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124-10273-10070 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Office Mem SECRET tum UNGEE LEDRSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION GOVERNMENT TO : MR. BOARDMAN DATE: January 22, 1958 FROM : AH, BELMONT BELMONT PROTET HUNTER - Policy Jove INFF 300 FOLILY SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.) Tols Nicholst Boardman Belmont Masor Mohr Parsons Roser Tamm Nease e) of MI-5, Liaison Representa- Winterrowd Tele. Room On January 10, 1958, Harry St Stone) of MI-5,7 tive with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his service had Nowe meet with their principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication; 7129160 determined that Soviet illegal agents all over the world, when they want a INFO GIL sec Holloman Gandy to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R." Mr. Stone stated, (S) the RCMP only. 165-6500 that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and ! کو Braam

On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the (U.S.S.R.), looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address. :

On January 21, 1958, SAC Powers of the New York Office called advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfielă. Powers stated that he subsequently received a call from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.

Almost simultaneous with this advice, Mr. James Angleton of CIA approached our Liaison Agent, (Sam Papich) on a personal basis. He indicated that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he would lose his job. Mr. Angleton stated it had come to the attention of CIA, through the Post Office, that we were making inquiries concerning the coverage of mail to the U.S.S.R), and as a result CIA was expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by CIA. He stated the coverage is actual WAB:hmm (5) cc: 1- Boardman 1- Belmont 131-Branigan

lly made through the Post Office in New York 4105-930897 MCT-24 SLUFEB 20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. 10/26/00 CLASSIFIED BY SPALM BY SPALM/ DECLASSIFY ON: 25X MDR-16 "

StoneT MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S. (U.S.S.R.) and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific examinations of the material. He said two or three hundred CIA employees are exclusively engaged on various facets of the coverage. Angleton also indicated that the cost of the operation was well over a million dollars a year, He further indicated that the coverage has been in existence in excess of a year and he stated that the sole purpose for the coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached Jin their countries as contacts and sources for CIA. Angleton indicated that CIA had successfully developed several sources through this means. He stressed the confidential nature of his information and stated that while other officials of CIA more directly concerned with the coverage were expecting a visit from the FBI he was passing this along for our guidance.

It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of CIA. The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain, and according to Angleton they have had some success: in this regard. At the same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand items of correspondence to the U.S.S.R. each day. Angleton said they have not come up with a microdot or secret message communication as yet. ACTION: SECRET 1. On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in a position and should, through Liaison, approach CIA, informing them that it has been indicated that their Agency has coverage of mail going to the the U.S.S.R U.S.S.R We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might effect internal security matters

SLUALI ΜΕΜΟ ΤΟ: MR. BOARDMAN RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.) 2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name and Moscow address furnished us by the British, telling CIA that we want to (s) be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be violating the confidence of the British. (5) د 3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as - *handle communications intelligence data.

SECRET -3-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 Office Memorandum TO UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED US HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN WHERE SHOWN OTHDAY February 6, 1958 FROM: MR. A. H. BELMONT JUNE CLASSIFIED BYSTALMEN 10/26/00 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6 (U.S.S.R. SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S. Tokson NICOR Boardman Belmofit Mohr Parsons Rosen Tamm Trotter- Nease Holloman Gandy Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our Hole. Room Liaison Agent by CIA representatives on 1-24-58 as to the nature and extent of CIA coverage of mail going to and coming from(Russia) Our Liaison Agent determined that CIA began this coverage approximatelý a year and a half ago through confidential arrangements made with postal authorities. Initially, this coverage involved photographing of envelopes; these envelopes were not to be opened. The envelopes were microfilmed and the names and addresses appearing thereon were indexed with IBM equipment. Several months ago CIA began opening some of this mail, microfilming the contents and indexing pertinent data therein. Approximately 250,000 names have been indexed by CIA. Examination of certain of this mail for microdots and secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too humerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. CIA has also advised that this program has not reached its full potential, but that its system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. CIA has expressed a willingness to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of interest to us.

An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain in the future Prod 1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double talk, et cetera.

2) All correspondence indicating that the Soviets may be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on (Soviet citizens who have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S.

