Since the failure of the last asylum attempt for Mrs. AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in refer- ence I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what little optimism he had remaining for a safe method of bringing his wife and children out of Cuba. After the failure of the asylum attempt in March 1964, Mrs. AMLEO-3 again renewed her attack upon AMLEO-3 by phone and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get her or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children. Up until recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, and equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission successfully. Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discon- tinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he would prefer to terminate his relationship with KUBARK so that he can carry out such exfiltration attempts on his own in a completely independent manner.

1. Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts in- side Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts. As a result AMLEO-3 has borrowed money from AMSHED-1 and family relatives in the U.S. attempting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in debt to these individuals to the tune of $4-$5,000.00, On 5 May 1964, AMLEO-3 informed his C/Outhat he had recently heard from his wife via the Japanese diplomatic Courier channel and in her letter she had told him that she planned to participate in an exfiltration attempt from inside the Island the weekend of 10 May 1964. AMLEO-3 requested the C/O to alert QKMAGNET to this attempt, and said that he expected to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964. Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the fol- lowing morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O and gave him the following information: "The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11 adults and children. They plan to depart from Playa de Guanabo, between Havana and Matanzas, during the night of 11 May 1964 and expect to arrive in Key West, Florida sometime on 12 May 1964."

AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group planned to use, nor the exact time of departure, route the boat would follow, etc. It was not until 13 May 1964, that AMLEO-3 mentioned to Bruce P. VEDDER and Leon C. FLUTEO, during a routine operational meeting, that he had sponsored and masterminded the aborted exfiltratio operation, and that the operation had been mounted from the U.S., and not from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to the C/O.

1. On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation. AMLEO-3 claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his part to KUBARK, since KUBARK had refused to continue_its effort to rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his attempts to do so. AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following individuals in the operation.

A. Mario REMIS, probably identical with Mario REMIS- CAMEJO, A-12 834 780; PDOB, Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came to the U.S. from Cuba in August 1962 departing from Guanabo by small boat with five other Cuban refugees. AMLEO-3_claims he used this individual as his principal organizer in the expedition, and REMIS had agreed to go into Cuba acting as a guide and leader of the group. REMIS had previously resided in an area close to AMLEO-3's home in Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go to A-3's home and bring his family out. REMIS did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last minute supposedly was unable to make the trip because of other committments_and instead turned his responsibilities over to the next individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos.

B. Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/V ADA, and brought the boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963 Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay, and supplied him with a recent photograph of Mrs. AMLEO-3 and her children, and AMLEO-3 wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the back of the photograph and also listed his home address without revealing (he says

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH the true name of his wife. (This photograph was brought back by RODRIGUEZ and returned to AMLEO-3). RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed to lead the infiltration mission, and personally contact AMLEO-3's family and the family of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not supposed to exceed 15 persons.

c. Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa, and AMBIG-4 were recruited by RODRIGUEZ for the mission, and supposedly AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the mission, nor were they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission. AMBIG-4 was to bring out his father, mother, sister, younger brother, and his own and LOPEZ's fiancees; BLANCO his wife and daughter; RODRIGUEZ, his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla. AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset, and AMLEO-3 has never indicated in any way that he knew AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset. Since the boat in question, the M/V ADA, was not equipped with a radio set, AMBIG-4 was obviously not desired for use as a radio operator by the group.

1. AMLEO-3 informed the C/O that he had previously warned his wife that something was to happen the weekend of 10 May 1964, and that someone would be coming to see her with bona fides from him. Mrs. AMLEO-3 also was instructed to supply this contact man with all the pesos she had at her disposal, since the infiltrees reportedly were able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them. Since_the abort of the mission, Mrs. AMLEO-3 has talked to A-3 by phone at least three times, and she claims no one ever contacted her; that no one has bothered her since the failure of the mission; and that she is reportedly not under control or surveillance by the Cuban Intelligence Services.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ADA 4 May-8. May 1964 5. During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group bought in a local Army/Navy store. They were also equipped with two Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic 38 Cal pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition for the four weapons. These weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only. The boat, the M/V ADA, was located at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Florida.

9 May 1964 6. On 9 May 1964, at approximately 1800 hours, the M/V ADA departed from Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla for Cuba. The crew was made up of Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIG-4, The M/V ADA was enroute to Cuba during the remainder of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual reportedly occurred during the voyage.

10 May 1964 7. The infiltration crew arrived in Cuba at a point approxi- mately mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours. There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent at the base of the reefs. In broad daylight, all four went ashore and walked across the highway 'Via Blanca'. There were several empty trenches between the highway and the coast line, but the group could detect no vigilance in the area. LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes near the highway, while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to o meet RODRIGUEZ contact. (in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one Paulo MARTINEZ as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo. AMLABEL-1 states he asked the name of this contact several times, but each time LOPEZ

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH maintained that he did not know. AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the C/O who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group. LOPEZ may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or else fabri- cated a name.) 8. LOPEZ began to count cars to while away the time. During the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks with approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of Matanzas. One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites, who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same easterly direction. LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy in both directions. RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ went back to the boat. RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are located. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the engine and went to sleep. (The above information in para 8 is the version AMLABEL-1 obtained from LOPEZ.)

1. In the AMLEO-3 version of this period, again acquired from LOPEZ, AMLEO-3 reported the following activity: Upon his return to the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ saw LOPEZ and told him to wait and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GOC. A-3 would_not say how these contacts were carried out, but due to the time factor it-is assumed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims the contacts were as follows:

A. A high level civilian official of the GOC, with the rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS, who is willing to collaborate with the Rebel Army in exile, and willing to furnish their infiltrated agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces of Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their missions.

