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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TRANSMITTAL SLIP |

TO: DDCI 1-

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION 55 FOREB-241 REPLACES FORM 36-6 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO 1957-0-439445 (0)

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(CLASSIFICATION) ...

65-1507/2

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

In reply refer to Action Memorandum No. A-450

Date 7 April 1965

ACTION

TO Deputy Director for Plans Dopaty Director for Intelligence : Deputy Director for Science & Technology Deputy Director for support

Agreement Between the United states Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning SUBJECT : Presidential Protection in the United States

REFERENCE: Aecorandum from: DDCI to DD/L DD/F, and DD/S, dated 8 June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support of Presidential Trips Abroad

1. Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject agreement developed by the Chief of the secret service and re, in accordance with the recommendations of the Warren Commission and the actions of the President's Committee on the Warren Report.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans la responsible for insuring Agency con.pliance with this agreement and for maintaining the active liaison with the Secret Service. The staff function in this regard is being performed in the Counter Intelligence Staff of the DD/P. All Agency components in liaison with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence staff inforned of their dealings with the jocret Service, The Counter Intelligence Staff will provide advice to other Agency components who receive requests for support from the Secret Service.

3. This agreement does not amend or alter current Agency policy as expressed in my memorandum of 8 June 1963 concerning support of Presidential cripe abroad. An additional agreement with the secret service, involving CIA and other Government agencies dealing with Presidential travel abroad, is in process of developzest.

SUSPENSE DATE: Attachn.ent

Cc: CGC nis

(Signed), Marshall S. Carter raball 3, Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director

(CLASSIFICATION)

MEMORANDUM

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nee Registry 65-1567

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Purpose of Agreement

A. The purpose of this Agreement is to define the types of infor- mation, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer nest in the order of succession to the office of President, the Vice President-elect and former Presidents.

II. General Responsibilities

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the person of the President. It undertakes to identify individuals who, brause of their individual propensities or characteristics, are dangerous or who may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever action is required to counteract any th eat to the person of the President posed by such individuals.

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B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and maintains biographic and other data on organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of performing its statutory functions. It also originates, and receives from other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the Agency has no police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal- security functions.

III. Information to be Reported by CIA

A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in Appendix B to this Agreement. The information may be furnished in more than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be given to its preparation and delivery. -

B. After reporting an individual to the Secret Service, the CIA will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service intelligence and intelligence information that becomes available concerning:

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(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate assassination of government officials as a political weapon and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any person named in Article I, Para- graph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate a Chief of State or other high official.

D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA and the Secret Service annually, or at such more frequent occasions as either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be pro- tected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may, at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers

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CONDENTIAL i .: to the Secret Service in order to augment the Service's capacity to carry out its protective functiors in the most secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers of the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards established by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accord- ance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA. Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Service and the CIA undertake to maintain an active liaison to insure the prompt passage of available information concerning individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by the Secret Service as dangerous to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are fully carried out.

Central Intelligence Agency

!! Dated: 27 March 1965. By Marshall S. Carter Deputy Director

United States Secr. Service Dated: B By James J. Rowiey CONFIDENTIAL Chief

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APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

Identification Data. to the extent available to CIA, name or names of individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms), address, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes in Appendix B, which the individual reported fits;

A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any CLA file on an individual reported which cause him to fit any class or classes in Appendix B.

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2.

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APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal, state or local Governments or foreign government officials while they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country; provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government official or employee because of his official status;

Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary grievance against Federal, state or local Governments or any employee or official thereof by other than legal means;

13. United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect; 4.

5. Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who have been of pecial interest or value to the United States, and who cannot be eliminated as a possible source of danger to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B;

Subversives, com nunists, racists and fascists in the United States who meet one or more of the following criteria:

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(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States sentiment;

(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antip- athy toward good order and government.

The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Govern- ment of the United States or the government of any state, district or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

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LAST MONTH 1963 ОСТОBER 1963 SMTWTFS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1963 NOVEMBER 1963 SMTWTF S 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 NEXT MONTH 1963 DECEMBER 1963 SMTWTFS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Friday 22 November

A.M. FPM 8:45 1:00 9:00 Intelligence Briefing 1:15 9:15 1:30 9:30 1:45 9:45 2:00 10:00 2:15 10:15 2:30 10:30 2:45 10:45 3:00 11:00 3:15 11:15 3:30 11:30 3:45 Cement Cark 11:45 4:00 returned from Iso 12:00 4:15 nents of 12:15 4:30 renneisy 12:30 4:45 12:45 5:00

MEMORANDA

326 Friday, November 22, 1963 39

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LAST MONTH 1963 ОСТОBER 1963 SMTWTFS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1963 NOVEMBER 1963 SMTWT 3 4 5 6 10 11 12 13 F S 12 7 8 9 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NEX: MONTH 1963 DECEMBER 1963 SMTWTFS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Sat.-Sun. 23-24 November

A.M. P.M. DCI, Helms, cline, R. Jask 8:45h, col. White Dr. 1:00 Jhal Mr.Kirkpatrick 9:00 at EAST 1:15 9:15 whit, welms.cline, LBK- 1:30 atfost 9:30 1:45 9:45 2:00 SAI 10:00 SA 2:15 Mr. Bros: meretric 10:15met w/whatin Kirkpatrick 2:30 F at Langley. Colned white joined for a while Mr Elter Mr Vivo co 10:30 2:45 10:45 3:00 11:00 3:15 11:15 3:30 11:30 3:45 11:45 4:00 12:00 4:15 12:15 4:30 12:30 to white sense to 4:45 repicts to presinant 12:45 Hidro by w/Mr Kimpatrick 5:00

MEMORANDA SUNDAY-8:30 Meeting at East Bldg w/ CI #Intell Brictin briefers, Generel canter left at 1dico for 18:15 mating at DCI's house, then he was to go home 16 (w/cline (wlby, Elder) 327 Sat, Nov. 23, 1963 38 328 Sun., Nov. 24, 1963 37

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LAST MONTH 1963 ОСТOBER 1963 SMTWTFS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Monday 1963 NOVEMBER 1963 SMTWT F S 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 NEXT MONTH 1963 DECEMBER 1963 SMTWTFS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28. 29 30 31 November 25

A.M. P.M. 8:30 DEL anessing: PiSmith 8:45 clinc at East 1:00 9:00 1:15 9:15 1:30 9:30 1:45 9:45 2:00 10:00 Left pick up Mrs Carter 2:15 and mos me come to go to 10:15 Stmatthew's 2:30 10:30 2:45 Returned from Funent after going to Quarters 10:45 3:00 11:00 3:15 3:25 Mr. Heties 11:15 3:30 11:30 3:45 11:45 4:00 12:00 Preside it kennedy's funeral 4:15 at St. Marthel's 12:15 4:30 1 12:30 4:45 12:45 5:00

MEMORANDA 6:30 51 St D.I will • Eneral Barnes 01-Dinner -Dinnerd by Fring Navy club (lied Room) in honor format ( drina of visiting Britin sic prach will : 1 by Comcille Monday, November Monday, November 25, 1963 329 36 deal of Fred Kennedy -

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14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February 1

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann, General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip, he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while. In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM com - mittee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time. Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

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the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it. Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough. He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that prior activities in this regard had created great consternation in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr. McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache. Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro. At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that we should do everything possible to create provocations and distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled) and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses of action to include pros and cons, noise levels, estimated results, etc.

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b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified; 3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black- list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are, and on para- graph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday. Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend, DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

1. The next item was a very cursory review of the covert action programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern operations.

2. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

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friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organiza - tion and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of difficulties. Mr. Vance stated it would be the regular cover plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one- shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission. He said they could understand the need for two air- planes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent. He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for this.

1. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

13-00000 6 5 to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest, most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director

Distribution: Original - DDCI 1 - Elder/Enright Paras 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGO Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

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STORET EYES CAY 18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964 at the White House

Note: sy して、 人 Tec 112 1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone. The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

1. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

2. The President opened by stating that he had read the revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection (paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of deter- mining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down he simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

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said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we chose. This position was agreed.

1. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights. Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a num- ber of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa for example. The President said that when the crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on nuclear-free zones was eliminated. A

2. I then stated that the President should know that there was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some problem areas that could develop in a number of these points, particularly as to our getting back into a position of letting up on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany, and particularly France, that should be considered. The President then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

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level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that as a statement by the President there was adequate protection in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the require- ment for adequate verification and that the additional words inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intel- ligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.) The President then directed a number of actions as regards Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference statement. In connection with this speech for American con- sumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant farmer could understand it ten words per sentence, four sen- tences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout. : 6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

1. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which such a letter would be made public.

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b. The President then expressed his great concern over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc., etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article) that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were. He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did not get the impression that a decision was made in this regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then on the security aspects of leaks