3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or double agent purposes & 105-93089-4 4) Any information appearing in correspondence Indicating Soviet control or direction of the Cp, USA. (APLDEM:mn (9) CC- Messrs, Boardman MCT00 Belmont Litrento Branigan Baumgardner JDDonohue REC-94 55 FFR 2710 Rapich Turner KEB 20SECRET : EX-135 --

SECRET : Belmont to Boardman (2-6-58) re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.) With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make arrangements for us to review at CIA any material of this nature and we will then select that which appears to warrant investigation and then make appropriate checks. This procedure will eliminate. having CIA sending us a bunch of worthless material with the possible expectation that we will be running out leads for them. It is believed this arrangement can be worked out with CIA in a proper fashion.

In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be effected with CIA:

1) Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently, engaged in (Soviet espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with U.S.S.R This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.

2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in Soviet Russia believed by the Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R.), which, according to information received from 1-5, is a drop utilized by (Soviet illegál (Soviet illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meet We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we obtain maximum benefits. RECOMMENDATIONS: : ings. . 1) * That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as Bureau Informant 200) Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has not been previously used. :

2) That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "June" and then filed and maintained in the Sovme Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "June" mail) to afford maximum security to this source.

3) That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them. SECRET (1) CIA ADUISED RE TYPE OF DAT OF INTCA 70 W (2) ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO (3) ATTRANGERENTS MADE FOR STOPS 1 4) In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum will_not he furnished to CTA ! A بلام

2/13/37 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE TH10 26/10 BY SO2ALM MEMORANDUM FOR: Director SUBJECT: 6 February 1958 Federal Bureau of Investigation Attention: Mr. S. J. Pa XHUNTER Report #1 Papich ا کے 1. The intercept project that has been explained orally to (Mr. Papich) will be referred to as Project HUNTER in correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency. : 2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER Report

1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.

  1. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to you, reports will be submitted in the following form:

a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been opened.

b. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will be available upon request.

  1. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries, there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for any addressee in the U.S. of mail from P. KROVAN) whose location is believed to be in Moscow, might result in the following reply: SERICLOSURE Got : REC-94 EX-135 (105-95089-3 SECRET

. Date Name In SECRET 7 Ref Loc Name Out Ref Loc Ban Firms A 57CO5C3325 KROVAN, Paraskoviya)() ABB EVOSWA, Wasyl ( ) KM 2)() This reply has the following meaning:

"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceeded by "A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are presently contemplated.

"57C09'is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C" indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1. "05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57C05" is 5 March 1957.

The group "C3325" is our own internal filing number.

The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the USSR. the USSR.) that KROVAN)sent # i letter. The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that KROVAN sent the lett

The entry in "Loc" (ation) column indicates the area or city inside the Soviet Union from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was mailed from the western section of Ukrainian SSR. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities within the USSR! A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.

The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the family name is listed first. (USSR) In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.

The entry in the second "Loc" (ation) column indicates the state of the U. S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state, thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City. For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code indicator is set out in Enclosure 5. : 2 A

SECRET Date - The absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.

  1. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from(P. from KROVAN who is believed to be located in Moscow) only the listing as set out above would be furnished, since it would not appear that Paraskoviya KROVAN, located in the western section of the (Ukrainian SSR is identical If in connection with future investigation or information otherwise available, you may believe that (KROVAN) may be identical with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original film and made available to you.

  2. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the (Soviet Union to Rose ESTERSON, who resides in Chicago, the reply might be as follows: Name In N.) Ref Loc Name Out A57D230 57018 (AVRUNINA, Vera) (*) AAA (ESTERSON, Rose) Ref Loc Ban Firms KKB X The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:

"U" is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identi- fication since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing both A57D23U and 57D18 mumbers, the outer envelopes and their con- tents will be reproduced and furnished to you.

  1. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours. In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.

for(KROVAN, 8. If your first request had been for(KR or P. KROVAN, or Paraskoviya KROVAN) located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR) you would have initially received the photograph of the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had 3 SECRET

SECRET been for ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON located in Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographed copies of the envelope and its contents.

  1. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request, it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not required. The same would apply to the (USSR) The above should be listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known, various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject, at this address to whom the questioned communication might be addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in turn number each card as HUNTER Request No.

  2. On each request will you also indicate whether the request is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch List, i. e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelled". If a Watch List is requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a possible hit is made, i. e. photograph outside only; photograph outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give: us a white list of correspondents of interest to you whoare not Watch List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the receipt of the letter by the addressee.

II. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names of all correspondents either addressor, addressee, or both, from any specific area in the (USSR) to the United States or to any specific state or city in the U.S., or vice versa. There are various other combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed 4

SECRET or any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do, -how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS: Enclosures (5) SECRET J. Aufleston James Angleton (B) ...

