198 10009 10099

198-10009-10099 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: 198-10009-10099 RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

Document Information ORIGINATOR: MULTIPLE FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 02/00/1963 PAGES: 153 SUBJECTS: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA1962 CUBAN SUBVERSION SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret RESTRICTIONS: IB CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/15/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in Cuba, etc.

JFK Review Department of the Army EO 13526 Declassify Exclude Exempt Authority Review Date 5/11/2015 By Kmen

22 CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II

NO. SUBJECT: DATE: 1. Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA Undated before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC 2. Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the 7 Jan 63 Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis 3. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte 11 Feb 63 4. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte 12 Feb 63 5. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte 13 Feb 63. :. 6. SecNav testimony before HASC 18. Feb 63 7. Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState 19 Feb 63 with attached statement by Mr. Martin before the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject of communist subversion of the hemisphere 8. SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I-A.M.) 19 Feb 63 9. SecNav testimony before HASC 19 Feb 63 10. Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell 20 Feb 63 D. Taylor, ChJCS 11. Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC 20 Feb 63 12. SecDef testimony before SASC 21 Feb 63 13. Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC 21 Feb 63 14. SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba) 22 Feb 63 15. Statement by the Dir CIA for use of the staff of the 26 Feb 63 Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator (Transmittal Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA) Slip) 16. Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent 13 March 63 Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Govern- ment Operations - U.S. Senate CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II (Cont'd)

NO. SUBJECT: DATE: 17. Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert 8 Mar 63 Subj: Cuba with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments 18. Study on Cuba as a Base for --------prepared by Bob Undated Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def 19. Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis 29 Mar 63 Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano w/draft of President's message atchd Sub 20. Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm Undtd on Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8) DATE MANSMITTAL SLIP 26 Feb 6

TO: Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance ROOM NO. BUILDING 3E985 Pentagon REMARKS:

FROM: CIA William A. Tidwell ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION Code143 6614 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO: 1957-0-439445 (47) WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET 35 286

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

OSA, ASG Control No.519 SECRET SECRET 25 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis- phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com- munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support takes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assist- ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab- otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup- port, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and special- ized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cu- ban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad- visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con- front regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had

SECRET to fight a pitched battle with regular military for- mations which might have required more advanced weap- ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain- ing revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu- ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri- ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Vene- zuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the pres- ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un- der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or- ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist- ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres- ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that

-2- SECRET / SECRET this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government build- ings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train- ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push- ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac- tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over- turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com- munists which have been repeated to us, have been in- sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic- aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first

-3- SECRET / SECRET eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade- craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa- ganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha- vana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. It may be worth noting that the postal and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the airport or in the post office and destroyed.

The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet, about two and a half by four inches, called "150 ques- tions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba, and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with 100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and in- cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as well as charts for calculating the force of various explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist- guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces in his homeland.

NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 10 -4- SECRET SECRET III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo- logical indoctrination or guerrilla warfare train- ing or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Vene- zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely at- tended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. (Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed. However, we know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist par- ties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao.

We derive some of our figures from travel con- trol points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the -5- SECRET ر SECRET Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross- checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not re- ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op- posite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjust- ments by the cross-checking information mentioned above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and train- ing in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961. An The basic training covers cross-country movement: of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna- tional Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into na- tional units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

-6- SECRET SECRET A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training in Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill out lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil- ities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup- ply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu- bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are in- variably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in several million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature con- tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in- structors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November.

IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous -7- SECRET SECRET sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weap- ons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Ar- gentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any de- termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by our agents in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary)) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug- gled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in- numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send

8- SECRET SECRET them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units, but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.

In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat- ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most ser- ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations.

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit- case. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter- mine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was cap- tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto- carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep- tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane to over- fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar- rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 15 -9- SECRET SECRET having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together with funds to support their activities. One item of $44,000 was publicized in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of pro- cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap- ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac- tivity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show- ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front- group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex- posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

The principle that guerrillas must be self-sus- taining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob- beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub- urb last year which netted almost $100,000. From the participants, who have been caught, we know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer- rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all -10- SECRET SECRET times, with regularly scheduled and special broad- casts to specific countries as well as general trans- missions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op- portunity for revolutionary action against the "cor- rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressive- ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called *Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out- let. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta- tion broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter- ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was in- augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first in- ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Haitian Creole to Haiti 7 hr

Arabic to the Mediterranean area 5 hr 15 min

English to Europe 9 hr 20 min

English to the Western Hemis- 17 hr 30 min phere French to Europe 9 hr 20 min

French to Canada 3 hr 20 min

French to Mediterranean 3 hr 30 min

Portuguese to Brazil 7 hr

Spanish to Europe 16 hr 55 min

Spanish to the Americas. 108 hr 30 min -11- SECRET SECRET In addition to the regularly scheduled inter- national service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advan- tage of unique political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off after about a week, but not before direc- tion finder bearings and other technical clues in- dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin Ameri- can countries so they can beam programs to their home- lands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re- public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are ex- emplified by the programs transmitted to the Domini- can Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re- public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Con- stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo. : There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles -12- SECRET SECRET southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob- viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos- cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be- tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy-- call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between var- ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de- liver the Latin American countries into the Commu- nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser- vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the set- ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the prob- lems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese -13- SECRET ==End of OCR for page 129==