157 10014 10109

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: 7/8/2015

Agency Information AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10109 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-15

Document Information ORIGINATOR: SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 06/25/1975 PAGES: 19 SUBJECTS: HARVEY, WILLIAM ZRRIFLE OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION: Declassified RESTRICTIONS: IB; 1C CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/08/2000

OPENING CRITERIA: COMMENTS: CCBOX 418

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

Date: 08/06/95 Page: 1

AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10109 RECORDS SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-15

DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR: SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 06/25/75 PAGES: 19 SUBJECTS: HARVEY, WILLIAM OPERATION MONGOOSE

ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED CURRENT STATUS: POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA: COMMENTS: CCBOX 418

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Box 418 MEETING 25 JUNE 75

AGENDA

TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING

Testimony by Mr. William Harvey

TOP SECRET

WILLIAM HARVEY Short Chronology*

Biographical 1940-47 Counterespionage work as FBI agent 1947 Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch 1948 Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP) 1952 Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation) 1959 Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries)

1960 August 16 DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21)

1961 Late January EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of POISON PILLS. (24) (approx.) February BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's (approx.) notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)

HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38)

Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

  • Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA.

TOP SECRET

1961 (cont'd) Early Feb. According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. (27)

Late Feb. Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27)

March-Early April O'CONNELL gives pills and money to ROSELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32)

Mid-April Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor Committee. November 15 Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39) November 29 MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

1962 February EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40) February 7 EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60) February 19 HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38) April 8-9 HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to brief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41) April 14 HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46) April 18-19 Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'd) April 21 HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. (47-8)

Late April HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)

Throughout May Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. (50)

May 7 EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*

May 14 Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65)

HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)

June 21 ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)

August 10 Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that MCNAMARA raised the subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans.

August 13 General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes planning for "splitting the regime, including liquidation of leaders".

  • RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'd) August 14 HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.

September Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)

October CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1963 February HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52)

June HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)

August 16 Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)

SEGRET EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SUBJECT: John Rosselli

14 May 1962

EdWARDS EXI 5/30175

INVENTORIED: MAR 1977 BY

  1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.
  2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.
  3. On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

Sheffield Edwards Director of Security

EVES CALY SEGRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Alternate Course B

INVENTORIED: MAR 21 1977

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course E for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Fach of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of crane.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, 1, Daonomic (cabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any sutions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

SEC DEF CONTR No. X- 1.CP SECRET-NOFURN ICTERIN FANDLING EXCLUDED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FAC REGRADING; DOD DIT 200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

This document contains Copy No. of CO

SECRET SENSITIVE EVES ONLY HELMIS EXZ.. 6/13/75

14 August 1962

MAR 21 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operation MONGOOSE

  1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

  2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

  3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's ofice on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

  4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, in-cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

SEERST EVES ONLY SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE EYES UILY

  1. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

Attachment lucky WILLIAM K. HARVEY Chief, Task Force W

Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

EVES ONLY

Excluded

SECRET Project ZRRIFLE

R371

ON MAR Z 1977

  1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.
  2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.
  3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions.

Classified by RECEIVED FROM SECRET JUN 24 1975 CIA

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11252 exemption schedule 53 (1), (2), (3) Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine

control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

  1. Operational Assets: (1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I. S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In October 1960,

SECRET RECEIVED FROM JUN 24 1975 CIA

SECRET

QJWIN annual salary: $7,200

Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & other agents & agent condidates: 2,000

Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates: 2,000

Travel of staff employees engaged in ARRIFLE activity: 2,500

Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses: 1,000 $14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?.

1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability. 2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important. 3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Government agencies. b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandato RECEIVED FROM SECRET JUN 24 1975 CIA

SECRET

DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency.

Training by opposition would

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Manuel in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all. 4) Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals.

SECRET RECEIVED FROM ANN 24 1975 GIA

SEGRET e. Staffers -selection.

5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file.

7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.

9) Useady nobody who has ever dealt with criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

10) Possible use of staffers for the action.

11) Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

SECRET RECEIVED FROM JUN 24 1975 CIA

SECRET Freedom to travel

Khokhlov case.

Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.

1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering & deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough.

2) One focal point for search, control, training, case-officer & PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

4) Non-attributability: No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can and limited official reference. pass as foreigners

5) No chain of connections/permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selecter in house territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. /4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

SECRET RECEIVED FRO... JUN 24 1975 CIA

SECRET 10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS) archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) Danger of Standbys.

SECRET RECEIVED FROM AN 24 1975 CIA

SECRET Scd G - 25/1 Exec Actions

Narcotics Bureau "for a living" RIS 201 cover caution Bankruptcy No star eyes Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2 Not a TSD problem Apply brakes Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.

--El Benefactor assumptions Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Ledford Ehut R&D memo.

"Translating machines" of E basic sounds project. pherious (V with CB)

comment Gear

Anathesia

26/1 AS Fanforn DCI Matter No file Never mentions word assassination.

  1. Select proper oern to run 2 Max as
  2. Place a cover BWKH - AS-
  3. Security Rules Sid Reserv.
  4. Guide leves Substitute What next
  5. Last Resort Brakes -
  6. No other agencies
  7. No projects or papers except per cover.
  8. Principal agent (Mankel) ? AF Project draft LCH tested 1500 from NB. Mask spat rqm. stall AF project cler Dbieke SECRET RECEIVED FROM JUN 24 1975 CIA

SECRET

  1. Disposal
  2. Targets who & where Must know before we can spot
  3. Case officering
  4. Cover file create to provide RIS or xxxtobel it. non Sov
  5. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed Fd J list Remember

SECRET RECEIVED FROM 制 24 1975 CIA