STANDARD FORM NO, 64 Office "Memorandum ΟΙ FROM : A. H. Belmont : W. A. Branigan CBUREAU SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 : UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. 1- Belmont 1 - Branigan 1-Litrento. 1 - Schweppe NUME DATE: 4-21-58 200) -PALLINON LALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 2600 BY DATE SPALM Tolo Nichos Boaroman Belmond Mason Mohr Parsons Rosen Tamm Nease (Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated Winterrowd Tele. Room for information furnished by CIA to the Bureau from its coverage Hello Ro of mail going to and from the USSR) This designation was approvedandy in your memorandum to Mr. Boardman' dated 2-6-58. That memo pointed out the willingness of CIA to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we felt would be of interést to us. That memo recommended that Liaison effect arrangements with CIA so that we could review information obtained from that coverage...

SFICE CIA is furnishing us with certain of the results of the coverage of Soviet mail under the caption "Project Hunter. Each report received isabeled with a report number, for example, Hunter Report

19

:

The reports received are reviewed in the Soume (Soume) Unit. When the information fails to indicate which Section or Unit 'would have a logical interest in the report, the names involved will be searched for identifiable information. Then we can locate no such information, a case will be opened if deemed warranted. The objectives of those investigations will be the ide identification of persons of pro-Soviet sympathies whose dealings with the Russians are of a security or intelligence interest, the identification of those individuals who might present logical "hostage" possibilities which could be exploited by the Soviets and the identification of any (Soviet) individual in the U.S. who has indicated weakness or dissatisfaction, a situation which the Bureau might exploit for defection or double agent purposes.

Investigations in the field would include a check of office indices and logical sources and informants in order to establish the subject's background, activities, sympathies and the strategic character of his employment. This could culminate in recommendations for interview to clarify certain points not established by investigation and to determine whether the present activities of the subject are inimical to the best interests of the U.S., provided available infor- mation does not dictate against such interview and provided the interview can be conducted without compromising (Bureau Informant 200

Information from Bureau Informant 200 would be forwarded to the field, personal attention SAC, utilizing the following or similar 20y phraseology: "Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200 REC 11 (105-93089-9 105-67845) 58 MAY 8 1958 HITS:cug All Supervisors SEREC 11 BRANIGAN A

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 105-67845 5-6784

JFR a most sensitive and reliable source, indicating that John Doe has been in direct contact with....." ....." The contents of the Hunter Report should then be summarized as necessary and paraphrased. Following the reporting of information found in Bufiles on the subject, and instructions regarding the investigation to be conducted a paragraph as follows should also be added: "You are being cautioned that infor- mation obtained from Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative reports. Information from this informant should be utilized for lead purposes. only. You must avoid any statement concerning the scope of the coverage in effect. in this instance and under no circumstances is the subject or any unauthorized person to become aware that we have- knowledge of his contact with a person in Russia)"

In those instances where an opened or closed case file an aj FR person mentioned in a Hunter Report is located at the Bureau, the Hunter Report will be forwarded to the appropirate Section Chief or Supervisor for his information and any action he deems necessary. Said Supervisor might desire to advise the field in the manner-described above or place a brief, paraphrased version of the Hunter Report into the subject's main file for information purposes. RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of this source, the knowledge of the same is to be confined to a need-to-know basis. Therefore, within the Domestic Intelligence Division the Section Chiefs of the Nationalities and Intelligence Section, the Internal Security Section, and the Subversive Control. Section will be advised of the above procedure for their personal information. All supervisors in the Espionage Section will also be informed of this procedure. -2 -

OPTIONAL FORM NO. TO UNITED STATES GOVLENT Memorandum TC Calu Loach Ενότιο Malone TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: March 10, 1961 Rosen Tevel Trotter Tele. Room FROM MR. D. E. MOORE cc) Mr. Parsons Ingram Gandy Mr. Conrad m SUBJECT: HUNTER P ESPIONAGER JFS DATE 10/26/10 BY ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Mr. Belmont Mr. D. E. Moore La Mr. Branigan Mr. W. D. Stewart Hunter is CIA's sensitive project involving the re- view of mail going to the (Soviet Union), CIA makes available ✓ to us results of their analysis relative to this project. (C XOC .

