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104-10338-10018 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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OCI No. 1586/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 4 June 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America Since July 1963

  1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevi- tability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to vio- lence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high.

  2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re- captured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's mili- tants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and "open the breach." On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperial- ists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accom- plished "many other revolutions like ours will ap- pear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation."

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  1. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolu- tions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as pos- sible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolu- tionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts.

  2. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi- sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was success- fully transferred following President Leoni's dra- matic election victory last December; and the out- breaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April re- volt in which President Goulart of Brazil was over- thrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. More- over, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then.

  3. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (be- fore the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

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Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means."

  1. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious form of subversion from Havana is its train- ing of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred Americans who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train- ing. It has been learned that "scholarship students" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" re- ceive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence net- works to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruc- tion on how to operate independently in the country- side for extended periods of time. A separate train- ing school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's one- year course is divided between the study of Commu- nist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are de- veloping extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to Argentine, trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques- tions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge on.

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  1. Latin Americans returning to their coun- tries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. Bloc ightsabowPrague. They then go through Europe to some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine.com- munications, which permits them to maintain a con- tact with Cuba after they have returned home.

  2. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and else- where. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary ef- fort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba.

  3. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Vene- zuela on 1 November, however, has there been in- controvertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long- established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.

  4. Another important aspect of Havana's ef- forts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

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labor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its con- stituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's sup- port for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli- darity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress--which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian govern- ment--would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM ANNEX Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

  1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year con- firms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to estab- lish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists such as AmericosBarnzos,AUDELO-Gafregor and Hectors Villalon have been in close liaison with Cuban agents in and elsewhere. Gallego appears to be the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peron- ists believed to be directed and supported by the Montevideo.

Last January, Gallego traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla war- fare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in north- ern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas_pos- sessed the same specifications as those found in the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is be- lieved to be of Cuban origen. More than 500 Argentines have recivedndoctrina tion or subversive ning in Cuba Since 1950. At least 222 Argents traveled to Cuba 64

  1. Bolivia

Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

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President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup- porters some arms and money to aid his bitter strug- gle with President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country. September extremist leaders, Cuban Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to supply the required arms. Reliable clandestine sommes was told gave him two boxes of arms to be distrubuted among the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time were in revolt against his government. 1964 Mr. Madrob the Cuban government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to of- fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na- tional Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained sub- versives into neighboring countires. It is pos- sible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been a favorite transit area for terrorists returning to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Com- munist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led

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police to an arms cache which was to be used to sup- port guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authori- ties have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro- Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year. Some 300 Bolivians have 1964.

  1. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operat- ing primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother- in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow. ELERATO February a usually reliable source. ported stirsingreedstor acceptoffers of Cuban financial assistance to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy_some_arms" from_his Popular Mobilization Front. The same sounce reported first Subsidy on Havana GUNONGTOS to buy arms In addition, a usually reliable reports Embassy in Mexico City reports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Ha- vana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces, Four Cuban_couriers_reportedly took the money to Brazil Mexico City

Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba, The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues

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had increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar or- ganizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro- Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL) -- which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera- tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega- tion to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly sup- porting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them direct support. 57 Brazilians veled to Cuba in 4. British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana, In contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime.

Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP)Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

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Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Com- munist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Ex- port (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment $ 300,000 to the manager of GIMPEX in September, ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses.

Georgetown officials believe Cuban- trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior police official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in George- town. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army Guyanese aveled to cuba in have traveled to Cuba in 1963 5. Chile

The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on sup- port for the presidential campaign of Salvadore Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist- dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin Ameri- can country to enter our camp."

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A clandestine source much to Chilean student Cuba reported in February that returning student said some 40 Chileans would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The Source said these Chileans had received political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identi- fied 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as "subversives," but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of Chilean groups in Cuba. 350 chileans Traveled sto Cubanat uba on19163 64 months.

  1. Colombia

Cuba has been providing funds to subversives in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker- Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recip- ients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source ASTRA Colombia to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity. Site Cuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army troops who are fighting the bandits have found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits. Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had substantial success so far in directing bandit activity for political ends. 7.

