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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10105 RECORDS SERIES : TRANSCRIPT AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : ΤΟ : TITLE : TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM HARVEY DATE: 06/25/75 PAGES : 62 SUBJECTS : ZRRIFLE CASTRO ROSELLI, JOHNNY OPERATION MONGOOSE BISSELL, RICHARD ASSASSINATION KENNEDY, JOHN F. THE PRESIDENT QJWIN MAFIA SILVER, ARNOLD DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : T RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED CURRENT STATUS: P DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/30/93 OPENING CRITERIA : Box 245 Folder 13 COMMENTS: [R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED Date: 09/30/93 Page: 1

TOP SECRET 6 1 counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and 2 the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the 3 War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until 4 the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again. 5 Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as 6 head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch? 7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct. 8 Mr. Schwarz. Is that also counterespionage? 9 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it was. 10 Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked 11 on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in 12 the Department for Plans, is that right? 13 Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular 14 command and staff responsibility on communications intelligence 15 and for a period of, I would think probably eight to ten 16 months, I headed a planning staff, along with that. 17 Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to Berlin as chief of 18 Station for the CIA? 19 Mr. Harvey. I did. 20 Mr. Schwarz. And were you there until 1959? 21 Mr. Harvey. Until the end of 1959. 22 Mr. Schwarz. I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some 23 rather substantial accomplishments there, such as the Berlin 24 Tunnel 25 Could you just very succinctly describe the Berlin Tunnel

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TOP SECRET 7 1 operation and then move on? 2 Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that 3 and I conceived some time before I went to 4 Berlin Senator Tower. You and who? 5 6 Mr. Harvey. Frank Rollett, who for many years was one of 7 the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the 8 cryptologic group. 9 And one of the reasons I went to Berlin was to attempt to 10 mount this operation. 11 In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly 12 complex cover within a cover installation in West Berlin and 13 driving a tunnel approximately 500 meters, well underground 14 across the sector boundary, wand Wandtapping into three main 15 telephone, telegraph and teleprinter cables. 16 I think we had a total of around 900 circuits of these S 17 which were, among other things, the main circuit between the 18 command headquarters of the Soviet Group in Bunsdorf, and the 19% outlying commands in Germany and the headquarters in Moscow 20 We also tapped into a number of Soviet Embassy circuits in 21. Unter den Frund and Unter den Linden in East Berlin, including 22 a number of intelligence circuits which unfortunately were not 23 really readable. 24 Senator Tower. Were not what? 25 Mr. Harvey. Were not readable.

TOP SECRET 8 1 Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey is this not 2 correct that you not only conceived the program but helped 3 to dig the tunnel? 4 Mr. Harvey. I did. 5 Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign 6 Intelligence Staff Division D? 7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct. 8 Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which 9 is responsible for communications intelligence? 10 Mr. Harvey. That is also correct. 11 Mr. Schwarz. But part 12 Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may, 13 Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services, 14 which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two 15 things: the procurement of communications intelligence through 16 operational and clandestine sources and the control and utiliza 177 tion of the product of communications intelligence, as it 18 affected the clandestine services 19 We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of 20 research and analysis use which was handled in a separate 21 COMINT shop in the what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director 22 Intelligence. 23 Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibili- 24 ties the surreptitious obtaining of code information? : 25 Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways: TOP SECRET complete control and TOP SECRET { 9 1 coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the 2 security risk, and also in the direct procurement through 3 operational means abroad, but not in this country. 4 Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean entering into 5 buildings? 6 Mr. Harvey. Surreptitious entry, intercepting couriers 7 monitoring of communications, monitoring of scatterback from 8 microwave, that type of thing. Clandestine monitoring would 9 be covered as well. 10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call Justin O'Donnell work 11 for you in Staff D? 12 Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did. He Plads in Fall ハ1907. 13 Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did M. O'Donnell recount to 14 you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba? 15 Mr. Harvey. Yes. 16 Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you? 17 Mr. Harvey. Briefly, Mr. Don All came to me and said 18 that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then 19 Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the 20 Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of 21 Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to 7 23 22 undertake this assignment. Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversa- 24 tion with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had 25 requested Mroo Donnell to undertake such an operation? TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 13 1 of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and 2 theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to 3 4 determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment,... 5 this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly, 6 of self-protection. 