180 10110 10100

180-10110-10100 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: 10/20/20

Agency Information AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10100 RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 125-JFK

Document Information ORIGINATOR: CIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 00/00/0000 PAGES: 1 SUBJECTS: OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified RESTRICTIONS: 1A CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/01/2003 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS: Box 4. v9.1 NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 1

Wich Danny get exact. + focumented visits phonecalls: / SCENARIO Educa y Joys gregand by Dan Hardwa CHRONOLOGY OF OSWALD'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

September 26, 1963 Thursday A man claiming to be Oswald vists the Cuban Embassy between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. The visit probably occurs around one o'clock. "Oswald" is discribed as 5'6" tall, blond hair, sunken cheeks, very thin, aquiline nose, very straight eyebrows, approximately 35 years old and wearing a light blue Prince of Wales suit. He was said to look very cold with a hard face and a penetrating cunning way of looking at you. "Oswald" was seeking an intransit visa to Cuba on his way to Russia. He displayed documents that showed his membership in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the American Communist Party. He was told that he would have to first obtain a visa to Russia before he could be issued an intransit visa. He is also told that he should return to the Cuban Embassy with his passport and a copy of a photograph in order to fill out the visa application.

September 27, 1963 Friday

Circa 10:30 Α.Μ. "Oswald" calls the Soviet Military Attache (SMA) Teltry with whom he speaks in Spanish. He tells the SMA that he is looking for a visa to Odessa. The SMA tells him to call the Consulate. "Oswald" asks for directions to the Embassy and recieves them.

10:37 Α.Μ. "Oswald" calls the Soviet Consulate and asks to Teltop speak to the Consul in Spanish. He is told that the Consul is not in. He is told that he can call back at 11:30. "Oswald" says that he is looking for a visa to Odessa.

circa 11:30 Α.Μ. "Oswald" goes to the Russian Embassy where he Tel log at once again exhibits the documents he has already shown the Cubans as well as other documents such as his and Marina's marriage license. "Oswald" discusses his situation with someone at the Embassy and comes away with the understanding that everything would be expeditiously handled.

circa 12:15 Ρ.Μ. Someone from the Soviet Embassy calls Azcue w/C here whom he is aware of because of what "Oswald" Azque has told him, and tells him that they have to get authorization from Moscow to grant him a visa and that it will probably take four months.

circa 12:45 Α.Μ. "Oswald" returns to the Cuban Embassy with the NW 50955 DocId: DocId: 32263505 Page 2

Page Two.

9/27/63 12:45 (cont'd) photo and completes the visa application, e stating that he would like to leave in three days. He asks Azcue about how long it will Arque take to get the visa. Azcue explains his DUNAN misconception to him, an argument results and 5:00 Sivasey Azcue throws Oswald out. Duran feels sympathetic w/C. to Oswald, gives him her address, and promises to help in any way she can. She feels that Oswald should have been granted the visa with no problems and that Azcue's actions are wrong.

1:25 Ρ.Μ. Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate in an attempt to find out what has gone wrong with the arraing- ment he thought he had. In Spanish, he asks for the Consul. He is told that the Consul is out and that he can be contacted between four and five on Mondays and Fridays. This call may have been from Duran's phone. If it was he then told her that he could get hold of the Soviet he had his deal with and would she be kind enough to talk to him. She said that she would and to come back at four o'clock. If the call was not made then Oswald got this message to Silvia and the same arraingments for Silvia's four o'clock call were made.

4:05 Ρ.Μ. Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Embassy. She tells them the American citizen, the one who wants a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia, is -4 there. She asks who he talked to at the Soviet Telitop Embassy when she sent him there to get a Soviet visa so he could get an intransit visa to Cuba. She tells the official she is speaking with that the man seeking the visa wants to know with whom he spoke because he had been assured that there would be no problem. The man at the Soviet Embassy puts another man on the phone and Silvia goes through it again. He tells her that her call will be returned..

4:26 Ρ.Μ. A Soviet Official returns Silvia's call. The TelTgs situation is explained to Silvia. She realizes that she cannot give him a visa because of the delay on the Soviet end and the fact that he does not know anyone in Cuba. What does Silvia tell Oswald who is still setting there waiting? In light of subsequent events it was probably something that would keep his hopes up.

Night Oswald goes to a party at Rubin Duran's with Silvia and two American friends. This may have been, more likely was, the night of the 26th. He is seen by Elena Garro de Paz. He spends the night with Silvia. NW. 50955 DocId: 32263505 Page 3

Page Three.

September 28, 1963 Saturday

circa 11:00 Α.Μ. Oswald is back at the Soviet Embassy bugging them to expedite his visa. They send him back to the Cuban Embassy to get an address.

11:51 Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and puts Oswald. He tells them that he is returning 6 to the Soviet Embassy with the address. d on the phone.

circa 12:00 Oswald returns to the Soviet Embassy and is assured that a telegram will be sent and that it will be handled as quickly as possible.

afternoon Oswald decides that he needs more help and tracks down a revolutionary, pro-Castro Cuban group on the campus of the University of Mexico. Maybe he hopes that he can find someone who will say they know him in Cuba. In any case, he seeks some sort of assistance from these Pro-Castroites. He spends the night with them.

September 29, 1963 Sunday Morning Oswald spends the day with the Pro-Castro group.

Sunday Afternoon/ evening and night ?

September 30, 1963 ? Note: the association with the Cuban group could have been anytime between the afternoon. of 9/28 and the afternoon of 9/30. Contreras said that he met Oswald in the afternoon and spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day with him.

October 1, 1963 10:31 Α.Μ. Oswald calls the Soviet Military Attache inquiring about a telegram. He is refered Tueday to the Consulate..

10:45 Α.Μ. Oswald calls the consulate with the same inquiry and learns that the telegram has been sent but f no reply has been received. He is discouraged. Obyedkov hangs up on him.

later or earlier Oswald calls the man with whom he had made his "arrangement" and discusses the assistance that was promised him. He is dangled and the man

later or on the 2nd. Oswald leaves Mexico. Wednesday ==End of OCR for page 4==

On or about 9/30/63 Mondens

10/1/63 this may have happened MCS recieves a transcript in which Silvia Duran discusses an American and his prob- lem with a Soviet Counsel. Win Scott writes "Can we identify?" on transcript........ Goodpasture notifies Flick that an Ameri can is apparently trying to get a visa and that the COS would like to ID, The Cuban and Soviet monitors are asked to notify Flick of any conversation involving an american, or in English. etc, HOWEVER.

Flick is notified by a monitor that there is an English conversation on the Soviet tap. Flick listens and hears the man ID himself as Oswald. He pulls the tape and marks it "urgent" and notifies Goodpasture that they have an ID on an American. The tape is delivered to Tarasoff for immediate transcription. It is recieved late this day or early on the second by Goodpasture. Disposition of tape unknown, could "urgent" tapes have been routinely retained for longer period? Goodpasture now has ID but does not know for sure that it is the one that Scott has asked about. The guy in the 9/27 conversation sounds real interesting but there is nothing in this conversation, OR, that clearly connects. She discusses reporting it with Manell. There is some disagreement over whose responsiblity it is to report. Either decesion is made, or conflict continues until photos is checked.

Goodpasture ties in 9/28 Soviet conversation re: address.

10/7/63 Photos from 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4 (?) are recieved in base from Soviet Embassy.

10/8/63 B. Manell drafts report cable. Goodpasture adds paragraph 2.

10/10/63 (in interim: Goodpasture tries to ID MMM photo? how?) HQ response recieved. Descriptions don't match. Controversy in station on whether Oswald's same. 9/2749/28 DAFINATELY conversation tied in to LHO during this week. by similarity of SULTANTIVE CONTENT OF CADIZ AND CONVERSATION ATUD VOICE COMPARISON.

10/16/63 Oswald "P" file opened.

10/18/63 by this time photo of MMM recieved at Station. Goodpasture picks up on it. This MMM photo one from Cubemb on 10/15. NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 5

10/21/63 10/15 MMM shown to penetration agents by this time. What response? MCS cables HQ asking for a photo of LHO. For what purpose? Was it just to compare to surveillance photos? Were they planning on showing to penatration agents? why? note: quite a few people say interest. level was high--so what actions werė taken? NW 50955 DocId: 32263505 Page 6

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 24 August 1978 011042 HSCA Interview of David Atlee Phillips at HSCA offices, 8/23/78, 1:20 to 4:35 P.M., by Dan Hardway, Charles Berk, and Gaeton Fonzi.

