157 10002 10056

157-10002-10056 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10056

RECORDS SERIES : MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA FROM: SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR TO: THE PRESIDENT

TITLE : CIA REORGANIZATION

DATE: 06/10/61 PAGES: 15

SUBJECTS: CIA COVERT ACTION PARAMILITARY WARFARE CUBA POLICY CONTROL

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : S RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED CURRENT STATUS: P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS: Box 244 Folder 7 Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Date: 09/30/93 Page: 1

SECRET (8)(1) (1)) 1. Sperations and Folicy

  1. Clandestina activitice should be accessed uut caly in the context of their relationshty to an open cecloty but ales in the context of their ratatianabip to United States foroign policy.

CIA operations have not been bald effectively enbordinate to U. 8. foreign policy.

  1. Clandestine intelligence collection in, by charter, froo frown This fact exposes American foreign policy State Departmane control. tika multitrds of embarrassinents when CIA la diecovered recruiting The recent agente or developing sources in a friendly country. Singapore case, whon CIA, without notice to the Consul General, triod to submart a member of the Spacial Eranch of the Singaporo Pelice provides ac instructiva example. After complications of ludicrous conglezity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit and long since Informed bia superiore of the CIA approach and was leading CLA imo a trep which, when spring, produced consideratio embarrass- amount to relations between the US and the bingapore government. There have been treaties of a comparable sort is in Pakistan Rakistan and i Japan (whoron grote a Calusso Nationele veraferniggled into Sasebo ohin CLA-NATCO6ration).

CIA bas said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depari. ment in Washington is normally formed of this type of operation. In abort, no one knows how many potential prebiams for UB foreiga policy -- and how each potentiel friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestina intelligence operation Surely there is on argument fex permitting Stats to decide whether the advantage to be joined by the operation (a.g., the information derivak from en agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) Qui- weighn the rick (6.5., arsuperating the local government and shaking ite confidence buta in our purpoese mod in cer sansa), Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be clanzod both with the Doper ment of State and (cave for enceptlocal instances and cu agzcement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambacsador.

SECRET

(1)(8) It has meant too that the State Depertment, ates aparicad ed an operation only in ite later stagen, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exorcistus a vete. I wall remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation, but, olace it kaz gone as far as it bae, I do not think we can rich cailing it off." Moreover, Matins when there is lucrancing promiam en activism, Stats, when it questions CIA oparations or Initiatives, caste taalf in a prissy, sisey, negativo rele. The advocata of clandestine activitien seema 'tough' and realistice, the appensat heo te tavoka rath istangibles sa she reputation of the United Staten, world public opicion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and ostma bapalessly idealistis, legalistic and 'scat'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political oporations bas boun to cranto situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles WTCCS in hie 1947 memorandum to the Sonats Arund Services Committes, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have anthing to do with policy." Yot, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' pelloy in many parte of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have evan bzen targets of CIA attempts a worthrax -- a state of mind calculated to stimuleta friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, ia a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operatica is inadequate to protect US bntoroute, There must be some means by which Skote can be informed ef such operations at an carly enough otaga to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Chhorviss CLA will coa- tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reason- able control.

The Controlled American Source (CAS) repreesnio a particula Class encroachmard on poitcy-making fanctions. CIA today egroct of CIA bas nearly as many people under filciel 00758 evasten Ste 13900 to 3200. Aboat 1500 of time aro nador Etato Department coVOT

Sec 3 DEPARTMENT OF STATسعد س Retain class'n Change/classify t With concurrence of Peclassify In part and excise as shown JEKAT E1256 FPC/HDR by Af 16193

SECRET

(1) (8) (1) (c) 4 Nov 93 (8) : 8. Che other 2200 are premamably under military or other nen-State Oficial cover). Originally the age of Santo Department covorίβε Mpersoonal was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Ballco-Correr-Jeckeen report stated in 1943, "The CIA should tate Department cover as a simple answer to all its problame bass shouldproceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and tirough increased efficiency of its overdoas personnri, And a way to temper ita demands upon the finta Uppartment." Nong Choless CLA hoa readily increzood ito requloittane for official cover.

There are several reasons why CLA has alagdoned its original intenti of developing systemsed privato cover. Yiu easier to arrange Through State; it is lempensive, it is quicker, it facilitates acurity of operations sa well as có corpinuntcatious; it insures a Bleasanter fe for the CIA topics. bu the affect is to further the GIA encroachment on the tysaltional functions of State.

sont missions, I understand CAS perennel cutaumbors regular Saste Department personnel. We American Subassy in Vien out of 20 peraons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List 20 being in the Political Secrtant 16 ore CAS personnels d the 3.1 cilicoron Mated en engaging in soparting activities, Guer ball aro CAS 13 cificare Woted in the Politieel Section in car Eimbaccy in Chile 11 ara CAS On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration of pescom Let the politieni foificats sarving in United States Embassies ware Cab Sometimes the CIAAniseien chief has been ta the country longer, ha more money at his disposal, wielés more infivanen (and is abler) than the Ambascador Uiten bo has direct eccese to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes les during a critical period da Laen) he pursues a different policy frora that of the Ambassador. Aloo he is generally Well knownfccally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris ambassy today, there are 123 CLA people. has long since began to mora isto arens of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA mon doing overt internal political reporting cutyumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10.2 CLA hap egen sought to monopoliza contact with certain French, political perasmall- thos, among them the President of the National Assembly. the top floor of the Pasta Lanbassy, a fact wall irzowa locally, a CIAccuies DEPARTMENT OF STATO Delete Sex 3 Retain elass'n Change/classify JPICT With concurrence of excise- as shown Declassify In part and exc nd FPC/HDR by C 0587 1246-193

رصة (198) 4 NOV 23 SECRET DEPARTMENT OF STATE Solite Secs Retain class'n Change/classify to JFic ACT With eencurrence of Declassify In part and excise as shown E0 12356, Sec. 15 FC/HDR by the night of the Generals' reveitto Maria Parasa, hotd e-by-note withesmusement that the top floor was ablass with ligias. I am informed that Ambassador Coeln was able to ascore catrance that night to the Catoffices only with difficulty.)

CLA is apparently Dywiruly committed to Un CAB approach as a פתרוןnt solution for itongoblems. t to proming to have CLA praple given the rank of Counsela Balore State lasne central прози ані пore of its pratumed overeses pereganal, and hafare CAS hoecavas permanently integrated Inve the Foreign Service, it would הם important (a) to assure ovary ambassadorube firın esntrel over the local CAS atation nominally promised in the New Directive of Mancory 19, 1961, and (L) to review the currens CAS antics with aabye to a steady reduction ef CAS personnal.

  1. Faramilitary warfare, I gathor, is regarded in some quartora za a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there- fore a proper function of the Department of Dafanas. Yet there is almost no CIA function mere pecullerly dependant on the political context then pasamilitary warfaro. 0.1. There are several rossono far this. For can thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable perettan and choreby, no suggested abera, clashes with the presuppositions of our epon society. (These coerideretiens need not sppiy, hamoves, to tha traising of, cay, the Bouth Vietnamese in guarrilla tactics or t cupport of already existing guerrilla activitice. For another, 10 moral and political price of direct paramilitary failuro is scute for Communists, when they stimulato paramilitary activity, are dong what the world expects frezan themi when we do it, we appaar to betray our own professed principles and therefore canact afford to compound delinquency by defeat Moreover, as the routat Algerien opicoda chowa, once we convince the world that we era committed to a paramilitary endsever, we will be blamed fve all sorts of thinga. as the recent tractors-fer-prizoneza episode edad, when we do and man to possible death, ma conzat lightly walte them off and claze the booka. Tha Cemrnuntate, on the other haw, have to acrepics about Hquidating a lusing aher