104-10337-10014¶

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Co

RELEASE IN FULL 2000

24 November, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. The JFK Act

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un- realistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by- page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today."

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a "unique" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.

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For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in. the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required docmentation of “current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.

Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.

II. The Process

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.
We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project.
Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be :

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released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.

On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.
Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.
Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.
In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).
Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.
If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

III The Requests

(being drafted)

Attachment I. (incomplete draft attached]

Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. (being drafted]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFS, SANS, DIFS, NBR, etc.)] L

13-00000 CIA SPECIAL CYLIERCITONS RECFOLL 2000

DRAFT

12 December, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. Background (1992-1995)

The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates decided to start declassification process before Congress passed legislation:

testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA`S new openness policy and announced the declassification of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the pre-assassination file).
six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992.

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992:

it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination Records Review Board composed of non-government individuals;
established "a presumption of immediate disclosure" for records relating to the assassination.

For first two years of its existence, the Historical Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK assassination records: :

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there were two major releases of Agency records (August 1993 and August 1994) of approximately 227,000 pages;
joint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination related collections at National Archives (Warren Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford Presidential Library (Rockefellow Commission) plus numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI, State, Army, etc.).

Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release of far more information than the Agency had released in the 1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the previously released sanitized documents:

approximately 80% of the 227, 000 pages release in 1993-94 contained deletions
resources were taken from other projects and added to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines.

II. The JFK Act and the ARRB

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un- realistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

For Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by- page review and sanitization of classified documents. example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by :

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both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a "unique" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication. For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required documentation of "current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.

For

Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.

III. The Process and Lessons Learned

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive. :

13-00000 * We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of “official release" in the context of each project.

Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.
On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.
Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.
Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.
In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above). :
Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.
If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

IV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

Attachment I. (see attached draft) Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. (being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.] [statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFS, SANS, DIFS, NBR, etc.)]

13-00000 9:irg-hrp "reg.doc"

DRAFT: Section I, ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency's involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested in the Board it established the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and information, specifically:

...(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, in- cluding authority to :

(C)(ii) direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities;

(F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents.

This substantial authority provided the "ARRB and its staff with almost unlimited access to Agency records and personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific requests from the Board to the Agency for additional information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP designated this ARRB activity, "Special Requests." During its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37.

Categories of Requests:

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Although each request had unique characteristics, all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff member on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell generally into five broad categories as follows:

a. Requests for access to basic information which would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational structure and how it operated around the time of the assassination which included: Requests for organizational charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the so-called "Breckinridge files;" and, a search for an IG index of Oswald reports.

b. Requests about methodologies which included: How cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms, crypts, etc.

c. Requests for subject specific matters which included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald's pre assassination files; and, a search for any documents or information detailing the Agency's involvement in transporting and processing the Zapruder film.

d. Requests for project specific information and files, which included: Requests for information and files on AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes.

e. Requests for individual specific information and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular "George Bush;" and, the files on William Pawley.

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;

How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component(s) to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials and identified those which it believed were relevant to their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However, the mere identification of materials did not equate to automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive information was involved, negotiations took place and, on occasion, a written statement about the materials was provided for release vice the actual document(s).
The Agency's written responses to each request either a letter or memoranda included, of course, the fact the materials designated were to be processed for release according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then wrote its own version of the request, search, and response. Both of these are a part of the public record on this project.

5 Lessons learned: A number of things surfaced as HRP worked to complete these requests which required considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution.

a. First among these was the fact there existed an outside Board which asked for information and carefully monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and information to be found and made available that would not have been provided to an internal declassification project.

b. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be successful, there is an absolute requirement that each directorate and independent office identify two responsible persons a senior management official who can ensure that deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external :

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authority) are met; and, a senior focal point officer, who has the substantive knowledge and background to both locate all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity.

c. Third, the individuals identified and appointed in sub-paragraph "b" next above must be fully versed in the guidelines which pertain to each specific project. They cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of their searches or the conditions governing release/ redaction/denial of materials.

