176 10030 10422

176-10030-10422 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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AGENCY: NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10030-10422 RECORD SERIES: Sorensen Papers AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: Schlesinger, Jr. TO: President Kennedy TITLE: Memo to President CIA Reorganization DATE: 6/30/1961 PAGES: 15 SUBJECTS: CIA DOCUMENT TYPE: Memoranda CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified RESTRICTIONS: 1C CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 8/21/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS: Sorensen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA, Document 1a.

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June 30, 1961

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK-84-149 ARABIC.C. 9/02

MEMORANDUM FC. THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CLA Reorganisation

I submit the following views as one who worked in CSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

Un balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. Put, again in the nature of the case, an ayency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned isw visible errors. The important thing to recognise today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Es margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate, and that this autonoray is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

Or should be -- a gross and repeated. CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e. g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, bet 30, No. 13, 1954).

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conception of the reintionship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these prob- lems can perhaps be llevinted

L CLA Autonomy : CIA conducts three : main forms of secret work, clandestine intelli- gence collection: comert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical. : When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, losked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. it did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to cutstrip the State Department in the quality of ite personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous pro- tection against MicCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a larga number of able and independent-minded men. The mere it added brilliant activists to its staff, the mere memestum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that Stato had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed. the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State re- tained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation simost as a fait accompli; State never had title to central overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it bad lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of evert diplomatic contacts.

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For its part. CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral- leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Departsant as well. Today it has its own politicai desks and military #ale; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or hes had) the own combat forces), it even has its own sir force. As annual budget is about times that of the State Depart- iment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristica of a state within a stato.

II Doctrine

Though CLA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operatione. The problem of doctrine for CIA to the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

Yot It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-sech, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in con. spiracy: and the whole point of Communist social and political organi sation is to make conspiracy effective. f 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the frecioms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under- stood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free secial order? : We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reportere will dig out stories, newspapers will pub- lish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operates. In abort, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

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Thers follows from ads, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secre: activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. ts rules and usages are fairly well established in the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate evan espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) sid whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other ar of the government. 4 Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidise newspapers, politicians and organisations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I' wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the sise of the pro- posed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater. the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming casa be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in قه serious way false to its owa principles. : นพ 10061 Docta 32622644 Page 5

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III. Operations and olicy Clandestine activitie should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of thei: relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U. S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestins satelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multituds of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of Indicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considershie embarrass- ment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depart- ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problema fer US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being crested as this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (o.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Bingapore Police) out- weighs the risk (e. g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in pur purposes and in our sonse), Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared bath with the Depart- ment of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador,

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1. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber האם :

This has been partly De consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personel, especially as compared with the diffider.ne of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organising coups or prepazing for paramilitary warfare, those men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and seal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organise as many coupe as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumabiy in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning.' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training cá personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contin- gencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is ergued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what bad started sa a pure apoculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to creste too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thoro after do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agenta. * : We become prisoners of our agente in another sense too. The Cuba episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control ita own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are mon of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are some times tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their ow and not necessarily in pelitical or even moral sympathy with the purpos of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revelationary Counci such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportech trained Cubans in methods of torture, such opisodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfa Nodal Tarets and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CLA in Washington to only dierly acquainted.

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1. ... It has meant too the the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its ater stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operatie, as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences a exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the way the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have isvored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off. " Moreover, at a time when there is incrossing premium en activism, State, when it questions CLA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative rods. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistics the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's Landtiative in covert political operations has been to create situations shich have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years siace, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even tren targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stininlate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime szampis.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CLA notifica State of a projected covert operation is inadequate te protect US Interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will con- tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reason- able control.

1. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CLA's encroachment on policy-making functione. CIA.today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department covar

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(the other 2200 are resumably under military or other nen-State official cover). Orginally the use of State Department cover for CLA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Ealles-Corrsa-ackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problenia, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through: tzcreased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to tempe: its dersands upon the State Department." Non- theless CIA has stently locreased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several wasons vary CLA has abandoned its original intentio of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive, it is quicker, it facilitates tha security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a picasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienns, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List Re being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CA5. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, bas more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Citen be bas direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursued a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative. !

