104 10423 10337

1000000 104-10423-10337 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TAL Commission Fil DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T TO: Chiefs of all Stations

FROM: Chief, KUDOVE

SUBJECT: Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President travels abroad.

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation, which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and overseas.

FLETCHER M. KNIGHT

DATE TYPED: 23 Dec. 1964

DATE DISPATCHED: 2 FEB 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: Book Dispatch No. 4726

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 100-300-12

13-00000 S-E-C-R-E-T Distribution For Book Dispatch No. 4726

AF Division: Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Bamako, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Conakry, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Freetown, Kampala, Khartoum, Lagos, Leopoldville, Lome, Lusaka, Mogadiscio, Monrovia, Nairobi, Pretoria, Rabat, Salisbury, Tananarive, Tripoli, Tunis, Yaounde

The above listing has been reviewed in the AF Division.

EE Division: Athens, Bern, Frankfurt, Nicosia, Vienna

The above listing has been reviewed in the EE Division.

FE Division: Bangkok, Djakarta, Hong Kong, Honolulu, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Melbourne, Okinawa, Rangoon, Saigon, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, Vientiane, Wellington

The above listing has been reviewed in the FE Division.

13-00000 S-E-C-R-E-T Distribution For Book Dispatch No. 4726

NE Division: Aden, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, Kuwait, New Delhi, Tehran

The above listing has been reviewed in the NE Division.

WE Division: Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Paris/LCPIPIT, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm

The above listing has been reviewed in the WE Division.

13-00000 S-E-C-R-E-T Distribution For Book Dispatch No. 4726

WH Division: Asuncion, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Georgetown, Guatemala City, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama City, Paramaribo, Port-au-Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, San Juan, San Salvador, Santiago, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa

The above listing has been reviewed in the WH Division.

13-00000 S-E-C-R-E-T

Headquarters Distribution for Book Dispatch No. 4726

2 DDP, 2 C/WE 1 ADDP, 1 C/WE/1 1 C/OPSER, 1 C/WE/2 1 C/TSD, 1 C/WE/3 1 C/CA, 1 C/WE/4 1 C/CCS, 1 C/WE/5 1 C/SOD, 1 C/WE/BC 1 C/CI 1 C/FI, 2 C/WH 1 C/WH/1 2 C/AF, 1 C/WH/2 1 C/AF/1, 1 C/WH/3 1 C/AF/2, 1 C/WH/4 1 C/AF/3, 1 C/WH/5 1 C/AF/4, 1 WH/COPS 1 C/AF/5, 1 WH/POA 1 C/AF/6, 1 WH/POB 1 WH/Plans 2 C/EE 1 C/EE/G, 2 CI/R&A 1 C/EE/K, 1 CI/LIA 1 C/EE/SA, 1 CI/OPS/AF 1 CI/OPS/EE 2 C/FE, 1 CI/OPS/FE 1 C/FE/CH, 1 CI/OPS/NE 1 C/FE/HULA, 1 CI/OPS/SS 1 C/FE/JKO, 1 CI/OPS/WE 1 C/FE/PMI, 1 CI/OPS/WH 1 C/FE/TBL 1 C/FE/VNC, 1 RID

2 C/NE 1 C/NE/1 1 DC/NE/AA 1 C/NE/4 1 C/NE/5 1 C/NE/6

Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964 and MR.A.E. Dooley, Ext. 6748

S-E-C-R-E-T

13-00000

ALAN H. BELMONT, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI MAY 4, 1964

Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might- The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose. Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions? Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines. We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner. That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have hap- pened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can. Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to? Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him. Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland. So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college. Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question. Mr. DULLES. I have one question. I would like to put to you on the first ques- tion and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833-the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file." The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known about it? Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

13-00000

We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies. Mr. DULLES. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP? Mr. BELMONT. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request. Mr. DULLES. Thank you. Mr. STERN. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York? Mr. BELMONT. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.. Mr. STERN. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that? Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963-1962, I believe it was, was it not? The CHAIRMAN. Yes; 1962. Mr. BELMONT. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time. Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied. Mr. STERN. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual? Mr. BELMONT. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it. Mr. STERN. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative? Mr. BELMONT. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was con- tacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the inter- viewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him. When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes. Mr. STERN. Turning to Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. BELMONT. No evidence whatsoever.