Mr. Phillips was reminded that the CIA omnibus release letter still 1 applied to our discussions and that he should feel free to answer our questions in spite of any secrecy oath that he may have executed during his employment with the CIA, He was asked if he remembered and under stood the letter and if he wanted to review the letter again, Mr. Phillips stated that he remembered the letter and did not think it necessary to see the letter again,

リ 1 Mr. Phillips was asked about his activities in Mexico that related to his job as Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City Station from 1961 to 1963, Mr. Phillips was asked how many persons were in his propoganda shop in Mexico City, He said that it was manned only by himself, a case officer under his direction and a secretary. He later added that there was also one other case officer under his direction who worked under deep cover outside of the Embassy. Mr. Phillips stated that from 1961 to 1963 he ran only about 6 or 7 operations or projects. He added that there would have also been many "ad hoc" actions. Under questioning, he stated that it is possible that he was responsible for as many as 14 to 17 ongoing operations and 3 to 6 developmental stage operations. Most of these operations were directed at the Cuban target and "the great percentage of them had an anti-Cuban or anti-Soviet bias."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the handling of agents, He stated that he himself handled "very very few agents, "Usually I met with someone who was working deep cover and they in turn would handle several agents." Mr. Phillips did recall handling one agent personally, a radio-TV broadcaster. He also said that he would often meet with other agents even NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 7 :5 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 2. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1.? though he was not handling them on a day to day basis, He stated that at all times he had at least one deep cover officer working outside of the Embassy and that, sometimes, he had two such officers,

Mr. Phillips stated that he did have access, and did use in some of his propoganda activities, agents who were located outside of Mexico,

Mr. Phillips also stated that he did use a few assets that he had developed prior to his transfer to Mexico City; he specifically recalled a man named SAYAS who had been a newspaperman in Cuba and went to workin Mexico City. He said that while he had been a propoganda officer for the JMARC operation he had used assets that he had developed during his prior tour of duty in Hayana, Mr, Phillips said that such assets were usually handled by him personally during the Bay of Pigs, : 7 Mr. Phillips stated that during the Bay of Pigs operation he travelled to Miami "fairly frequently; every 6 weeks, 3 weeks, 5 weeks." He stated that responsibility for propoganda operations were divided between him and his subordinate in Miami, William Kent, When asked to explain that division Mr. Phillips stated: Kent reported to my shop in Washington, He had day to day contact with the groups we were supporting down there, the student group and the doctors or whatever, and the people involved in Radio Swan,

Phillips stated that Radio Swan was run out of Miami, through the mechanism of the Gibralter Steamship Company, He did say that he was in contact with the agent who ran Radio Swan, He said that he felt uncom- fortable naming thần agent and suggested we ask the Agency for his identity, D Mr. Phillips stated that when he traveled to Miami he often went " to see the people he knew from Hayana, including those he was running as agents himself, .: He would also, on occassion meet with agents whom NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 8 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 3. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Bill Kent was running "if Bill Kent got to the point where he felt he would like a little weight," Sometimes he went down to Miami on a "trouble shooting" mission, as when problems developed with a commercial radio station the Agency was funding, 1 : Mr. Phillips stated that he had had no recent contact with Mr. Kent relating to anything being done by this Committee, He did state that, approximately a month ago when Mr. Kent retired from the CIA, he received a call from Mr, Kent, He said that Mr. Kent said that he was setting up an executive employment agency and had asked for Mr. Phillips help in finding jobs for former employees of the agency as well as referring people for specific skilled jobs, They did not discuss the HSCA at all, 1 according to Phillips, 1. Mr. Phillips stated that it would be accurate to state that there were two "sets" of propoganda activities during the Bay of Pigs; one that was run out of the Miami offices coordinated by Bill Kent and a second set that he personnally ran without coordinating with Mr. Kent. Most of Mr. Phillips prior established assets were in the second set of propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that even after he became Chief of Cuban Operations in Mexico City he still worked very closely with the propoganda shop, and his successor as head of that shop, James Flannery, in propoganda operations. Mr. Phillips said that his "Cuban shop" covered the activities of the Cuban Embassy and that a special group covered the airport. He said that a good deal of time was COMMITTEE SENSITIVE NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 9

Phillips, page 4. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE spent looking for opportunities to recruit Cubans who came to Mexico City. The shop also ran a debriefing center for Cubans who left Cuba by way of Mexico. He also said that one of the primary activities of the Cuban shop would have been to identi- fy the DGI officers in the Cuban Embassy and their functions, duties and assignments whenever possible. Mr. Phillips said that he was still involved in propaganda activities at this time specifically recalling a Mexican broadcaster whose radio station could be heard in Cuba. Mr. Phillips pointed out that he had been a close friend of Mr. Flannery's and that Mr. Flannery was made Chief of Covert Action in Mexico on his, Phillip's, recommendation.

Mr. Phillips' said that he had "quite good" relations with Win Scott and that he reported directly to him as opposed to reporting through the Deputy Chief of Station which would have been the routine manner. Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that Robert Shaw had been in charge of the Cuban photographic surveillance operations and that they had two penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy. He stated that he could not remember the names of the penetration agents and was not sure of the cryptonyms.

Mr. Phillips was asked why his name came up so infrequently in a review of Agency documents of this period from Mexico City. He said that his name should appear on any "formal project" he had going, but that he "did like to delegate work." He said that his name must be on many papers. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE 1 DocId:32263505 Page 10

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Phillips, page 5.

Mr. Phillips said that there was a CI responsibility in the Cuban shop. "You always watch out for it, but there was no formal program." He said, however, that "I never really under- stood what CI was." Phillips said that there were some CIA officers who made counter-intelligence their primary concern during their entire careers but that he was not one of them.

He described the CI effectiveness of the Mexico City Station as "average" and its Cuban section as "less than average."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was aware of the existence of the Special Affairs Staff in Washington that dealt with Cuban matters. He was also aware that the SAS had its own counter-intelligence section. He recalled meeting the Chief of that section, Hal SWENSON, on a trip to Washington. He normal also said that it would have been routine for Mr. Swenson to have traveled to Mexico City on "routine trips" or special cases. He said that he had probably seen Swenson in Mexico but that he did not recall any specific meetings.

Mr. Phillips recalled that the Legat office of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico was large; that it had 11 to 20 officers assigned to it. He said that there was a close relationship between the Agency station and the Legat office. He said what? that the Legat got "drop copies" of most reports. He said that it would have been routine to advise the Legat of "interesting cases" and that an American reporting to a foreign embassy would have been such a case. He said that a local dissemination would have definately been routine and that this liaison NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 11 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Phillips, page 6 relationship would have been at least partially responsible for reporting such a visit to Headquarters.

Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case, it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any action other than just reporting the information that had come to its attention. Mr. Phillips said that it could have happened in certain circumstances, such as if the contact looked as if he had recruitment potential or was a serious security case. In those instances it was possible that other actions would be taken. Mr. Phillips remembers one such instance specifically and pointed out that it is related in his book, Nightwatch, on pp. 126-128. This is a story of an American military officer who offered to spy for the Cubans and an operation mounted against him by the Agency in Mexico. In response to a direct question Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the Station other than just reporting could, and often did, take actions/in regard to Americans in Mexico that were in contact with Soviet or Bloc Embassies without a specific request from another interested agency; i.e., they often took investigative and operational action on their own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did not go to the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division but directly to either the DCI or DDP. He pointed out that Scott had been a division chief himself prior to his assignment as Chief of Station in Mexico. NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 12 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Phillips, page 7.

Mr. Phillips was asked if the CIA shared assets and informants with the FBI in Mexico. He said that he did not know of any such cases but there was coordination and liaison with the Bureau on the surveillance operations. have Mr. Mr. Phillips acknowledged that one additional area in which the Station and the FBI shared an interest was the colony of American expatriates in Mexico. He said that he was not sure of who had the responsibility for that area in the Station but that it may of been Ms. Ann Goodpasture. Phillips stated that he was not aware of any Agency liaison in Mexico City with either Army or Navy regarding counter- intelligence or counter-espionage cases. He said that he had never heard of any arguments that may have occured concerning whose responsibility it was to report Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy or about the extensiveness of the Station's reporting after the assassination.