B. Some unnamed high level Cuban military officers.

A-3 claims that these officials are willing to listen to the Rebel Army exiles, but do not intend to do anything positive with them unless they demonstrate their power by eliminating AMTHUG-1, or carrying out some type of pe of strong action that would prove they had strong outside backing. AMLEO-3 stated that he would be more than willing to collab- orate with KUBARK in furthering contact with these unnamed individuals if KUBARK would support him in a future exfiltration to rescue his family from Cuba. AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information relative to these supposed inside contacts of his. AMLEO-3 states that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964, and then he and LOPEZ boarded the boat and went out to sea for the night. A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local fisherman dropped by to look at the boat while it remained at the reef, and nothing was done to insure the cooperation of the fishermen nor did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing on the infiltration to local security authorities.

11 May 1964 10. After putting out to sea, RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during the night and awoke the next morning, 11 May, at about 1130 hours to find themselves directly across from the city of Matanzas. They returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours. (LOPEZ said the boat would only do about 4 to 6 knots). They took the boat back close to the original landing place, waited to see some light signals indi- cating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to go in anyway and investigate. When approximately_20 yards off shore, they were fired upon by automatic weapons and a spotlight came on searching for them. The boat party was not hit by the fire and re- treated to the open sea.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH 11. The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three miles down the coast from Guanabo, and they attempted to land on the beach again. Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided not to attempt a landing and instead anchored the boat beyond the surf line (about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach. RODRIGUEZ went inland and caught a bus to Guanabo, and they went back to the safehouse of Paulo MARTINEZ 06 At the safehouse he found the pickup team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and some 28 people whom they had acquired as passengers. These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable to locate the homes of Jesus_GOMEZ_Calzadilla and AMLEO-3 and therefore had not been able to contact these families. They then returned the bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3 and GOMEZ. (AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to come, never even tried to find his home nor that of GOMEZ.) RODRIGUEZ, AMBIG-4, and BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo, and arranged recognition signals. RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat, leaving AMBIG-4 and BLANCO to convoy the passengers in three cars to the exfiltration point. 12. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about 20 minutes after the appointed our of 2300, and halted the boat about 100 meters offshore. They saw a light on top of the reef at which point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal, (When asked about the recognition signals, LOPEZ stated that he did not know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights and an exchange of names. He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all these details). They brought the boat right up to the reef at which point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directio of the highway. (AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get women and children down these steep cliffs. LOPEZ replied that the difficulties-involved had not occurred to them. By the same token, they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families.)

1. RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the boat as protection against the rifle fire. LOPEZ states that RODRIGUE: was hit as he jumped overboard. RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of his shoulder wound. On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore. LOPEZ decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the boat. LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard. He then claims that the rifle (FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward land rather than out to sea toward their boat. LOPEZ states that this diversion was the only thing which saved them.

2. LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding north when he saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle in front of his boat. LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on the deck) of this new development. Even though bleeding and barely con- scious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas City. LOPEZ said he could. RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward Matanzas hugging the coastline. The patrol craft (or fishing boats) had since extinguished their lights. LOPEZ followed his advice and several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol craft. RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until the compass showed "N", straighten out and follow that course to Key West. Three or four of the gas tanks had been pierced by the barrage, and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West. last remaining water tank was also shot up. They arrived at approxi- mately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla. on 12 May 1964.

Their 15. Upon arrival in Key West, Fla, RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated thro his arm. He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right lung was not punctured, but there was some blood between his lung and the pleura and the Subject was operated on successfully the morning

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH of 13 May 1964. now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida. His con- dition is now_satisfactory. RODRIGUEZ has since been moved to Miami, and is

AFTER ACTION REPORTS 16. After the abortive exfiltration attempt by the M/V ADA, various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various individuals. The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cable and debriefings of Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:

A. On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the National Police in Havana who had received a telegram from his daughte Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964. (She was supposed to have con out with BLANCO and AMBIG-4 in the exfiltration). The telegram stated (English translation) "Congratulations, we are well, love to all, embrace. Your daughter.", and supposedly indicated the daughter was safe.

B. On 14 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had received three telegrams from Cuba: the first on 10 May stated "Armando arrived all is well"; the second on 11 May stated, "Armando departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's cable no good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.

c. On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informed him that the 14 year old son of Mario REMIS (see para 3 A above) had called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while trying to leave Cuba, and that the police had let the children free, but continued to hold the adults under arrest. Reportedly only one car had been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being As of 23 May 1964, no other information has been reported to KUBARK on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG-4, or the passengers who were at the exfiltration point.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA 17. As noted in paragraph 8 of reference J, various operational inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the exfiltration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba. WAVE is of the opinion that some of these inconsistencies can be attributed to genuine con- fusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4 again after their infiltration inland), and the withholding of facts by AMLEO-3 who considers this activity was his own personal būsiness and had nothing to do with KUBARK. Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infil- tration, but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and KUBARK does not consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation of him at this time. It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withhold information he considers privileged, and it has been noted that AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the expedition, Mario REMIS, has been visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla. Since the two infiltrees, BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under arrest or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to AMLEO-3's family etc., will ever be completely clarified.' 18. As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J, AMLEO-3 continues to look for methods whereby he may exfiltrate his family from Cuba, and has reached the point where he is no longer rational in his reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family. AMLEO-3 is

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH definitely acting out of dosperation, and although he does not desire to burn all his KUBARK bridges behind him, he feels that he must since KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under our control. WAVE's position on the matter has been fully stated in paragraph 9 of reference J. On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to con- tact AMSWIRL-1 and inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry out further family rescue missions to Cuba at this time.

Anthony K. Reuteman Andrew K. REUTEMAN