198 10004 10076

198-10004-10076 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form

Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: 198-10004-10076

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information ORIGINATOR: ARMY FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR. TO:

TITLE:

DATE: 00/00/1963 PAGES: 123

SUBJECTS: EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1B; IC CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.

JFK Assassination Records Department of the Army EO 13526 Declassify Exclude Exempt Authority Refer To Review Date 12/8/2015 By K. Emer

v9.i 2

NO. SUBJECT DATE 1 CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 17 Jan 63 (SECRET-NOFORN)

2 Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C) 22 Jan 63 w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)

3 Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy 23 Jan 63 Towards Cuba (TOP SECRET) (in dupe)

4 Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above (TOP SECRET) 23 Jan 63

5 Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above, from 23 Jan 63 DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)

6 DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards 23 Jan 63 Cuba, Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1 Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm, Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba (TOP SECRET)

7 Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for 24 Jan 63 NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan. 63. (TOP SECRET)

8 National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and Undtd Closed) (TOP SECRET)

9 Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina- 4 Feb 63 tion of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)

SECRET - SENSITIVE February 4, 1963

: ARA - Hr. Cottrell FRON : S/P - John W. Ford Subject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba

In accordance with your instructions, over the week-end I have reviewed the main sources of policy on Cuba. The problem as I define it as follows:

The Problem:

Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinat- ing Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work bed been done on Cuba, both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of such policy and contingency planning in an effort to determine if any of the work previously done will be of value to the officers of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.

Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:

The principal sources of policy and contingency planning which may or may not be of value to the work of your committee ere as follows:

  1. The National Security Action Hemorenda emenating from the White House.

  2. The Actions of the National Security Council.

  3. The Eesia National Security Policy of the U.S. (now avaiting final stages of formal elecrance before presentation to National Security Council).

  4. The Records

SECRET - - BENSITIVE 4. The Records of Action of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council as they pertain to Cuba.

  1. The Reports of the Sub-Committees of EXCOM - curing the Cuban Crisis.

  2. The Resolutions of the Organization of American States and the Punta del Este Conference.

  3. Public Statements of Government Officials, in Particuler Press Conference of President Kennedy of September 13, 1962.

  4. Meeting of Secretary Rusk with Foreign Ministero of Latin America during Cuban Crisis.

  5. Recently Approved New Policy Statement and Objectives en Drews Up by the Interdepartmental Comittee of Cuban Affairs.

  6. Ouben Guidelines Paper. (A guidelines paper es such does not exist on Cuba os is the case in a majority of other countries.)

CONCLUSIONS:

There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with Cuba, perticalerly thet generated during the recent October crisis. This review is nearing completion, and I en segregating particular reports which may be of value to the members of your comittee as we go forward with implementation of the new policy and objectives. In the attached documentation, I have segregated those National Security Council decisions and National Security Action Memoranda which are carried es pending or closed in the files of the Department of Stete. Where action on a particular MSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to EXOOM, action responsibility on these decisions would appear now to be within the purview of your Coordinating Committee. From my review to date,

CRET - SENSITIVE to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for actions which have already been considered by your Committee. You will note that in some instances cction responsibility on an NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to the Special Group (Mr. Alexis Johnson).

Attachment: List of Pending and Closed NSC and NASAM decisiona concerning Cuba.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA (PENDING AND CLOSED)

NSC Action No. Substance Status 483 NSC 2422a Agreed that US policy toward (Pending) 5/5/61 Cuba should sim at the downfall According to of Castro regime. files, out of thia NSC direct- ive grew a policy paper, to be handled different ly from regular guidelines papers on each country. As of 9/4/62, White House was informed that action on this NSC directive would be reported in compliance with NSAM 181 which transferred certain NSC & NASAM actions to special group (Alexis Johnson).

483 NSC 2422d Importance President (Pending) 5/5/61 attaches to obtaining Action to be adequate intelligence reported in on Cuban military compliance with capabilities. NASAM 181 (Johnson channel)

483 NSC 24226 Importance President (Pending) 5/5/61 attaches to publication Action trans- in free world press of ferred to EXCOM terrorist actions of Castro regime, etc. and to possible political action to end current terror.

483 NSC 24228 Relations with Cuban (Pending) 5/5/61 Revolutionary Council Action trans- should be improved. ferred to EXCOM

483 NSC 24221 Cuban refugees to be given (Pending) 5/5/61 refugee status; refugees in Action trans- Hiami to be relocated; ferred to EXCOM refugees to be eligible to apply for travel privileges.

