176 10033 10145

176-10033-10145 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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AGENCY: NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10145 RECORD SERIES: Church Committee AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : WH FROM: Schlessinger, Jr. TO: Kennedy, John F TITLE: CIA Reorganization DATE: 6/30/1961 PAGES: 15 SUBJECTS: DOCUMENT TYPE: Paper, Textual CLASSIFICATION: Declassified RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 2/14/2001. OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS :

FINITILED ML. 11. 2612 5/12 SECRET

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization .. CIA. } I submit the following viewe as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quote. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more GIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum te that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonomy te due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate *Or should be a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, NN. 6, 13, 1954). SECRET

SECRET 8. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests waye in which some of these prob- lems can perhaps be allevinted.

CIA Autonomy CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intellt gence collections covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the sutonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of ite traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on thie new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firma control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities, and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their coustries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of ite personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher anteries and aven more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous pro- tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large sumber of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater rote it played in the loftiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems crested by an active and autonomous CIA, it had tong since missed the change to establish its ava ultimate authority, While State re- tained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, thia vạn to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a fait accomplis Gtate never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collections and it had lost ground in such arese as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contactor SECRET 4

SECRET 3. For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral- leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffes it has in effect its own foreign service, it has (or bas had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about _ times that of the State Depart- ment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state. - Doctrine Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our donduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such. we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in con- spiracy, and the whole point of Communist social and political organi- zation is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americane in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open cociety places on secret activity. Until this te done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under- stood. The problem which must be faced ion what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politiciane will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will pub- lish editorials, individuels, driven by promptinge of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate, In short, they constitute the problems and, ae General Marshall used to say, "There's no point to fighting the problem." SECRET 6

SECRET There followe from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents ite own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Es rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook end a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS te not beginning to barm other activities of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidico newspapers, politicians and organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Fazamilitary activities creato an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general. I could suggest that any secret operation whose success to dependant on the suppression of newe, on lying to Congressmen and journaliste and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the cristo to co considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the gise of the pro posed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations caa bo done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more ite success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society. the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it to that an overwhelming case be mede for ite necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed oporation, we must not only ask whether the operation to technically fensitie in its own termen we must ask whether ite succese requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principled, SECRET

4000 SECRET' 6 5. III. Operations and Policy Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CLA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U. S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exровев American foreign poltey to a multitude of embarrassmente when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Polico provides en instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiore of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, preduced considerabis embarrase. ment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been tronbies of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NGA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depart- ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential probleme for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are boing created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decido whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (eg, the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) out- weighs the risk (c.ge, azasporating the local government and shaking ite confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Depart- ment of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassados. SECRET

SECRET 6. 2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organising coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal, they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unlese, say, they organize as many coups se possible. The concept of 'coatingency planning' hae legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage, people did not at first actice that 'contingency planning.' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforme contin gencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basts, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and allenation of the groupt to the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many probleme and embarrassmente. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lando, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must there. efter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.

We become prisoners of our agente in another canse too. The Cuban opisode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control ite own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are some- times tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their owa and not necessarily in political or even morel sympathy with the purposes of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council, such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfa Nodal Tarafa and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted. SECRET

SECRET ( 7. It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of en operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a vetc. i well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was cando to go ahead on Cubat "I would never have favored initiating this operations but, since it • bas gone as far as it has. I do not think we can risk calling it off. " Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activie Etate, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, caste itself in a prissy, cissy, negative sole. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles ae the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we cay in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idralistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of GIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have loveed policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind GIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 meraorendum to the Genate Armed Bervices Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the yeere since, CIA hae, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governmente still in power know that they have aven bean targets of CIA attempts at overthrow - not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelinge toward the United States. Indonesis, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present systems by which CIA notifice State of a projected covert operation te inadequate to protect UB Interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will con tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but et too late a point to subject that impact to reason. able control 3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly to many people under official cover oversese as State - 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover 49061 DocId: 32629331 Pare A SECRET

SECRET 8. (the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." None- theless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State, it is less expensive; it is quickers it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

Of the In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List 60 being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnels of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. 13 officere listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS, Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and to abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador, Also he te generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Forte Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Parto has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA bao even sought to monopolice contact with certain French political personali ties, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, e fact well known locally: and on SECRET 6

SECRET 9. the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passere-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.

CIA is apparently now Armly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have GIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before GAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local GAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

1. Paramilitery warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quartere as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there- fore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there to almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political contaxt than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasone for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation to in ite nature & large and attributable operation and thereby. de suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in gusseilla tactics or to the support of slready existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the mozel and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them, when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defest. Moreover, 80 the rodent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisonere episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books, The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about Uquidating e losing show, SECRET

SECRET 10. Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeede when his program enlists grassroote supports and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over coming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

In Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border: in the Philippines; and in Malaya. the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operatione but a vast educational program, organisation of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrillas power lies in his revolutionary program, the anewer lies in part in meeting the aceds which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung. "guerrille warfare must fall, as it must if ito političal objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the meeses? If we do, we must go among the masses: arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe." For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon, it te primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense. SECRET

SECRET 11. 5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of wayer

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates undes the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of 815.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by 818, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Comosunist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under Secretary's Department in the Fareiga Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only con form to Foreign Office directives dut must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical degke

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern opere. tions to special areas, such es, for example, Sino-Soviet rela- tions of the World Youth Festival,

c) a Foreign Office Staff Lisicon Officer sito nest to the 818 Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve toure of duty in 819 sections All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Departments Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance → à clearance to be SECRET ها

SECRET 12. enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and Intelligence The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particu- larly perplexing questions. Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collections and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelli- gence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulies estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by...overt, normal, and aboveboard moans would supply us with ever 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the colletion and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysie and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Doparimont.

Under the American gyetem, CIA has responatbility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Depart ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysto responsibilities, but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in euch e way as to reduce State's contribution to gubmitting ita views to CIA for acceptance or rejections in other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA, SECRET شا

SECRET 13. The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facte, and to draw conclusions from those facte, without baving either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA.. Le.. if intelligence is too closely connected with operatione, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to eclect out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, ane runs into the opposite dangers that te. that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate Intelligence checke,

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operetion evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in telligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never salted to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cube where a succosefal tanding operation would provoko uprisings behind the Haco and defections from the Militia. in December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation I gather that, if ite opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cube from that on which the opera tion was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation SECRET

1. SECRET 14. that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bare by any number of low level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde- pendent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA →→ photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, mape, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.. The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drestic rearrange. ment of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department es at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this ise not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department. SECRET

JA0061 SECRET 15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include repre- sentatives from all elements in the intelligence coramunity and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Informa tion Service). This new agency would be charged with responsi- bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activitice. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation. ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi nate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would Include CIA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, mape, avert collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

cc: The Attorney General Mr. Bundy Mr. Dungan Arthur Schlesinger, jr. SECRET