Mr. Phillips does remember Viola June COBB. "Blonde, flew an airplane, track record for hitting a lot of beds in Cuba, had a twin sister involved in aviation. That's what comes to mind." He vaguely remembers messages or reports from or about her coming out of his Cuban shop but he believes that she was run out of Washington or Miami as an asset and that someone from one of those two places would have regularly come to Mexico to run her.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did not recall an officer with a hair lip or who spoke with a lisp. NW 50955 DocId: 32263505 Page 13 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Phillips, page 8.

Phillips stated that he did not know if Ms. Cobb was also an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Phillips stated that he recalls three or four members of the Warren Commission staff coming to Mexico. He said that he may have chatted with them informally but he had no formal dealings with them. He said that they spent most of their time with Mr. Scott.

Mr. Phillips said that he first heard the name of Silvia Duran about the time he arrived in Mexico, as soon as he started reading the telephone tap transcripts. "Her name appeared time and time again." He added: "We had no interest in her. She wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously mentioned, in his discussion of the Cuban shop's interest in recruiting agents, the name of Ambassador Lachuga and their interest in pitching him. Mr. Phillips was shown Slawson's memo concerning his trip to Mexico where Scott told him that the CIA had a substantial prior interest in Duran because of her affair with Lắchuga. Phillips seemed surprised and said "No one let me in on this operation." Mr. Phillips said that it is possible that the Agency pitched Duran. "At one time we pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy. She must have been considered." Mr. Phillips said that it was possible that she was not pitched because the station could not identify any of her weaknesses. At this point Mr. Phillips was told about the LITAMEL/9 reports on Duran that said that all that 1 NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 14 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 9. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE all that would have to be done to recruit her was get a blonde, blue eyed American in bed with the little "puta." Mr. Phillips admitted that it sounded like she had at least been targeted and that the station's interest was substantial and that the weakness and means had been identified. He pointed out, however, that targeting does not necessarily mean that she had been pitched, or, even if she was pitched, that she had accepted the pitch. Mr. Phillips said that he was not aware that a pitch had been made.

Phillips stated that Ms. Duran's 201 file should be "very thick". He stated that a thin 201 file prior to the assassination "would be very surprising". He said that a name trace should come up with at least a lot of 3x5 cards that predate the assassination.

Mr. Phillips stated that he saw Lachuga only three times after he left Cuba: once on an airplane from Miami--"we just nodded"--; once at the inauguration of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz; and once when he was having lunch at a fancy resturant near the American Embassy in Mexico. On the last encounter Phillips said that he knew Lắchuga was going to be there and that he had specifically gone there to talk to him. He said that Lachuga turned off all the advances he made.

Phillips was asked why the Agency had sent a cable to Mexico after Ms. Duran's arrest saying "don't allow any Americans to have contact with her." (paraphrase). He said: "Don't know. I can't tell you why they did that. I can't guess why." He said that he was not aware that the NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 15 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 10. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Warren Commission staffers who were in Mexico wanted to talk to Duran. He said that he knew Clarence BOONSTRA well, that the last he heard he was in North Florida, but that he had never discussed the assassination or Oswald with him.

Mr. Phillips said that he vaguely remembered that Win Scott did have a safe in his office. He guessed that Scott and his secretary would have been the only people who had access to that saff. He said that Scott had had several secretaries over a period and that he only remembers the first name of one of them: Dottie. He said that he had no idea of what Scott kept in his safe. personallyy He said that when he was chief of station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela, he kept really "very sensitive" material in his safe in his office. He assumes that the same would have been true of Mr. Scott. Phillips offered the example that someone would call and say that someone at the Embassy was a prostitute, he would note that for the record in keep it in the private safe. He guessed that the material in the safe would have been material Scott generated himself. He said that memos of meetings with the Mexican president in which sensitive topics were discussed would have been a likely candidate for retention in Scott's safe. He said that he does not know what happened to Scott's safe after he died but that he has heard a vague story that someone went out and found a lot of documents that Scott had kept.

Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that the Chief of NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 16 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 11. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE the DGI in Mexico was a man named "LUNA."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the story in his book con- cerning the DGI officer with the penchant for antique jewelry that appears at page 133. He said that he does not remember the name of that person, but says he took some literary license because he doesn't specifically recall if the person was, in fact, a DGI officer. "Thank God my next book is fiction," he said.

Phillips was asked about the following DGI officers: Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez--"vaguely familiar"; Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez--"Yes, familiar."; Manual Vega--could have been Chief of DGI; Luisa Caldern--"familiar"; Teresa Proenza--"definitely familiar"; Alfredo Mirabal--"familiar"; Eusebio Azcue--the consul, "to my knowledge he was not Cuban intelligence."

Mr. Phillips was asked if Proenza was a CIA asset. He said "The name is familiar but I don't recall the context." He also could not remember if Luisa Calderon had been an asset.. He said: "I don't really remember the true names of the agents. I never saw them or dealt with them." He stated that he could not remember whether the Agency had ever pitched Ruiz but that "there were several attempts to pitch intelligence types."

Mr. Phillips was shown Carlos Blanco's report of 28 June 1963. He stated that he had probably seen it previously but does not remember it specifically. He said that the name COMMITTEE SENSITIVE NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 17

Phillips, page 12. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE Carlos Blanco had probably been made up for the purposes of this one report. He said that he recalled the name of Luisa Calderon a bit better after reading the document. He said that she may have been the asset who worked in the Embassy for the Agency but he still could not be certain because he could not recall the true names. He said that he did not know if there would have been a "further report" and that, if there was, it would not have necessarily been sent to Head- quarters unless it had been of special interest.

Mr. Phillips was then shown the dispatch concerning Luisa's sister. (CIA # 3715.) He said that he does not know whether she was ever identified, contacted or used. He said that he had never heard of a "domestic exploitation section" and pointed out that the words were not capitalized.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did know Mr. Barney Hidalgo. He does not recall him ever being in Mexico but said that it was possible that Mr. Hidalgo could have been there and that he would not have known about it. He said that he had on occassion worked with Mr. Hidalgo. He said that Hidalgo did not have any executive talents, but he was involved in a lot of operations. He said that Hidalgo had some problems: "I don't want to say he was crazy, but I was always uncomfortable around him." Mr. Phillips also recognized the cryptonym AMMUG/1.

Mr. Phillips was shown CIA #3's 3665 and 3662 which are reports from AMMUG that the Cubans believed that Calderon had been recruited by the CIA and had, therefore, called her back NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 18 COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Phillips, page 13. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE to Cuba. Mr. Phillips said that that did not help him recall that much about Calderon other than to make him think that she was not a CIA agent "because she went back to Cuba."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware that after the assassination that Thomas Mann expressed a great deal of interest in the Mexico City investigation. He also said that he did not know why Mann would have been pressing for the arrest and questioning of Luisa Calderon. He said that, in fact, he had never known or heard that such was the case.

call. Mr. Phillips was shown the transcript of the Calderon (CIA 3717.) He said "I've seen this document before... He when we were reviewing things after the assassination." was asked what the Mexico Station had done to follow up on that conversation. He said that he could not recall that any- thing was done other than forwarding the conversation to Head- quarters. He said that he did not know what Headquarters had done with it. He said that he could not remember being tasked or his shop being tasked, with anything concerning this lead. He said that he did not know if this conversation was given to the WC by HQ but acknowledged that it was not shown to the staff members who visited Mexico. He does not recall any specific follow up regarding Calderon. He does not know why Calderon was not arrested.

The section of Carlos Blanco's report concerning Teresa Proenza was pointed out to Phillips. He said that he thought the report may have been written by a person used by the station that thought that everyone was a communist. He said this may COMMITTEE SENSITIVE NW 50955 DocId:32263505 Page 19

Phillips, page 14. COMMITTEE SENSITIVE have been LIHUFF/1. He said that the document did not help his memory that much and that "I don't know of any reason why she would be termed dangerous."

(CIA # 3714.). Mr. Phillips Phillips was shown the LITAMEL/9 contact report regarding the firing of