7 I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions. 8 In the field of political assassination, although I cannot 9 document this by evidence, I have no question but what the 10 Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of 11 assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside 12 of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to 13 make a distinction, the distinction roughly and I'm over- simplifying this slightly but a distinction into perhaps 14 15 three classes. 16 One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous 17 agents of third countries. And thirdly, the recognized official 18 staff officers of other intelligence services. 19 During the seven years that I spent in Berlin, which was 20 the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to 21 Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great 22 many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other nationalities. 23 24 25 Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean Russians who were working with the United States? TOP SECRET TOP SECRET- 19 1 Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination. 2 Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just 3 these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB 4 to assassinate me in West Berlin than it would have been for 5 me to assassinate my opposite number in East Berlin, in the 6 Soviet Embassy across the border. 7 Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish 8 between political assassination, direct agents of the United 9 States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals. 10 Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but 11 emigres and Soviet nationals. 12 Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals. 13 Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are 14 the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course. 15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States 16 ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country? 17 Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected 18 or doubled? 19 Mr. Schwarz. Yes. 20 Mr. Harvey. To my personal knowledge, no. 21 Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country 22 enemies of the United States? 23 Mr. Harvey. No. 24 Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United 25 States assassinating any person who is in the non-political TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 49 1 2 Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary documentation for the authority which was later signed off on 14 3 by Dick Helms as Deputy Director. 4 Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3.-- 5 Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story, 6 not the real story, the objectives -- 7 Mr. Harvey. It is both. 8 Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective, 9 assassination or assassination capability. 10 Mr. Harvey. No, it does not. 11 Mr. Schwarz. Instead, it cites the obtaining of code 12 and cypher materials. 13 Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a 14 perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover 15 story except that if this project had gone so far as to the 16 actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the target- 17 ting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would 18 have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were 19 spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also 20 honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of 21 communications intelligence outside the U.S. So it's -- maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover 22 in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words. 23 24 Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose. Mr. Harvey. 25 It was a dual purpose. TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 50 1 2 Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWIN / an agent who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection. 3 with the Executive Action program? 4 Mr. Harvey. No, QJWIN is an agent that I considered for 5 possible use and used for a limited period through Arnold Silver 6 for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld 7 connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of 8 whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I 9 personally know, were. ever used. 10 Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one 11 purpose the possible use in assassination? 12 Mr. Harvey. Only the sense that had we ever been saddled with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I might have considered the people spotted by WIN as possibil- ities. But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is approached for any operation and particularly and please, I don't mean to sound pedantic on this, I don't mean to is should be actually approached, there is a long period of assessment, crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know. I only know of one use made by QJWIN until we terminated It was him some months later, I don't remember the exact date. before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation TOP SECRET Follo TOP SECRET 51 1 and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do 2 with assassination. 15 3 I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4. 4 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment, 5 pages that were written by Mr. Arnold Silver? 6 Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the 7 same writing as these first three pages. 8 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by 9 you? 10 11 Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those. I would also like to point out that from page 4 that 12 that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting 13 was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I 14 would guess were probably Arnold Silver's notes and probably 15 based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me, 16 and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that 17 I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised. 18 Mr. Schwarz. Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting, 19 is that right? 20 Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting. 21 Mr. Schwarz... And at the bottom of page 8, does that 22 indicate that you had a conversation with Mr. Silver on January 26th? 23 24 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does. 25 Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January TOP SECRET TOP SECRET- 1 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action? 2 52 3 4 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is. Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr. 5 Bissell that you have recounted? 6 Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be well, when 7 I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to 8 be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this 9 Dick Bissell In early January and this is difficult to pinpoint 10 because there were several such discussions in varying degrees 11 of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in 12 13 '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver had or that Bissell had discussed the question 14 of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at 15 17 18 16 the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver X Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of It's 19 paper, what they are from they are in my handwriting. from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used 20 21 to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people. 22 23 Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them classified: trash, dictate from them, or occasionally save 24 them. There is no relationship between the material that 25 appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 53 1 before the 26/1-AS, and the material which appears above 2 it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21. 15 3 Mr. Schwarz. That would be Sid Gottlieb? 4 Mr. Harvey. Sid Gottlieb. 5 Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb 6 on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included 7 the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was 8 Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of 9 assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a 10 discussion on a number of other things that were of particular 11 and specific interest to the communications intelligence field 12 and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you 13 will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a 14 sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably 15 held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after 16 17 he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the 18 clandestine services. 19 Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that 20 conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last 21 resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to 22 assassination? 23 Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination. 24 That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the : ! 25 use and propriety of assassination as a technique was. TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 55 1 of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that 2 3 4 5 the question then came in pure theory as to as in such cases as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in 6 my opinion we were wrong. Whether I said that to Gottlieb in 7 the words that are here, I just don't know. 8 Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that 9 make up the examples of 3? 10 Mr. Harvey. I presume I have no idea, but I presume 11 that the logical candidates at that point would have been 12 Lumumba and Castro. By: logical candidates, I mean not that 14 15 16 tape 2b 17 18 19 13 we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets for assassination, but that these were sort of the three people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this, these are three to be considered. C But you will notice, if I may,. Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of Sid's job. ELINT R&D Memo." Ludford is the name of the staff officer who worked for me in Division D at that time. 20 21 22 This "translating machine" was an experimental device, done under -- hoped for development by GE that I was most interested in, because of the serious translation problem that 23 we had and particularly in communications intelligence. 24 So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the 25 framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 56 1 as a general problem. 2 Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten 3 15 page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's 4 notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had 5 6 with Mr. Silver and it is his notes about that conversation, is that right? 7 Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess. 8 It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth. 9 I doubt if it includes it certainly would not include any 12 13 10 specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers, 11 because Arnold Silver was under specific instructions not to discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing it with me first. 14 Mr. Schwarz. And he starts, for example, by talking about 15 "Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth, 16 17 and that reflects the conversation you had with Mr. Silver? Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does. 18 Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b and 3 has 19 the heading "Maximum security" do you see that on page 4? 20 21 Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it. Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows 22 23 two sentences, which I should read into the record, three sentences. 24 "Within Kubark" 25 now, is that the CIA? TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 60 1 crossed in this document. 2 Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other? 3 Mr. Harvey. That's right. One way or the other. Mr. Schwarz. Your note has a report to the DCI, the 4 5 January 26th reference, which reads in the first line AS. 6 That is Arnold Silver, I take it?.. 7 8 9 matter. Mr. Harvey.. Yes, I'm sure that's Arnold Silver. Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI What does that mean? 10 Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to 11 that is a fairly illogical Fanfani,, and Fanfani was never 12 even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context. 13 Fanforn Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to 14 15 16 17 throw up my hands. I just don't know. Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI in the notes means? Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr. 18 Schwarz. 19 Mr. Schwarz. Okay. Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the 20 21 portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisified at this point? Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are 22 23 24 either not important or are understandable. Maybe some of the 25 members have questions. TOP SECRET SECRET Bed - 25/1 Eryer Estioi "The Magic button sarcaties kiire "for a hung". AIS 201 cover Caubois Bankruptcy no Stor nat ITSO Je contrachstruct eixes - Jum Frailes fromй 0-2 apply brakes... Lost resort beyoud last reiod يه Ce confession of wakuces. - El Benefactor assumptions- Example or 3 "Meray" Meno Hear RECE JAN 24 1975 CIA Anathesia. 26/1 Farform-200/- Matter nofil Rese 1. Select proper ofern to ress- 2 3. Security Rules 4. uie leves Resort-Brakes 3 B-WRN-AS- sid Reseiv. licet-v-ko

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