T On 3-9-61 during a conterence on Soviet illegal. es- viet) pionage activities between Special Agents (Papich, Litrento, Duckett and it and Messrs. Angleton, Horton and Hunt) of CIA, we I were advised that C IA has now established a laboratory in New York in connection with this project which can examine cor- respondence for secret writing, micro dots and possibly codes. He said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to our Laboratory in Washington, D.C. We expressed our appreciation for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize their laboratory, we would contact them. ACTION: For information. til JFK لا DEM:td.(7). এম 5. J. Papich SA S advised 4/19/61 another mods! That Hunter material ce NY Lab will increase about JFK 2015 0% since pow establishe WDA 4/21/61 @) EX114 PERE 写 REC 22 (105-93589-25) REC-22 7. MAR 23 196

0-14f (Rev. 10-16-70) SECRET ROUTE IN ENVELOPE Federal Bureau of Investigation March 10, 1972 ENCLOSURE Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 BY CIA COURIER ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans, JAMES JAMES ANGLETON RE: PHUNTER Dear Sir: HUNTER PROJECT FRU 1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you. :

  1. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.

  2. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter. زن 50-REC l Moments in conection 10

  3. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.

  4. Please note change in caption of this case.

  5. Status of case: Completed Very truly yours, Excluded from automatio GROUP 1 downgrading and declassification Enc. John Edgar Hoover Director. TO MAR 10 1972 Incomplete SECRET 5.med ИБАЖИЛЛАXKAXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Reference is made to your special notation on Hunter Report No. 27,226, 724134. Attached is a list of types of traffic we would like to receive. 9ZMAR 1. 1972

M. 1 - M. S. Triplett SECRET 1 - W. 0. Cregar ROUTE IN LAVLOPE RE: PROJECT HUNTER March 10, 1972

We are in the process of reviewing the Watch List and will advise you of additions and deletions. The following types of traffic have been of assistance and continue to be of interest to us: i

  1. Current and, former Soviet exchange students, visitors, researchers and scientists.

  2. Current and former Soviet official visitors.

  3. Current and former Sovtet]nonofficial visitors whose U.S contacts are subversive, would be of interest to the Soviets because of their access to classified data or are in a post- tion to be of assistance to the Soviets.

  4. U.S. exchange students, researchers and persons who have been in the USSR with American exhibitions and delegations. Te

  5. Current and former U.S. students and researchers in the USSE who do not come under official East-West Exchange Program, This does not include the short-term student tours but does Include individuals who are in the USSR for some time. would, of course, like to receive any traffic on individuals who are there for a short time if they have been sponsored by subversive organizations and subversive individuals or have received special invitations or special treatment from the Soviets

  6. We have no interest in the hundreds of legitimate travelers who visit the USSR) on regular tours or go to see relatives. We do have an interest in travel and contacts involving persons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be of interest to the Soviets because of their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters; individuals who appear to have been compromised, and persons who meet with Soviets connected with organizations known to specialize in propaganda of in obtaining information regarding the U.S. &

  7. Communist Party and front organizations (such as American Russian Institute, Russian Institute, National Council of of [American-Soviet Friendship] and Ukrainian News"), extremist and New Left organizations. 105-93089 M.E. Triplett met 102-930 (4) GROUP 1 Excluded from automatio Original to CIA, Att'n James Angleton by downgrading and CIA courier 3-10-72. SECRET CURE declassification

SECRET ☑ 8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace.

  1. Communista, Trotskyites and members of other Marzist- Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalist and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos Organization, Weathermen, Progressive-Labor Party, Worker's Student Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and other New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the (Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China. Far East

  2. Cu (Cubans and pro-Castro) individuals in the U.S.

  3. Traffic to and from (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.

  4. Contacts with the (Soviet Red Cros nade or received by individuals. Cross), particularly those

  5. (Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad) (contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in U.S.).

  6. Traffic between U.S. nationals and aliens in the J.S. with individuals attending such institutions as the (Central Komsomol School and Friendsh Friendship) University. This would include the (USSR) any aliens in the U.S. who have previously been in the USSR) as students.

NOTE: Above sent in answer to special notation on Hunter Report. 27,226, Item 72A13AM ((105-67845-38542)) reading as follows: "Your 30 October 1962 statement of HUNTER Project requirements does not cover 'contacts such as the one reflected in attached item. Please advise whether you wish to see traffic from U.S. nationals or aliens temporarily residing in the U.S. (e.g., foreign students) to rela- tives or friends studying at (Friendship) University or similar institutions. You may wish to take this opportunity to review, and possibly revise, your above