Costa Rica

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have

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begun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for anti- government action. Much of the_pro-Castro acti vity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on oc- casion crossed into Nicaragua. The police in- spector at a town in the Pacific banana zone re- ported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica at- tempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed" to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other Latin American countries, is an important Havana asset in San Jose. Cuba,

  1. Dominican Republic

The country's two militant pro-Communist or- ganizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faith- ful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, how- ever, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country. Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla train- ing in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new or- ganization is to promote urban terrorism. A ter- rorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms and guidance from Castro.

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  1. Ecuador

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Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the Ecuadorean government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities has hampered Cuban ef- forts there. When the junta began to exile Com- munists and pro-Castro extremists last fall, several took up residence in Havana. Osilentosiding in Bolivia told a clandestine source in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving guerrilla warfare training before returning to Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities. Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE), is re- portedly planning a trip to Havana in late May to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.

Other clandestine sources report Cuban aid has been offered to supporters of former presi- dent Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being of- fered to followers of former president Arosemena. ravel tuba throughs Apri 64

  1. El Salvador

There has been little evidence of direct Cuban- supported subversion in El Salvador during the past 10 months. The Castro government probably helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for guidance and training. Havana radio, heard clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda line which can be echoed in locally published Communist publications.

Havana-has at least one well-trained Salvadoran intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare but in clandestine communications. Like many other Cuban agents, he is not actually working in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from which he deals with Salvadoran operations across the border on direct instructions from a Cuban intelligence officer

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM traveled to Cuba Salvadorans throug April 1964. ravelesto Cuba through

  1. Guatemala

Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandes- tine sources reported hat extremist guerrilla leader von Sosa and some of his followers: traveled tto.Cuba during ar and returned Warren Barge to finance their activit es in addition, another source reports one of the persons involved in October by the premature ex posion on a homemade bomb, was acknowledged by the Guarenanian_commisit Party as a Cuban-trained ex- partin explosives. Mexican Marxist journalist Victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-Subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala. The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guer- rillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communica- tions and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.

At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandes- tine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 traveled secretly and that these received training in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination. 12. Haiti

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

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A French-language transmission is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses. The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broad- casts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla train- ing in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti, The long- time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire. Twenty-threes Hartrans traveled to Cuba-in

  1. Honduras

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role.

Two recent clandestine sources report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an ef- fective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organiza- tion with no direct ties to orthodox Communist groups. The Cubans are said to have selected Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to investigate their readiness for armed action against Honduras' military government. 50 Honmansstraveled to cuva

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 14. Mexico

The Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point.

Havana may find it difficult, however, to avoid exploiting the endemic peasant_unrest which is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine source reported from the Cubanrembassy Claustre Cobam charge giving Shen Sharb SoS of money to the Communist led Sidependente Central (CCI)--which has been behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities consider- ably in recent months. least 512 Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963; traveled to Cuba from January through April of This year.

  1. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revo- lutionary organization. Most of this group's guer- rilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolu- tionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organ- ization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon.

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tos Cuba 11-1963.

  1. Panama

-SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM guans are knownstos have traveled

Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in October 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably re- ported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR). Seven Panamaniansextremists returned to Panama In late March after thaving spent varying periods of time training in Cuba. Four of these were VAN members. Another group of recently-returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future. Sixty-one Panamanians traveled to Cuba-in 1963.

  1. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part dy Montevideo, Uruguay. The Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM attention, which is given through-the-Cuban embassy Ane Montevideo. Some FULNA members have received guerrilla training in Cuba.

A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani. Only six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in**1963. However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana.

  1. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 4.50 and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla train- Ing abroad, most of of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the move- ment is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training. Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited re- curring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have oc- curred there.

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM Hidrty three Peruvians are known to have Boaveled to Cuba in 1963, 16 traveled to Cuba through April of this year.

  1. Uruguay

We have no evidence of Cuban support for revo- lutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighbor- ing countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been particularly useful as a transit point for air travel to Cuba of of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propa- ganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.