13-00000

in view of the fact that we have practically-we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go over it and over it again. Mr. MCCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from the Embassy? Mr. BELMONT. You are looking at- Mr. MCCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We don't have these in our files, for example. Mr. BELMONT. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see, Mr. MCCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not pro- ducing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative proс- esses as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have somebody go through it. Mr. DULLES. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file probably. Mr. MCCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it. The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern. Mr. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file then until we can give you the information. The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Mr. STERN. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There are no security matters in this? Mr. BELMONT. No, sir. The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834. (The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification, was received in evidence.) Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 835? (The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for identification.) Mr. BELMONT. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover. Mr. STERN. What is the subject? Mr. BELMONT. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI. Mr. DULLES. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this sense? Mr. BELMONT. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or with- out payment. Mr. STERN. Thank you. Mr. BELMONT. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out informa- tion at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal

13-00000

matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants. Mr. STERN. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an in- formant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other agents have told us about? Mr. BELMONT. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in no way. Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information contained here? Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. Mr. STERN. And you are familiar with it? Mr. BELMONT. Yes; I am. Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant? Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants? Mr. BELMONT. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI. Mr. STERN. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI? 1 Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not. 1 Mr. DULLES. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his handling of the Oswald case? Mr. BELMONT. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and de- cided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand. Mr. DULLES. Thank you. MT. BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is concerned. The CHAIRMAN. And a year before the assassination. Mr. BELMONT. Frankly, I don't recall. The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified. Mr. STERN. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the FBI? Mr. BELMONT. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI. Mr. STERN. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testi- mony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subse- quently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission? Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testi- mony before the Commission. Mr. STERN. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an in- formant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission? Mr. BELMONT. The Commission's letter so advised us. Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835? The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number. (The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835 for identification, was received in evidence.) Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yester- day, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us? Mr. BELMONT. In order to be sure I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald. Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this material? Mr. BELMONT. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves. 1

13-00000

I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent over with this letter. Mr. STERN. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before the Commission? Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. Mr. STERN. To your knowledge, are they accurate? Mr. BELMONT. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes. Mr. STERN. Are they complete? Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Mr. STERN. They do not omit any significant fact you know of? Mr. BELMONT. No. Mr. STERN. In connection with the material they cover? Mr. BELMONT. No. Mr. STERN. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest we admit this document. The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825. (The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825 for identification, was received in evidence.) Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked. for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission? (The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for identification.) Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service. Mr. STERN. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission? Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation? Mr. BELMONT. I did. Mr. STERN. Have you reviewed it recently? Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered? : Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it is. Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the matters covered? Mr. BELMONT. Well Mr. DULLES. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider. Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Serv- ice and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions. Mr. DULLES. Subsequent to the assassination? Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. STERN. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to employ before the assassination in determining what information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President? Mr. BELMONT. These are contained in detail in the attachments which repre- sent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. These instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an at- tempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Wash- ington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been furnished to Secret Service.

13-00000

Mr. STERN. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that is before the assassination? Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Specifically the kind? Mr. STERN. Yes. Mr. BELMONT. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against the President and Vice President and members of the family. Mr. STERN. Have you broadened- Mr. BELMONT. I may say, sir- Mr. STERN. Yes. Mr. BELMONT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our re- sponsibility and duty to furnish this information. Mr. STERN. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information they were interested in? Mr. BELMONT. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as, we were constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should be furnished. Mr. STERN. That is, established by the Secret Service. Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. Mr. STERN. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of- Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not. Mr. STERN. This liaison function. Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other high officials when it appears desirable. Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your in- structions to special agents in this respect? Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instruc- tions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President. The CHAIRMAN. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont? Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment-working from the back, I think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of In- structions Section 83." The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it. Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously fur- nished to Secret Service involving threats. The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before. Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commis- sion's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the present date? Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do it with the staff, or can I help you here? Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the attachments. Mr. BELMONT. Very good.

13-00000

Mr. DULLES. Thank you. Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dis- semination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb- making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963. Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service? Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President. Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly changing in section (d) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government has. Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that. Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it. Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles. Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont, should that "and" before (d) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these- Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together if that is your thought. Mr. STERN. That is right. Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or". Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests. Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service. Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria. The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time? Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out. The CHAIRMAN. I see. Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. MCCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list? Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors. Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963? Mr. BELMONT. Correct. Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under the expanded criteria? Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.

13-00000

Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of security-I am not boring you with this, am I? The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important. Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tre- mendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as