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ATTACHMENT #1

Oswald Files CIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION

Pre-assassination "201" file --approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.

DO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre- assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA).

The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB. Additional documents, filed into the 201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.

Office of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201, was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the Agency's "JFK" collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A declassified version of the file was released in 1998.

DCD "A" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered collection. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.

Marina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be reviewed for release by September 1999.

The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

The Sequestered Collection

At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files, documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not reviewed by the HSCA staff.

JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection. They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include :

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approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993, then re-released under ARRB in 1997.

JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald files except for the security file.

DCI Morning Meeting Minutes

This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Morning Meetings that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in 1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection.

Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes)

Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency's liaison officers with the HSCA during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered collection. He continued in this role until 1992.

As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK reference file know as the "Ancillary Collection" (13 boxes). The contents are primarily duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests. There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the "Russ Holmes Working Files" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998. The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in early January 1999.

LA Division JFK Task Force Files

The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ##### located seven boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force A

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documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

New assassination Records -- "M" [Miscellaneous] Series

The ARRB submitted 53 numbered "Requests for Additional Information and Records" (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999,. :

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE IN FULL 2000

JFK Assassination Records Collection Act • Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended

• Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ "non Precedent Setting Releases" • Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action. • Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection. • Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board's requests. • Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review. • "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board. 6

During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency focus for a process which: Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly 250,000 pages (many duplicates) Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.

Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection. Prepared CIA's Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests. Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review. The Board's report of 30 September 1998 states that "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board.

6

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• JFK Act -- Process Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board. • Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3) Consistency Keeper. • Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate component (Often many times). • Components often take strong initial position but recede in face of strong arguments. • Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process unless problems come up. • Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management: Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations. 7

Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA. The scope/deadlines and decisons were defined in the law and by the Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers unless a major problem arose. When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board. :

7

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• • JFK Lessons Learned Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient Requirements to declassify All drives out focus on important Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned Structure and Planning Good Communications with Oversight Body Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood: • Guidelines (flexible), • Deadlines (reasonable), • Responsibilities Understanding of Final Product Desired: • Media, Databases, indexes, etc. Support of Senior Management 8 : • Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to :

• Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant. • Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents. • Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow • Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs. Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs for which we had no legal mandate. • Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that: • We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts. • We have found that annuitants "who know the territory" can be extremely valuable as a resource for finding and understanding the senstitivity of material. • We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to be and how we are to get there. • We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to significant misunderstandings between senior participants. • We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. That deed must have the benefit of 8

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ΟΙΜ 99-0281 29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

Charles A. Briggs JFK Declassification Project, OIM

The JFK Declassification Experience¶

My assumption in preparing the attached is that I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assign- ments, including being the first DO Information Review Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate- oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of allowed exemptions), to a "corporate" Agency-wide strategy to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP management.
Historically, the Deputy Directors have not paid much attention to information management unless there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers. And the IROS, who, in essence, determine credibility and resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience in at least two directorates. Because information release has become a major management issue, the Executive Director is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed implementation of release policy.

AIUO When Separated from Attachments -SECRET- CL BY: 0611637 CL REASON: 1.5(d) DECL ON: X5 DRV FRM: LIA 2-82

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SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

Considerable skepticism in the public, the media, and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of "official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information, even though such information is already in the public domain, from senior Agency officials' publications, Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are a lot more expensive than negotiation.
The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered some of the aspects of DCI Gates' "openness" philosophy did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest that a senior-level panel be established to consider an objective look at the need for continued classification of generic versus specific sources and methods information, particularly that already in the public domain and when dealing with matters of high public or historic interest. HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e. (4) to "Guidelines for Declassification" in Executive Order 12356, does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested in the Comments section on page eight of the attached.

Charles Bug Charles A. Briggs Briggs

2 SECRET

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SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs: