157 10002 10165

157-10002-10165 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 : JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10165 RECORDS SERIES : TRANSCRIPT AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-696 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : ΤΟ : TITLE : TESTIMONY OF DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS DATE: 07/31/75 PAGES: 178 ! SUBJECTS : CIA CUBA CASTRO LANSKY, MEYER BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION TRAFFICANTE, SANTOS RUBY, JACK CHILE ALLENDE OPERATION MONGOOSE 1 DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : T RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED CURRENT STATUS: P. DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/30/93 OPENING CRITERIA: Box 256 Folder 14 COMMENTS: NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 1 [R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED Date: 10/05/93 Page:1

TOP SECRET 10 1 Mr. Phillips. I did not. 2 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby? 3 Mr. Phillips. No, I did not. 4 Mr. Schwarz. Do youknow him under the name of Ruben- 5 stein? 6 Mr. Phillips. I did not. 7 Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba 8 and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your 9 time on? 10 Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican Republic as chief of Station Mr. Schwarz. And then Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until the summer of 1967. And after that I returned to Washington and became the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969. In 1970 I went to Rio de JanierodaseStation Chief And 20 21 in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to Brasilia from Rio de Janiero. 22 In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of Station 23 And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of 24 the then Western Hemisphere Division. 25 Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 2

TOP SECRET 14 1 or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as 2 3 4 5 to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually assassinate some one. 6 Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even 7 8 get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way. 9 10 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency talk that way? 11 Mr. Phillips. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Under traumatic conditions I have heard human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were bumped off or something. But I have never heard two officers sit down and seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line and say almost anything. 19 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with 20 21 22 the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifi- cally a Major Marshall, report reported to the CIA that they intended to assassinate Allende? 23 Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall, 24 Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think 25 of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 3

TOP SECRET 30 1 Mr. Schwarz. And you offered through Colonel Wimert, 2 whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could Mr. Phillips. That is true. Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Val- 3 accomplish it, didn't you? 4 Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes. 5 mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt 6 on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to 7 help accomplish the kidnapping? 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 enzuela group some machine guns, didn't you? Mr. Phillips. That is ture. Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that, didn't you? Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them spe- cifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin America. And they said something about, their own arms could be identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified. I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was just for that. It was certainly understood that they might TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 4

44 Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we establish what I called a false flag base of people that would go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much less, because they would appear to be from another nationality. is Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that he asked for it after I came over. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mr. Treverton. It is not. 10 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which 11 unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is 12 relatively simple. 13 This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970, 14 and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to 15 16 17 18 the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the purposes of setting up the false flag office Mr. Phillips. We call it a base. Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base 19 will enter and leave Chile with falst documents and operate as 20 a representative of his country rather than as anAmerican". 21 That is right, isn't it? 22 Mr. Phillips. That is true. 23 Mr. Schwarz. Continue: 24 "Having at least one key Brazilian and one key Argentinian 25 would be vital, and we have candidates." NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 5 TOP SECRET

IUP SECRET 45 1 And you did that. 2 Mr. Phillips. Yes. 3 Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows: "These 4 officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap 5 6 potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any Chilean." 7 8 That is right, isn't it? Mr. Phillips. That is true. 9 Mr.Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure? 10 Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall, 11 that sort of thing. 12 Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II 13 activities? 14 Mr. Phillips. That is right. 15 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have can- 16 17 18 19 20 21 didates who can successfully pose as Brazilian intelligence officers." You did that, didn't you? Mr. Phillips. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded and ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a Brazilian one". Mr. Phillips. Yes. 22 Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would 23 the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like Brazil would 24 be blamed if something went wrong. 25 Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me, : TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 6

TOP SECRET 46 1 because my daughter happens to be married to a Brazilian 2 foreign service officer! However, that was it. It was a 3 devious move. It was the final result the idea being that 4 if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone 5 other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is 6 not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying, 7 8 why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets, is not true. 9 But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents 10 should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that 11 was the idea. 12 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were 13 14 their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go to their death swearing they were Brazilians or whatever? 15 16 17 18 19 20 Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic, Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And I briefed them,and I think what I said to them was, this is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have to go if you don't want to, because you culd get in real trouble. And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help 21 you. 22 So, they shrugged their shoulders and went. 23 Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the Brazilians that you were 24 sending someone down to pose as a Brazilian, and his instruc- 25 tions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 7 TOP SECRET

47 1 as a Brazilian and the Brazilians were approached? 2 Mr. Phillips. It never occurred to us in our wildest 15 dreams to do that. 4 Mr. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between con- 5 6 7 8 9 tinuing intelligence services were things that were very important to preserve, and that we had very close and delicate relationships with the otherfintelligence services. Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a man the Brazilians would be quite unhappy with us. But I thought that was better than letting the world know that was 11 a U.S. Citizen down there. 10 12 Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27 to say this: "Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexi- bility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations secure- ly." 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging 20 from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA? 21 22 23 Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you 24 are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana 25 and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 8

TOP SECRET 48 1 service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the 2 Soviets, from us, or from the Brazilians. 13 4 Mr. Schwarz. So, it is not an unusual practice. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing 5 6 in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered 7 8 by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was Chile. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 And then you said what the other one was. What was that? Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs of Station course, which is a training course for people who are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station. When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there 17 18 wanted to be associated with something like that. But I de- 19 20 as the Chief of Station. And I just wasn't sure that I cided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is doing, I will go I am going to go along. So, I did go 21 along. 22 Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation 23 between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassin- 24 ations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding 25 it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 9 TOP SECRET

10P SECRET 55 1 Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could under- 2 3 stand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned. 4 Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that 5 6 he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32 years beforehe was elected. 7 8 Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ar- dent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that 9 10 11 we had a visit from a man who had the code name of Ariel, he was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot 12 13 14 at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send 22,000 rather than 400. 15 So, I can understand why they thought this was going, 16 in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our 17 interests. But that is an assumption. 18 19 It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The differ- 20 21 22 23 ence was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are going to have to use violence. 24 I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper 25 where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said, NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 10 TOP SECRET

1 2 activities? Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was the Station Chief in 59 3 4 Rio de Janiero in Brazil, and was called back in 1970 for six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II. 5 6 7 8 Senator Mondale. Now, in that position you familiarized yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on, and tried to become as expert as you could in the political forces and so on? 9 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator, 10 11 one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it. 12 Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I 14 15 16 .17 13 just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he was pursuing, is that correct? 18 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that he said it, but 19 he indeed acted that way. 20 Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pur- 21 suing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with 22 the population support under constitutional system? 23 Mr. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir. 24 Senator Mondale. Thank you. 25 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you in connection TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 11

TOP SECRET 65 1 assignment by the President and by the White House? 2 3 4 5 6 Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why h should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game. The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the word. 7 8 And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate. 9 Senator Hart of Colorado. 10 One other question. I call your attention in our briefing books to what is 11 12 13 Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21 September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author of that cable? 14 Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating 15 officer, yes. 16 Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean? 17 Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the 18 right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating 19 20 officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know the situation. 21 22 23 Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess is what I am after. Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably 24 written by Mr. Poinzio, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was 25 joint. But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by TOP SECRET : NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 12

IP SCUREI 66 1 putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was 2 a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is 3 the one that accepts the responsibility. 4 Senator Hart of Colorado. Page 3 of 7 which has 5 the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the follow- 6 ing sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending 7 us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et 8 cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have 9 10 to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes on the stars. 11 12 Mr. Phillips. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 What does that mean in Agency talk? Senator, I want to assure you with real seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase. Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye, however. Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed a joint venture, I can promise that that was Dino Poinzio's contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I 21 22 23 am not sure what it means even now. 24 SEnator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems 25 to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 13 TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 76 1 Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the 2 3 4 5 assassination of Schneider was something which presented the opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have done. Do you agree with me? 6 Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am 7 8 9 10. 11 12 13 14 not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finished Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred, Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as Marshall, immediately said, this is it, that is enough. There was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is 15 it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America 16 17 18 that would have been the signal for further action, weakness, and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the business. 19 20 Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activi ties which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group 21 and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one 22 23 of the assignments that the false flag officers had? Mr. Phillips. Yes. 24 Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 14 25 one of the assignments that Colonel Wimert had? TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 77 1 Mr. Phillips. Wimert Yes, I believe it was Colonel 2 Wimert that was in touch with that group. 15 3 Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem, 4 didn't they? 5 Mr. Phillips. Are you referring to Chilean teams? 6 Mr. Schwarz. No, the false flag team and colonel 7 Wimert. 8 Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have 9 10 11 been some central direction from the office or from headquar- ters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had the slightest idea that Colonel Wimert was working with us. 12 13 And I don't believe that Colonel Wilmert -- I don't know that Colonel Wimert knew about them. 14 15 So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of direction from the Station. 16 Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in 17 Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela groupand 18 the Viaux group? 19 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir. 20 21 Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here, counsel? 22 Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interrup- 23 tible. 24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, did we 25 chronologically maybe the staff can answer that, I am just TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 15

TOP SECRET 92 1 2 Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one of the Valenzuela group's plan? 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically. Obviously when the guns were passed through colonel Wimert and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we read the press reports that General Schneider died from hand- gun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly the Valenzuela group using those guns. Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had been furnished earlier? WAsn't there evidence that there were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to abduct General Schneider? Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. There may very well have been, but I am not real sure about that. Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which is the relationship with Colonel Wimert. If there are any questions on the relationship between the two groups. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with 25 US Army attache and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be TOP SECRET Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19 attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 16

TOP SECRET 93 1 2 3 15 4 5 6 7 8 9 carried out on October 19. The Huerth, who was head of the Carabineros, witting of the above plan, has promised to keep the Carabineros away from the Schneier houseto assure that the abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly involved." What do you think "not directly involved" refers to? Why not just not involved? Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what 10 11 I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin 12 that works with some group type of thing. 13 And I believe that it must refer to that. 14 Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual 15 cable in the Senator's books? 16 Mr. Inderfurther. No. 17 Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that para- 18 19 graph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19 October on the subject of General Viaux: 20 21 directly involved. "General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not He has been sent to Vina to stay with 22 prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 23 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is 24 25 not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week." TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 17

TOP SECRET 94 1 2 15 3 4 Now, I can't read that language any way other than meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear would 5 be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved. 6 7 8 And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups. Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that 9 way. 10 Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more 11 than just the statement? 12 Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66. 13 Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to 14 Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was Becksher. 15 Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book. 16 Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an ex- 17 hibit. 18 19 (The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2 20 for identification.) 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 18

TOP SECRET 101 1 As for the narrow part of your question, by all means 2 it is a bad way to do business. 3 מו Senator Schweiker. Go ahead. 4 Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line 5 6 of quesioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the docu- ment Tab A. 7 8 9 10 It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17 September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 Sep- tember, "Subject, Genesis of Project". Incidentally, what was the code name for this project? 11 Was it FU Belt? 12 Mr. Phillips. Beltway or FU Belt, one of the two. 13 14 Mr. Schwarz. Does FU stnd for anything in particular? Mr. Phillips. Chile. So it would be FU. The first two 15 letters there indicate a geographical araa. So it would beba 16 lot of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt 17 means Chile. Belt means nothing. 18 Mr. Schwarz. Everybody keeps saying that so many of 19 these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these 20 names? 21 Mr. Phillips. There is somebody who is supposed to have 22 a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated. 23 And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes 24 out in those things. 25 Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call NW 50955 DocId:32282005 Page 19

1 it pixie-like. 2 Mr. Phillips. IUP SECRET But many times the cryptonums mean ab- solutely nothing, they have no meaning at all. 4 Senator Schweiker. SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT 5 Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir. 6 Senator Schweiker. We have come across a few other good 7 ones. 8 9 10 11 Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2 indicates that the instructions from the President concluded: "The Agency is to carry out this mission without 12 coordination with the Department of State or Defense". 13 Mr. Phillips. Yes. 14 Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction? 15 Mr. Phillips. That is correct. 16 Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in 17 Chile a man called Colonel Wimert. 18 Mr. Phillips. Yes. 19 Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department? 20 Mr. Phillips. That is correct. 21 Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned he was instructed 22 23 to take his instructions only from the CIA inChile, is that right? 24 Mr. Phillips. Yes. 25 Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell TOP SECRET NW 50955 DocId: 32282005 Page 20 102

4 TOP SECRET 103 1 his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the 2 defense attache system down there? 3 Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Wimert was the man from the Army and then 5 6 there was someone else in the Air Force, the Navy, and there was a boss? 7 Mr. Phillips. That is right. 8 Mr. Schwarz. And Wimert was told not to tell that boss? 9 Mr. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes. 10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did it happen that Colonel Wimert 11 came to work for and under the direction of the CIA? 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mr.