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA poople. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporti outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. Cines even sought to monopelise contact with certain French political perecaiz ties, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA C the top floor of the Faris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on : NW 49061 DocId: 32622644 Page 9

the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement the the top floor was ablase with lights. (I am Laformed that Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA off: es only with difficulty.)

CLA is apparently Dos firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution or its problems. It is pressing to have CLA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before СА becomes permanentiy integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

1. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachabis from policy and there- fore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the politica! context than paramilitary warfare.

us. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and therely. as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics er to the suppert of already existing guerrilla activitisa,) For ansther, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own prodessed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show, : NW 49061 DocTd: 32622644 Page 10

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10. Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots supports and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with hirn. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sanding 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over- comeing guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force. : - Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second Worid var: in Greece, because Tite's defectica closed the corthara vorder; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paranmilitary operations but a vast educational program, organisation of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote ise Tee-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do. not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy. cooperation and assistance cannot be gained," He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern caresives with their weal and woe.." For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

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11. .. 5. How to Esta dish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience :ight not be of value. The notable feature of the Eritish intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under etric Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways : a) Secret telligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the Eritica representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of S.

b) basic poltical warfare directives are eriginated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group co International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent ader-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only con- form to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desko.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern opera- tions in special areas, such as, for example, Sine-Soviet rela- tions or the World Youth Festival. :o) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer ofte sent to the 815 Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Departement. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Departmeat clearance -- a clearance to be NW 49061 DocId: 32622644 Page: 12 E :

ke 12. enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groupe, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the felligence agency.

Cbviously this set would not succeed, however, unless the State Departmeat itself were prepared to overcome its inbred hatito of diffusion, egativism and delay and to take a firm and purpossful grip on ne situation.

IV. Cperations and intelligence The relationship between operations and intelligence raises partion- larly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine cellection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelli- gence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by...overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second invelves the colistion and interpretatior: of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for beth clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Depart- ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research siso hes ressarch and analysis responsibilities, but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing antional estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to subraitting its viewe to CLA for acceptance or rejection, in other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence fiabi, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA, NW 49061 DocId:32622644 Page 13

SECRET 13, The argument agains: incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that Information should processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to araw conclusions from these facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper proudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, havis-g once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty." .. Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA 1.e.. if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation. : Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishmeat ef a fairly independent esearch and estimate group. But, if the R& group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy or operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks. The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in- salligence branch (DD) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the potut in Cuba where a successful landing operation. would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia, In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situsties, but these were whally independent of the Cuban operation. I gat opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cube from that on which the opera tion was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situstion gather that, f : NW 49061 DocId:32622644 Page 14

SEUNCI : 14. that knowledge of the Cuben operation, flaunted in Miami bars by aay cumber of ice-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, : was denied to even see top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State know oven lass about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and cuerations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny. : Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as ki-o is to the Foreign Office, then the ..... function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde- pendent of both Stats and CLA, yet closely connected with both in dr to-day operations. The R&F. subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CLA/D and State/Intelligence and Research. might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collec tion, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Ecara with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman

V. Conclusion. The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrang rment of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacit of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to co so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as a present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this to not. In my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganisationa intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department. : : :

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SECRET 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would e as follows: : : 1) The Star Department would be granted general ciearance authority over all clandestine activity. This raight be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Unresecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for t! Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairrea of a Joint Intelligence Ecard.

2) The Jour. Intelligence Board would include repre- sentatives from ail elemente in the intelligence community and aleo from te bite House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless titis (the National Informa- tion Servico). This new agency would be charged with responsi- bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation. ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do. : 4) A second sensi-independent agency would be sat up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi- nate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. would include CLA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CLA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast inonitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean. cc: The Attorney General Mr. Bundy Mr. Dungan .. SECR Arthur Schlesinger, jr.