483 NSC 2422k Initiation of negotiations (Pending) 5/5/61 to enlarge willingness of Action trans- other American states to ferred to EXCOM join in action against Castro.

NSC Action No. Substance Status 483 NSC 2622m USIA will expand L.A. (Pending) 5/5/61 program, but not initiste Action trans- electronic warfare against ferred to Castro, means of propaganda Johnson channel should be madeavailable Per NASAM to non-US groups. 4181.

483 NSC 24228 US military officers under (Closed) 5/5/61 general guidance to be completed action prepared by Dept of State, as of 11/28/61. would discuse Castro threst to all L.A. with L.A. officers.

483 MSC 24220 Dept of State should prepare (Closed) 5/5/61 a report on a possible new S/P paper juridical basis for effective "possible new Basis for Anti- Communist Action" 7/24/61 anti-comunist action.

483 HSC 2422p Robert Woodward's assumption Closed. 5/5/61 of responsibility of Task Force on Cuba on announcement of appointment.

483 NSC 24226 No US military intervention Closed. 5/5/61 now. Do nothing which would foreclose possibility military intervention in future.

483 NSC 24226 No naval blockade or airwar Closed. 5/5/61 against Cuba.

483 NSC 2422f Detailed study to be made Closed. 5/5/61 by CIA with other Departments Bissell memo to of possible weaknesses and Achilles vulnerabilities in elements 11/21/61 re: which control Cuba. "Situstion and Prospects in Cube by Sherman Kent 11/3/61.

HSC Action No. Substance Status 483 NSC 2422h No separate Cuben military Closed. 5/5/61 forces should be organized DEF recomended in U.S. Cuben natinels would to Pres.draft be encouraged enlist in US program be Armed Forces. terminsted 6/30/62 due to codest results.

483 NSC 24225 No inmediate trade embargo Closed, 5/5/61 on Cuba. with President's sction of 2/3/62 declering total embargo on trade with Cuba with exception medicine and food on humanitarian grounds.

483 NSC 24221 Allience for Progress to be Closed. 5/5/61 strengthened. Weekly report now from AID

ASAN 194 Policy Toward non-bloc Pending. 10/2/62 ships in Cuban trade (Action Action trans- US Government proposes to ferred to take with regard to EXCOM. shipping to Cuba.)

NASAN 100 Contingency Planning for Pending 10/3/61 Cuba. Action trans- ferred to Johnson channel.

CUBA NASAM 431 US Government must have ready Closed. 3/11/61 a White Paper on Cuba and be Paper prepared ready to give assistance to and translated: Cuban Patriots in similar "The Castro effort. Regime in Cuba" 9/61

CUBA NASAM #181 Eyes only Limited Distrib- Closed. 8/24/62 ution. Reporting to be through another channel and handled personally by Deputy USecy Johnson (understand this authorized response 90 certain pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMs thru Johnson channel)

NSC Action No. Substance Status CUBA NASAM 196 Establishment of NSC Executive Closed. 10/22/62 Committee

CUBA NASAM 208 Cuba Overflights. (This Report Submitted. 12/6/62 Presidential directive EYES ONLY approved an attached Guidelines for the Planning of Cuben Overflights, and requested CIA to come up with en estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on assumption it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other evailable means.)

CUBA NASAM 213 Interdepartmental Organization Closed. 1/8/63 of Cuban Affairs - wich responsibility vested in a Coordinator of Cuban affairs in Department of State.

TOP SECRET DEPARTMENT OF STATE January 24, 1963

:

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States: Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for considera- tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be con- sidered at the Friday meeting. They are "United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States" and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."

Attachments: William H. B As stated. Executive Secretariat Copy No.

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide- lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives SECRET -2-

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

  1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

  2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

  3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

  4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;

  5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino- Soviet Communist purposes;

  6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

SECRET SECRET -3- 7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

  1. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

  2. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

  3. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

SECRET SECRET -4-

actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

  1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infil- tration of propaganda materials: a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

SECRET SECRET -5-

  1. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

  2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

  3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders: a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc- Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port; c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

SECRET SECRET -6- d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

  1. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions: a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

SECRET SECRET -7- 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transportating embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

  1. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

  2. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

  3. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

  4. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

SECRET SECRET -8-

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily- trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

SECRET SECRET 8

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

SECRET

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a. m.)

FROM : Department of Defense Representative on the Inter- departmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its sub- versive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal 1. of Russian troops from Cuba.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

We should be in a position to respond with open military sup- port (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/ Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U. S.

Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological